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DeAR ReADeR,
The Magyar Nemzeti Bank attaches great importance to 
making central bank analyses on various current economic 
and financial trends of general interest available to the 
wider public. The October 2012 issue of the MNB Bulletin 
provides an overview of households’ perceptions about the 
security of the various payment methods; discusses the 
latest developments in the Federal Reserve’s monetary 
policy; presents the ‘early warning’ system designed for use 
in macroprudential regulation by the central bank; takes an 
account of developments in external borrowing by the 
individual sectors; and analyses the debates about fiscal 
adjustment within the European Union. In addition, the 
current issue contains a report on the 11th Macroeconomic 
Research Workshop hosted by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
jointly with the CEPR and, for the first time, features an 
interview with Fabio Canova, professor at European 
University Institute, Florence.
In their article, Éva Divéki and Dániel Listár review the 
results of a representative survey, which asked the 
Hungarian public for their opinion on the security of 
payment instruments. The survey found that the Hungarian 
public considers bank cards to be the most secure electronic 
payment instrument. The positive perception of the bank 
card comes directly after the perceived security of 
traditional payment instruments: the yellow cheque and 
cash. Nevertheless, one of the key findings of the survey is 
that the less intensive use of state-of-the-art electronic 
payment instruments is not due primarily to security 
reasons, though such concerns may play a certain role, 
particularly in the case of online payment instruments. The 
authors point out that confidence in the various payment 
instruments relates mainly to familiarity and use and that 
the majority of the population expect their own account 
keeping bank to convey information relating to payment 
instruments.
Dániel Felcser and Kristóf Lehmann discuss the latest 
developments in the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy. In 
the first stage of the crisis, the Fed rapidly embarked on 
interest rate cuts followed by several rounds of substantial 
quantitative easing. However, the marked monetary easing 
and the persistently low interest rates triggered mounting 
fears of inflation, calling into question the Fed’s commitment 
to medium-term price stability. In response to criticism and 
to the risks relating to monetary policy, in January 2012 the 
Fed announced an explicit inflation target of 2 per cent to 
exploit the fact that a numerical inflation target improves 
the transparency of the central bank, helps to anchor 
inflation expectations and fosters consensus about the 
definition of price stability among policymakers. With this 
move, the Fed added key elements of inflation targeting to 
its monetary strategy. The announcement confirmed that 
inflation targeting is becoming increasingly popular and 
may be an attractive and efficient monetary strategy, even 
for the largest central banks.
The new Hungarian Central Bank Act passed at the end of 
2011 delegated macroprudential regulatory powers to the 
MNB. This issue is discussed in detail in the article by Dániel 
Holló. The author argues that an effective macroprudential 
policy requires the use of analytical tools which make it 
possible to quantify the effects arriving via different 
systemic risk channels and regulatory instruments which 
can help in the management of systemic risks. Among the 
four analytical tools tuned to identify and measure systemic 
risk two are already in regular use at the MNB, a contagion 
model is currently under development and the ‘early 
warning’ system is about to be introduced. The article 
presents the fourth tool in the list. The ‘early warning’ 
system may help in the identification of periods characterised 
by excessive credit growth and the accumulation of critical 
imbalances on the banking sector’s assets and liabilities 
side as a result of excessive bank lending (excessive credit 
growth channel of systemic risk), and may serve as a point 
of reference for the timing of the introduction of measures 
named in the new MNB Act to reduce systemic risk (e.g. 
anti-cyclical capital buffer and other regulatory instruments 
designed to prevent excessive credit growth).
The article by Péter Koroknai and Rita Lénárt-Odorán 
examines developments in the external financing of the 
Hungarian economy from the perspective of external 
borrowing by individual sectors. During the crisis, domestic 
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demand fell and the previous high deficit on the balance of 
payments turned into surplus. This also means that, due to 
a rise in the savings of economic agents, Hungary no longer 
has to rely on external borrowing and net repayment of 
loans taken out earlier is underway, i.e. earlier borrowing is 
being followed by an outflow of funds. However, repayment 
of external funds is not occurring in each sector. On the one 
hand, the repayment of loans granted to the private sector 
triggered a sizeable outflow of funds from the banking 
system, while on the other hand, there was hardly any 
change in net external funds granted to the corporate 
sector; at the same time, the consolidated general 
government continues to borrow. The adjustment process, 
which started after the crisis, is likely to continue in the 
years to come, and this may lead to a further increase in 
the external surplus of the economy and an acceleration of 
outflows of foreign funds.
In his article, Zoltán Szalai analyses the debates on fiscal 
adjustment within the European Union. He argues that in 
response to increasing market pressure, EMU countries 
embarked on a robust consolidation process in 2010 in order 
to reduce their fiscal deficits and sovereign debt levels. 
Although the most heavily indebted countries − relying on 
external help in a number of cases − have been implementing 
aggressive adjustment programmes, their GDP-proportionate 
sovereign debt is unlikely to change or change very much 
this or next year. Consequently, a debate has evolved over 
the effectiveness of fiscal tightening. The article takes a 
brief overview of the debates about the success of crisis 
management in Europe and, within that, the effectiveness 
of fiscal consolidation.
The current issue of the MNB Bulletin contains a report on 
the 11th Macroeconomic Research Workshop held at the 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank jointly with the Centre for Economic 
Policy Research on 6−7 September 2012. The title of the 
workshop was ‘Microeconomic Behaviour and its 
Macroeconomic Implications During the Financial Crisis’. 
The subject is highly topical, as economic policymakers try 
to understand the impact of the financial crisis on different 
economic agents and tailor their response to it. The 
keynote speakers of the event were professors Christopher 
D. Carroll (Johns Hopkins University) and Matthew D. 
Shapiro (University of Michigan), who are renowned for their 
work which establishes the importance of agent 
heterogeneity and microeconomic behaviour for 
macroeconomic outcomes. The event brought together 
researchers from both the academia and policy-making 
institutions, who presented their thought-provoking 
research which both empirically documented the importance 
of agent heterogeneity, and attempted to theoretically 
model its aggregate implications in the corporate, housing, 
banking sectors and labour markets.
Finally, for the first time in the series, the current issue 
contains an interview with Fabio Canova, professor at the 
European University Institute, Florence. Professor Canova 
has held consultancy positions with the Bank of England, 
the European Central Bank, the Banca d'Italia, the Banco de 
España and the International Monetary Fund. He is also 
programme director of the Budapest School of Central Bank 
Studies at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. His main research 
areas include quantitative macroeconomics, monetary 
economics, time series analysis and forecast, international 
business cycles and the economic policy of growth. He has 
published over 70 articles in international journals and his 
graduate textbook, Methods for Applied Macroeconomic 
Research, was published by Princeton University Press in 
2007. Professor Canova has been ranked in the Econometrics 
and Applied Econometrics Hall of Fame and in the Top 100 
most productive economists. It is planned that future issues 
of the MNB Bulletin will feature interviews with famous 
economists.
The Editorial Board
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iNtRODuCtiON
The increased use of state-of-the-art cashless electronic 
payment instruments may be hindered by the public’s 
perception that they are not secure enough and by 
consumers’ lack of awareness of their rights, duties and 
options in the event of fraud. Media news and hearsay may 
also influence users of payment instruments and determine 
the attitude of potential users.
Therefore, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB, the central 
bank of Hungary) initiated a broad-based consumer survey 
to assess consumers’ specific security-related knowledge 
about various payment instruments (mainly electronic 
payment instruments) and to find out the attitudes of 
potential users to such instruments. One of the survey’s 
objectives was to determine the reasons for not using 
electronic payment instruments, and to determine 
whether security-related expectations featured among 
these.
In this study, we present a brief overview of the international 
literature of payment instruments, the issues raised and the 
conclusions that can be drawn. This is followed by a 
discussion of the survey’s methodology, and then the 
description of our main findings. We analyse the opinions of 
respondents on the security of the various electronic 
payment instruments, in particular payment cards 
(hereinafter: bank cards or cards) and online payment 
solutions as well as payment accounts (hereinafter: bank 
accounts). Furthermore, we elaborate on the relationship 
between awareness and use of the various payment 
instruments and their perceived security. In these sections, 
we also discuss data obtained from other data sources of 
the central bank, in particular official reporting of payment 
service providers (hereinafter: banks) that are relevant for 
our purposes. We also highlight differences between the 
findings of the survey and the data from other sources. We 
point out the security considerations that should be taken 
into account when using the various electronic payment 
instruments. Finally, we end with a summary of the key 
conclusions of the survey.
HOW DOeS tHe SeNSe OF SeCuRity 
AFFeCt tHe uSe OF PAyMeNt 
iNStRuMeNtS?
There is no consensus in the international literature on 
whether consumers’ perception of security affects the 
choice between payment instruments, and if so, how and to 
what extent. Until now, no study had investigated these 
issues in detail in Hungary.
Éva Divéki and Dániel listár: Better safe than 
sorry: views of the Hungarian public on the 
security of payment instruments
Our survey found that the Hungarian public considers bank cards to be the most secure electronic payment instrument. 
The positive perception of the bank card ranks immediately behind the perceived security of traditional payment 
instruments: the yellow cheque and cash. Nevertheless, one of the key findings of our article is that the less intensive use 
of state-of-the-art electronic payment instruments is not due primarily to security reasons, although such concerns may 
play a certain role, particularly in the case of online payment instruments. The sense of security in payment instruments 
relates mainly to familiarity and use. That is, consumers consider payment instruments they know and use to be safe, 
while lesser known and little used ones are perceived as less secure. Consequently, the use of cashless electronic payment 
instruments can be intensified mostly through the dissemination of information, which will elevate the sense of security 
in consumers as well. The majority of the population expects their own account keeping bank to convey information 
relating to payment instruments.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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In their theoretical model, Bolt and Chakravorti (2008) 
contrast the cost of the loss of cash (e.g. robbery) with the 
cost of bank cards, which are considered much safer, and 
they conclude: from the aspect of consumers, the probability 
of the loss of cash determines the optimum level of bank 
card fees.
Yin and DeVaney (2001) use empirical methods to analyse in 
detail the relationship between consumers’ sense of 
security and the choice between payment instruments, but 
they find no empirical evidence that consumers who 
consider security more important would be more inclined to 
choose (debit) cards over cash. Schuh and Stavins (2009) 
rely on the data of a consumer survey on the choice 
between payment instruments and use an econometric 
model to conclude that safety orientation has only a limited 
role in consumer decisions.
Cheney (2006) arrives at a different conclusion; drawing on 
the results of a survey explained in a workshop she claims 
that for consumers, security and convenience are the two 
most important factors when choosing between payment 
instruments. Several surveys conducted in the US 
(Eisenstein, 2008; Federal Trade Commission, 2007; Unisys, 
2009) conclude that Americans claim to be concerned about 
the safety of payment instruments and potential fraud, and 
this concern is stronger than fears of terrorism, personal 
safety and various viruses.
The study by Kosse (2012) relies on daily transaction data 
and newspaper articles on the subject to examine the 
effects of newspaper articles about bank card fraud on 
bank card usage. The author concludes that the effect is 
small and short term compared to other factors; still, he 
thinks that the impact on the efficiency of low-value 
payments must not be underestimated.
Regarding Hungary, the study looking at the payment habits 
of Hungarian households (Takács, 2011) establishes that more 
intensive usage of electronic channels is now a possibility, 
instead of the heavily cash-oriented Hungarian payment 
methods, so that the majority of households could execute 
their payment transactions more efficiently. Despite this, 
four fifths of typical retail transactions occur in cash.
In light of the above, it is worth considering the role which 
the perception of the various payment instruments, in 
particular the sense of security, plays in the decisions of 
the Hungarian public in addition to the other factors 
identified in literature (see Chart 1).
The sense of security is the consumer’s subjective 
perception of the level of his concern about suffering a 
(financial) loss when using various payment instruments. 
One element of this is whether the consumer is concerned 
that he will not receive the product or service, the other 
element is the fear of falling victim to some kind of fraud 
when using the payment instrument. A high degree of a 
sense of security means that the consumer has no concerns 
relating to the payment instruments and is not afraid of 
suffering any (financial) loss by using the payment 
instrument; a low sense of security means the opposite. As 
the sense of security is a subjective judgement, it is 
irrelevant which payment instrument experts consider the 
most secure at the current level of technology.
tHe FRAMeWORK OF tHe CONSuMeR 
SuRvey
The consumer survey was conducted in the spring of 2012 
by GfK Hungária Kft. on behalf of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
The sample of one thousand interviewees is representative 
of the Hungarian population aged 15−69, in terms of gender, 
age, type of settlement and region. The methodology and 
the summary of the responses to questions is attached in 
the Appendix; the body of the article contains the analyses 
and calculations based on the detailed responses as well as 
other information related to the subject.
Chart 1
Major factors of choice among payment instruments
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experience 
and knowledge
individual
consumer
attitude
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OPiNiONS OF ReSPONDeNtS ON tHe 
SeCuRity OF PAyMeNt iNStRuMeNtS
The first important question relating to the outcome of our 
survey is how secure respondents consider the various 
electronic payment instruments and to what extent that 
subjective perception corresponds to reality. To this end, 
we compare below the responses to the questionnaire with 
the fraud statistics available to the MNB. In the analysis, we 
first focus on the security of bank cards as the best known 
and most widely used electronic payment instrument and 
then turn our attention to online payments.
Fraud events relating to electronic transactions
Interviewees reported few actual losses relating to 
electronic payments, but the MNB statistics show that the 
real value is an order of magnitude smaller than the 
responses would have us believe.
Compared to the total number of payment transactions, the 
annual ratio of fraud events relating to bank cards, online 
banking, telebanking and mobile banking was very low, at 
around 0.003 per cent in the period examined (between 
2007 and 2011). Thus, according to the statistical data, 
electronic payments are very safe.
Nevertheless, 6 per cent of the participants claimed that 
they or an familiarity of theirs had suffered financial losses 
in connection with bank card usage. The ratio is 3 per cent 
for online credit transfers and 1 per cent for other 
electronic payment options. Even though the fraud ratios 
calculated from the MNB data are not fully comparable with 
the charts from the survey (which also has an error margin), 
on the whole we can conclude that the subjective sense of 
security of the population is somewhat worse than the real 
situation.
This may be attributable to the following factors:
•  the questions asked (‘Have you or a personal familiarity 
of yours suffered a financial loss while using the following 
payment instruments?’) had no time horizon;
•  the range of fraud perceived by the public is wider than 
the coverage of the MNB data collection;
•  in general, people have an exaggerated view of fraud, 
which may be partly due to the negative information 
published in the press and various online media.
Safety of bank card usage
64 per cent of respondents feel that bank cards are very 
safe or fairly safe payment instruments. Only 7 per cent 
think that bank cards are not at all safe or rather unsafe.
In respect of bank card transactions (see Chart 2), 
respondents considered that cash withdrawal from ATMs is 
the safest (on a scale of 5, the average is 3.78), followed by 
purchases in Hungary and abroad (no difference between 
the two, at 3.50). They deem that contactless payment is 
the least safe (2.54), preceded by online use and cash 
withdrawal abroad (2.7).
 
Chart 2
Perception of the security of various forms of bank 
card payments, on a scale of one to five
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The statistics collected by the MNB indicate that fraud 
relating to cash withdrawal from ATMs and purchases using 
bank cards has declined significantly in recent years (see 
Chart 3). While fraud related to cash withdrawal from ATMs 
used to be more common than fraud relating to purchases 
up to 2010, the situation had reversed by 2011.
Only one third of cardholders (33 per cent) think that chip 
cards are safer than magnetic stripe cards even though chip 
technology was introduced on bank cards for considerations 
of safety. As a result, the number of fraud events declined, 
as evidenced by statistics.1 Every third cardholder considers 
both solutions safe (35 per cent), while 8 per cent think that 
magnetic stripe cards are safer (see Chart 4).
Almost every second cardholder thinks that the use of the 
PIN is safer than signature, but 28 per cent consider both to 
1 This issue is discussed in detail in section 2.2.1 of the MNB publication ‘Report on Payment Systems 2012’.
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be equally safe (see Chart 5). In reality, the use of the PIN 
is safer than signatures.
Every cardholder agreement provides that if the cardholder 
becomes aware of transactions indicative of unauthorised 
card use (for instance from a text message from its bank 
or an entry in the bank statement), or his card or the PIN 
has been lost or stolen, he must notify the issuer without 
delay.
If the lost or stolen bank card is used without authorisation, 
any loss incurred before such notification is borne by the 
cardholder up to HUF 45,000 (assuming that the loss was 
not the result of the intentional conduct or gross negligence 
of the cardholder); any additional loss is borne by the 
issuing bank. Any loss incurred after notification must be 
borne by the issuing bank.
None of the respondents was aware of this ‘forty-five 
thousand rule’. Only 7 per cent of the public (one tenth of 
cardholders) knew that the loss is shared by the bank and 
the cardholder and that there is a cap on the loss to the 
customer. In view of this, it is a positive aspect that 96 per 
cent of cardholders would report any suspicion of bank card 
fraud as soon as possible, and 90 per cent of them would 
notify their issuing bank.
In any event, banks have considerable responsibility relating 
to the security of payment instruments as 76 per cent of the 
respondents expect their own account keeping bank to 
inform them about security issues too.
Chart 3
Number of bank card related fraud events
0
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Source: MNB.
Chart 5
Perceived security of PiN and signature secured bank 
cards among cardholders
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Source: MNB.
Chart 4
Perceived security of chip cards and magnetic stripe 
cards among cardholders
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Source: MNB.
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One lesson from the focus groups was that knowledge 
transfer and personal example stimulate usage. That is, if 
consumers use the various payment instruments, they have 
information and practical experience about them and they 
exchange these with their peers, the use of such solutions 
will be more intensive − this is true not only for bank cards 
but for other electronic payment instruments as well.
Security of online payment instruments
Of the survey participants, 65 per cent claimed to have 
internet access (this result is broadly similar to the findings 
of other similar surveys2). The ratio of persons using the 
internet for payments is much smaller: online credit 
transfers are used by 19 per cent of respondents, online 
purchases with electronic payments by 11 per cent, and 
internet purchases with cash payments by 21 per cent.
For purchases made on the internet, cash arrangements 
(e.g. cash on delivery) are considered to safest, with a score 
of 4.18 on a scale of 1-5. For internet purchases, credit 
transfers (3.89) and online bank card usage (3.86) are 
deemed to be safer than average. Payment via PayPal or 
Skrill (Moneybookers)3 is considered to be the least safe 
(3.18 − average safety), (see Chart 6).
It is also important to find out what confirmation respondents 
consider reassuring when making purchases via the internet. 
More or less the same types of confirmation are considered 
Chart 6
Security of payment instruments for purchases on 
the internet, on a scale of five
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Chart 7
Security features considered satisfactory for internet banking and online purchases
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Source: MNB.
2 http://www.internetworldstats.com/eu/hu.htm
3 PayPal and Skrill (Moneybookers) are payment systems facilitating online credit transfer from accounts opened with them.
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satisfactory when using internet banking or making internet 
purchases. More than half of the respondents consider 
confirmation through text messages (SMS) adequate, while 
every fourth or fifth persons favours internet codes or 
passwords. Less than 10 per cent each mentioned e-mails or 
phone calls.
It is also important what persons making online payments 
do for the security of the computer they use. Only 14 per 
cent of interviewees admitted to doing nothing for security. 
Others (53 per cent) mentioned the use of security software 
(e.g. firewall, antivirus software), or the fact that they 
would not use computers in public places (e.g. internet 
cafés) for such purposes (45 per cent).
RelAtiONSHiP BetWeeN tHe 
FAMiliARity AND uSe OF PAyMeNt 
iNStRuMeNtS AND tHeiR PeRCeiveD 
SeCuRity
One objective of our analysis was to find out if there is any 
relationship between the awareness and usage of various 
payment instruments and their security, if there is, in what 
direction and what role the sense of security plays in 
consumer decisions when choosing between payment 
instruments.
Relationship between the familiarity of payment 
instruments and their perceived security
Based on the indicator measuring the familiarity of payment 
instruments (spontaneous recall, or marked ‘very well 
known’ from a list), the best known payment instrument is 
cash (100 per cent), followed by the postal inpayment 
money order − generally known as the ‘yellow cheque’ − (90 
per cent) and bank cards (78 per cent), while other 
instruments of payments are much less known. It should be 
noted that core direct debit (32 per cent) and online credit 
transfer (26 per cent) have a considerably higher profile 
than paper-based credit transfer (13 per cent), which may 
indicate that even if slowly, more modern payment 
instruments are increasingly recognised.
There is close interdependence between the familiarity of 
a payment instrument and its perceived security. The more 
respondents are acquainted with a payment method, the 
safer they consider it to be and vice versa.
Relationship between the usage of various 
payment instruments and their perceived 
security
The ratio of use of the various payment instruments is very 
similar to the familiarity ratios discussed above. Of the 
respondents, 97 per cent use cash at least once a year, 87 
per cent use yellow cheques and 67 per cent bank cards, 
while the use rate of other payment instruments is much 
lower. It is worth noting that the use of core direct debit (31 
per cent) and online credit transfer (19 per cent) is higher 
than that of printed paper-based credit transfer (13 per 
cent).
There is also close interdependence between the use of a 
payment instrument and its perceived security. The more 
respondents use the payment instrument, the safer they 
consider it to be and vice versa (see Chart 9).
In summary: there is close interdependence between the 
familiarity and use of various payment instruments and 
their perceived security. The next step is to establish the 
direction of the dependence: is the non-use of certain 
Chart 8
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payment instruments attributable primarily to security 
concerns or to other factors.
Factors hindering the wide-spread use of 
payment instruments
It is worth examining why some respondents have no bank 
accounts, as the existence of a bank account is a kind of 
‘entrance ticket’ to state-of-the-art electronic payment 
instruments.
Our survey revealed that 76 per cent of the respondents 
have bank accounts. It is mostly due to financial 
considerations that some people do not use bank accounts. 
39 per cent of persons without bank accounts claimed that 
they did not need one as they spend all their money and are 
unable to save. The main demographic characteristics of 
persons without bank accounts: average age of 40 years, 
not employed4 (76 per cent), highest school qualification 
not exceeding secondary school (99 per cent), low net 
income of HUF 0-60,000 (61 per cent), live in villages or 
small towns (72 per cent). A high percentage, 24 per cent 
responded that they received their income in cash. Only 6 
per cent answered that they did not open a bank account 
because they consider it unsafe.
The non-use of internet banking (also known as e-banking) 
is mostly due to reasons other than security concerns. 
Respondents do not use e-banking because they prefer to 
do their banking in person because they ‘receive a piece of 
paper’ about the transaction (32 per cent) or they can 
discuss their banking issues (27 per cent). Clear-cut security 
concerns were only cited by 15 per cent of respondents. If 
we add to this the essentially similar statement ‘I fear that 
unauthorised persons may have access to my bank account’, 
we find that the ratio of persons who selected at least one 
of the security concerns is 23 per cent on aggregate, but 
still lower than the causes mentioned in first and second 
place.
In the group that uses the internet for making purchases 
but does not choose modern electronic payment 
instruments but rather settles payment with cash on 
delivery, an outstanding 62 per cent responded that 
‘because I am sure to receive the goods, I only pay when 
the product is delivered’. This shows mistrust in the 
merchant rather than concern about the payment 
instrument. Thus, the increased use of electronic payments 
for purchases through the internet cannot be expected to 
occur automatically. A solution to this problem could be an 
Chart 9
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Chart 10
Causes of non-use of bank account
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4 Unemployed, housewife, child care benefit recipient, pensioner or student.
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arrangement where the couriers delivering the products 
had mobile POS devices that would facilitate bank card 
payment upon receipt of the goods. Among the reasons for 
reluctance to use electronic payment for internet 
purchases, the ratio of security concerns is 11 per cent. If 
we add the responses of those who fear that the vendor 
would obtain bank card information, the two considerations 
together make up only 15 per cent.
CONCluSiONS
One of the main conclusions of the analysis is that the less 
intensive use of modern, electronic payment instruments is 
primarily not due to security concerns. The sense of 
security relating to payment instruments relates mostly to 
familiarity, and concerns about the security of payment 
instruments tend to arise from lack of information. That is, 
consumers consider the solutions they know and use to be 
safer while the lesser known and little used ones are 
perceived as less secure. Consequently, the use of cashless 
electronic payment instruments can be intensified primarily 
through the dissemination of relevant information, which 
will elevate the sense of security in consumers as well.
As to the payment related knowledge of the population, 
there is room for improvement, which places considerable 
responsibility on the experts and institutions working in the 
area of payments. The survey highlighted that the majority 
of the population expects their own account keeping bank 
to convey information related to payment instruments.
Another conclusion of the survey is that personal example 
and the effect of opinion leaders encourages use. That is, if 
consumers use the various payment instruments, they have 
knowledge and practical experience about them and they 
exchange these with their peers, the use of such solutions 
will be more intensive.
The use of cashless electronic payment instruments can be 
intensified if we make people better informed, including 
information about security, and if their use is linked with 
some personal benefit.
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Reasons for reluctance to use electronic payment for 
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APPeNDix
SuRvey MetHODOlOgy, DetAilS OF All tHe ReSPONSeS tO tHe queStiONS
•  The survey was conducted by GfK Hungária Kft. on behalf of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, using computer-assisted personal 
interviewing (CAPI) in the framework of the regular omnibus survey.
•  Sample size: 1000 interviews.
•  The sample is representative of the Hungarian population aged 15−69 in terms of gender, age, type of settlement and 
region.
•  The interviews were conducted between 16 and 25 April 2012.
•  The focus group interviews were conducted on 26 March 2012 in two target groups of 8 persons each (aged 25−45 and 
45−59, respectively).
Which of the following payment instruments have you heard of, and how acquainted are you with 
them?  
(n = 1000, multiple answers allowed)
unaided recall
Knows this 
payment method 
very well
Has some 
knowledge of this 
payment method
Has heard the 
name of this 
payment method
Never heard of it
Cash 97% 3% 0% 0% 0%
Bank card 70% 8% 10% 12% 1%
Yellow cheque 60% 30% 7% 3% 0%
Online credit transfer 20% 6% 13% 48% 13%
Core direct debit 18% 14% 19% 37% 12%
Online purchase with cash payment 
(e.g. cash on delivery, postal 
payment) 7% 10% 20% 49% 14%
Online purchase with electronic 
payment 7% 6% 15% 51% 21%
Paper based credit transfer 7% 6% 15% 40% 31%
Fund transfer by telebank 3% 2% 11% 52% 32%
Mobile transfer from bank account 3% 2% 10% 51% 34%
Mobile payment from the pre-paid 
balance or settled on the phone bill 2% 3% 11% 50% 33%
Electronic bill presentment and 
payment 1% 4% 9% 41% 45%
Which of the following online payment instruments have you heard of, and how acquainted are you 
with them?  
(n=1000, multiple answers allowed)
unaided recall 
Knows this 
payment method 
very well
Has some 
knowledge of this 
payment method
Has heard the 
name of this 
payment method
Never heard of it
Cash (cash on delivery) 69% 8% 8% 12% 3%
Bank credit transfer 57% 5% 11% 22% 5%
Bank card 47% 9% 11% 26% 8%
PayPal or Skrill 
(Moneybookers) 8% 0% 3% 16% 73%
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How often do you use the following payment instruments or solutions in your day-to-day life?  
(n = 1000)
Daily
More than 
three times a 
month
up to three 
times a month
A few times a 
year
Does not use it 
at all
Never heard of 
it
Cash 72% 22% 2% 1% 2% 0%
Bank card 8% 31% 20% 8% 34% 1%
Yellow cheque 2% 42% 37% 6% 12% 0%
Core direct debit 1% 8% 18% 4% 58% 12%
Online credit transfer 0% 4% 6% 9% 67% 13%
Paper based credit transfer 0% 1% 4% 8% 56% 31%
Online purchase with cash 
payment (e.g. cash on delivery, 
postal payment ) 0% 1% 3% 17% 64% 14%
Online purchase with electronic 
payment 0% 1% 2% 8% 68% 21%
Electronic bill presentment and 
payment 0% 1% 2% 2% 50% 45%
Mobile payment from the pre-
paid balance or settled on the 
phone bill 0% 0% 1% 3% 63% 33%
Mobile transfer from bank 
account 0% 0% 1% 3% 62% 34%
Fund transfer by telebank 0% 0% 1% 2% 65% 32%
Which of the following devices or instruments do you have?  
(n = 1000)
yes No
Mobile phone 89% 11%
Bank account 76% 24%
Bank card 72% 28%
Internet access (uses the Internet) 65% 35%
How often do you do banking through the following channels? 
(n = 760, those who have bank accounts)
Daily
More than three 
times a month
up to three 
times a month
A few times a 
year
Does not use it at 
all
Online
(‘Internet bank’, ‘e-bank’) 1% 7% 11% 9% 72%
Personally in the bank 0% 4% 19% 64% 13%
Over the phone, with a bank clerk 
(‘telebank’, ‘call centre’) 0% 1% 5% 17% 77%
Mobile phone application on the 
mobile phone display (‘mobile bank’) 0% 1% 2% 5% 93%
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For which of the following purposes do you use your bank card and how often?  
(n = 719, those who have a bank card)
Daily
More than three 
times a month
up to three 
times a month
A few times a 
year
Does not use it 
at all
Purchases in Hungary 8% 34% 22% 15% 22%
Online use 2% 4% 4% 11% 79%
Cash withdrawal from ATM in Hungary 0% 21% 64% 9% 5%
Cash deposit at ATM 0% 3% 5% 5% 87%
Contactless payment 0% 1% 1% 2% 96%
Purchases abroad 0% 1% 1% 9% 90%
Cash withdrawal abroad 0% 0% 0% 7% 92%
How do you use your bank card to withdraw cash?  
(n = 682, those who use their bank card for cash withdrawal)
I aim for free withdrawal, but I withdraw cash more often if I need it 43%
As often as withdrawal is free 30%
Frequently, I withdraw cash any time I need it 26%
DK/AR* 1%
* Unable or unwilling to answer (doesn’t know/answer refused).
How do you use your bank card to make purchases?  
(n = 576, those who use their bank card for purchases)
If I have enough cash on me, I prefer to pay cash 49%
I prefer to use a bank card if possible 34%
Up to a certain amount I prefer cash, for higher sums, bank card 16%
What is that amount? Average: HUF 15,232
Median: HUF 10,000
DK/AR 1%
How often do you use the following payment instruments for online purchases?  
(n = 241, those who purchase on the internet)
Daily
More than three 
times a month
up to three times 
a month
A few times a 
year
Does not use it at 
all
Cash (cash on delivery) 9% 9% 7% 58% 17%
Bank card 2% 14% 11% 20% 52%
Credit transfer 0% 8% 15% 31% 46%
PayPal or Skrill (Moneybookers) 0% 1% 2% 16% 80%
MNB BulletiN • OctOBer 2012 19
BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY: VIEWS OF THE HUNGARIAN PUBLIC ON THE SECURITY OF PAYMENT...
How often do you use mobile payment for the following purposes?  
(n = 40, those who use mobile payment)*
Daily
More than three 
times a month
up to three times 
a month
A few times a 
year
Does not use it at 
all
Purchase of other goods and services 2% 5% 4% 30% 59%
Highway toll, parking 0% 7% 4% 48% 40%
SMS voting (premium SMS service) 0% 0% 2% 21% 77%
Mobile phone related purchases  
(ring tone, logo) 0% 0% 0% 21% 79%
* Indicative information due to the small sample size.
Why do you not have a bank account?  
(n = 246, those who have no bank account; multiple answers allowed)
I have no need for it because I cannot save. 39%
I receive my income and benefits in cash, so I get by without a bank account. 24%
I dislike banks. 17%
My money is no one else’s business. 16%
Cash is accepted everywhere. 13%
It’s too expensive to maintain a bank account. 12%
Cash is ‘free’. 10%
Too complicated. 7%
Unsafe. 6%
I would not know how much money exactly I have. 0%
DK/AR 2%
Why don’t you use your bank card for purchases?  
(n = 143, those who do not use their bank cards for making purchases, multiple answers allowed)
I consider it unsafe. 32%
I do not have enough money on it. 22%
Payment with a card is too slow. 19%
I do not know how much money I can spend. 14%
It’s complicated to use, I don’t know how to use it. 11%
I cannot remember so many codes/identifiers. 3%
I did not know that you could pay with it. 0%
Other* 11%
DK/AR 9%
* Typically: I prefer cash.
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Why don’t you use the telebank (call centre) to manage your account?  
(n = 580, those who do not use telebank, multiple answers allowed)
I prefer to deal with the bank in person. 39%
I do not like making phone calls. 24%
I don’t know how. 17%
It’s complicated. 16%
I prefer internet banking. 13%
I consider it unsafe. 9%
I have no need for it. 3%
I tried it, but I had bad experiences. 2%
I cannot remember my password and various ID codes. 2%
I don’t have a telephone. 1%
I prefer mobile banking. 1%
Other 2%
DK/AR 5%
Why don’t you use the internet bank (e-bank) to manage your account?  
(n = 330, those who use the internet but not the internet bank, multiple answers allowed)
I prefer to deal with the bank in person because at the bank I get a piece of paper about the transaction I initiated. 32%
I prefer to deal with the bank in person because I can discuss my banking questions with the clerk. 27%
I consider it unsafe. 15%
It’s complicated. 11%
I don’t know how to use it. 10%
I’m afraid that unauthorised persons would gain access to my bank account. 10%
I have no need for it. 4%
I cannot remember my password and various ID codes. 3%
I tried it, but I had bad experiences. 1%
Other 1%
DK/AR 7%
Why don’t you use the mobile bank to manage your account?  
(n = 656, those who do not use mobile banking, multiple answers allowed)
I prefer to deal with the bank in person. 39%
I consider it unsafe. 24%
I prefer internet banking (e-banking). 17%
I don’t know how. 16%
It’s complicated. 13%
The telephone display is too small. 4%
I have no need for it. 2%
I tried it, but I had bad experiences. 1%
Other 2%
DK/AR 4%
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Why do you pay in cash when making purchases through the internet?  
(n = 199, those who pay cash for online purchases, multiple answers allowed)
Because I am sure to receive the goods (I pay only when the product is delivered). 62%
This is the only way payment is accepted, I have no choice. 24%
I consider non-cash payment instruments to be unsafe. 11%
I have no bank account. 5%
I fear that the seller would obtain my bank card information. 4%
I have no PayPal (or similar) ‘account’. 3%
I have no bank card. 3%
Other 2%
DK/AR 6%
Why don’t you use core direct debit for payment?  
(n = 579, those who have heard of core direct debit but are not using it, multiple answers allowed)
I use the yellow cheque to pay whenever I want. 50%
I do not see the invoice in advance, so I cannot verify the amount. 20%
I’m afraid that the payee (company) will debit my account by more than they are owed. 12%
I do not want them to have access to my bank account. 9%
I am not the one responsible for these things. 6%
I do not know the details of this payment solution. 5%
I have no bank account. 4%
I receive yellow cheques, but I make the transfer through the internet rather than paying in the post office. 3%
I have given a mandate for core direct debit, but eventually my account was not debited, I did not investigate why. 1%
I receive bills electronically and pay using one of the options offered there. 0%
Other 3%
DK/AR 7%
For core direct debits, do you set a limit above which you bank refuses the direct debit?  
(n = 298, those who use core direct debit)
Yes 42%
No 51%
DK/AR 7%
Do you know that the settlement of core direct debit can be blocked?  
(n = 1000)
Yes 36%
No 64%
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By which date can you block the payment if you see from the bill that the payee wants to debit more 
than the legitimate amount?  
(n = 360, those who know about the possibility of blocking)
By the end of the day preceding settlement 42%
Other 5%
DK/AR 53%
What is the maximum amount that you consider it safe...  
(n = 1000)
Average 
(among those 
who stated a 
sum)
Median 
(among those 
who stated a 
sum)
Any amount DK/AR
No amount 
(HuF 0)
Average 
(among those 
who stated a 
sum other 
than 0)
Median 
(among those 
who stated a 
sum other 
than 0)
...to use a bank card for 
purchases? HUF 39,171 HUF 20,000 45% 29% 3% HUF 44,649 HUF 20,000
...to pay through paper 
based credit transfer? HUF 41,163 HUF 10,000 40% 46% 5% HUF 66,608 HUF 20,000
...to use a bank card for 
cash withdrawal? HUF 55,452 HUF 50,000 32% 24% 2% HUF 57,785 HUF 50,000
…to use core direct debit for 
payment? HUF 27,640 HUF 15,000 31% 45% 7% HUF 40,231 HUF 20,000
...to transfer funds though 
an internet bank? HUF 21,337 HUF 0 29% 51% 10% HUF 43,333 HUF 20,000
...to carry cash on you? HUF 16,199 HUF 10,000 18% 14% 1% HUF 16,474 HUF 10,000
...to use bank cards for 
online purchases? HUF 12,607 HUF 0 18% 54% 15% HUF 27,905 HUF 12,500
...to pay online for products 
or services purchased 
through the internet? HUF 17,238 HUF 1,000 17% 52% 15% HUF 33,247 HUF 10,000
...to pay using a mobile 
phone? HUF 3,820 HUF 0 11% 62% 14% HUF 8,095 HUF 5,000
How secure do you consider the following payment instruments or solutions?  
(n = 1000)
Average  
(on a scale 
of 5)
very safe  
(5)
Fairly safe 
(4)
Medium safe 
(3)
Rather 
unsafe  
(2)
very unsafe 
(1)
DK/AR
Never heard 
of the 
payment 
method
Yellow cheque 4.46 56% 34% 6% 1% 1% 2% 0%
Cash 4.35 52% 33% 12% 1% 1% 2% 0%
Bank card 3.85 24% 40% 21% 4% 3% 7% 1%
Paper based credit 
transfer 3.63 15% 22% 12% 5% 5% 10% 31%
Core direct debit 3.46 15% 25% 23% 6% 7% 12% 12%
Online credit 
transfer 3.01 9% 19% 21% 12% 12% 15% 13%
Mobile transfer 
from bank account 2.64 2% 10% 19% 11% 11% 14% 34%
Fund transfer by 
telebank 2.63 2% 11% 18% 14% 11% 13% 32%
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How secure do you consider the following bank card based payment instruments or solutions?  
(n = 1000)
Average  
(on a scale 
of 5)
very safe 
(5)
Fairly safe 
(4)
Medium 
safe  
(3)
Rather 
unsafe  
(2)
very unsafe 
(1)
DK/AR
Never heard 
of payment 
with bank 
card
Cash withdrawal from 
ATM 3.78 19% 42% 24% 3% 3% 8% 1%
Purchases in Hungary 
(POS terminal) 3.50 15% 30% 22% 6% 7% 19% 1%
Purchases abroad 3.50 15% 30% 22% 6% 7% 19% 1%
Cash deposit at ATM 2.96 8% 18% 22% 11% 13% 27% 1%
Cash withdrawal 
abroad 2.71 6% 15% 20% 14% 17% 28% 1%
Online use 2.71 5% 16% 23% 16% 16% 23% 1%
Contactless payment 2.54 4% 10% 14% 12% 16% 43% 1%
How secure do you consider the following online payment instruments or solutions?  
(n=1000)
Average  
(on a scale 
of 5)
very safe 
(5)
Fairly safe 
(4)
Medium safe 
(3)
Rather 
unsafe  
(2)
very unsafe 
(1)
DK/AR
Never heard 
of the 
payment 
method
Cash (cash on 
delivery) 4.18 36% 41% 14% 1% 1% 3% 3%
Credit transfer 3.89 23% 41% 18% 3% 3% 7% 5%
Bank card 3.86 20% 41% 20% 3% 2% 5% 8%
Paypal or Skrill 
(Moneybookers) 3.18 2% 5% 6% 2% 2% 10% 73%
Have you or a personal familiarity of yours suffered a financial loss while using the following payment 
instruments? Have you heard that anyone has suffered a financial loss...  
(n = 1000)
yes, i have 
suffered a loss
yes, an 
acquaintance 
has suffered a 
loss
i have heard 
of this, but 
know of no 
specific 
incidents
No
Never heard 
of the 
payment 
method
...using cash? 3% 5% 19% 73% 0%
...using bank cards? 1% 5% 29% 65% 1%
…using core direct debit? 1% 4% 16% 67% 12%
...using online credit transfer? 0% 3% 18% 66% 13%
...using electronic payment for online purchases 
through the internet? 0% 2% 17% 60% 21%
...using cash payment for online purchases through 
the internet? (e.g. cash on delivery, postal payment) 0% 2% 15% 68% 14%
…using yellow cheques? 0% 2% 13% 84% 0%
...using mobile banking, when payment is made from 
the pre-paid balance or settled on the phone bill? 0% 1% 12% 53% 33%
...using telephone credit transfer? 0% 1% 11% 56% 32%
...using mobile banking to the debit of a bank 
account? 0% 1% 11% 54% 34%
...using paper based credit transfer on a printed form? 0% 0% 8% 60% 31%
...using electronic bill presentment and payment? 0% 0% 8% 46% 45%
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What would you consider to be a safe, reassuring confirmation in the course of the following online 
activities?  
(n = 314, those who use the internet for banking or purchases)
SMS e-mail Phone call
internet code, 
password
DK/AR
When using internet banking 56% 7% 5% 25% 7%
When making online purchases 53% 8% 8% 22% 9%
What is your most important expectation from the selected payment method when you next 
encounter a purchasing/payment situation and you choose between payment alternatives?  
(n = 1000)
Speed Convenience
Security  
(no possibility of 
fraud)
Reclaimability
low cost  
(of payment)
For low-value purchases or 
payments (up to HUF 1000) 44% 14% 27% 5% 11%
For medium-value purchases or 
payments (up to HUF 10,000) 25% 20% 42% 5% 8%
For high-value purchases or 
payments (over HUF 10,000) 13% 12% 60% 7% 8%
For settling utility bills 13% 14% 52% 10% 12%
When making online payments or using internet banking, what measures do you take for the safety of 
your computer and data?  
(n = 314, those who use internet banking or online purchases, multiple answers allowed)
Uses security software (e.g. firewall, antivirus software, etc.). 53%
Do not use computers in public places (e.g. internet cafés) for such purposes. 45%
None 14%
Other 1%
DK/AR 8%
What do you watch out for when using AtMs?  
(n = 687, those who use their cards in AtMs, multiple answers allowed)
The safety of the neighbourhood 57%
Persons nearby 43%
Only uses it in the daytime 35%
Condition of the ATM 25%
Only uses it in a bank (within the building) 22%
Never uses it in busy locations 10%
None of these 8%
Never uses it in the street, outdoors 6%
DK/AR 1%
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From among bank cards, which solution do you consider to be safer?  
(n = 719, those who have bank cards)
Chip cards are safer. 33%
Magnetic stripe cards are safer. 8%
Both are equally safe. 35%
DK/AR 24%
When using bank cards for payment, which solution do you consider to be safer?  
(n = 719, those who have bank cards)
The PIN is safer. 48%
Signature is safer. 10%
Both are equally safe. 28%
DK/AR 14%
if you must enter a PiN when making a purchase, what do you watch out for?  
(n = 719, those who have bank cards)
I try to conceal my hand so that it is not visible. 70%
I would try to conceal it, but it is impossible. 11%
I ask the cashier to look away. 1%
Nothing 13%
Other 2%
DK/AR 3%
As far as you know, to whom can you disclose the PiN of your bank card?  
(n = 719, those who have bank cards, multiple answers allowed)
No one 58%
Family members 36%
The bank 4%
The police or other official bodies 2%
Friends, acquaintances 1%
DK/AR 3%
As far as you know, to whom can you give your bank card when making purchases?  
(n = 719, those who have bank cards, multiple answers allowed)
Any cashier, but only if you can clearly see all the time what s/he is doing with the card. 57%
No one 34%
Any cashier without any restriction 9%
DK/AR 1%
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As far as you know, to whom can you give you bank card for their use?  
(n = 719, those who have bank cards, multiple answers allowed)
No one 59%
Family members 40%
Friends, acquaintances 1%
DK/AR 1%
Do you know the purpose of the three-digit code at the back of every bank card, next to the 
signature field?  
(n = 1000)
Yes, it is used for online payment with bank cards. 17%
Yes, other. 1%
No 82%
if you suffer a loss due to bank card fraud or if your card is lost or stolen, who do (would) you contact 
first?  
(n = 719, those who have bank cards)
The bank 90%
The police 10%
The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority 0%
No one 0%
if you suffer a loss due to bank card fraud or if your card is lost or stolen, how soon would you report it?  
(n = 719, those who have bank cards)
As soon as possible 96%
The same day 4%
When I have time 0%
Never 0%
if you suffer a loss due to bank card fraud (assuming that it is not your fault), how do you think is the 
loss divided between the cardholder and the bank?  
(n = 719, those who have bank cards)
The entire loss is borne by the cardholder (client). 22%
The loss is borne by the cardholder (client) up to a certain amount, the remaining part by the bank. 10%
The loss is borne by the bank up to a certain amount, the remaining part by the cardholder (client). 8%
The entire loss is borne by the bank. 34%
DK/AR 26%
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the loss is borne by the cardholder (client) up to a certain amount, the remaining part by the bank: 
Can you specify the amount above which the bank bears the loss?  
(n = 74, those who have bank cards and know that the loss is borne by the cardholder [client] up to a 
certain amount, the remaining part by the bank)
HUF 45,000 0%
Other (median: HUF 30,000, average: HUF 130,731) 100%
Who would you like to inform you about the safe use of various payment instruments?  
(n = 1000, multiple answers allowed)
My own account keeping bank 76%
Acquaintances, friends, family members 13%
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority 4%
Other banks, financial enterprises 3%
Magyar Nemzeti Bank 3%
The police 3%
IT companies 2%
Other 1%
DK/AR 14%
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During the global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve (Fed) 
in charge of U.S. monetary policy soon reduced the federal 
funds rate to practically zero; consequently, it could only 
employ non-conventional instruments1 for the monetary 
easing required to achieve its statutory objectives. Before 
2012, the Fed had announced two major asset purchase 
programmes (in March 2009 and November 2010), followed 
by the extension of the maturities of the government 
securities portfolio on its balance sheet starting in 
September 2011 (‘Operation Twist’). Within the framework 
of the latter, long-term government bonds were bought and 
short-term bonds sold, and thus the average maturity 
increased without any major change in the balance sheet of 
the central bank. This measure contributed to lowering 
longer-term interest rates. Furthermore, in August 2011 
forward guidance was added to their statement to the 
effect that economic conditions warranted ‘exceptionally 
low rates’ at least through mid-2013, instead of the earlier 
‘extended period’. Setting a longer horizon than previously 
anticipated may have also helped to lower long-term 
interest rates (Bernanke, 2012). In January 2012, the time 
horizon was extended even further, until late 2014.
To supplement these measures, simultaneously with the 
interest rate decision in January 2012, the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) announced two new monetary 
policy tools: a 2 per cent inflation target as measured by 
the annual change in the personal consumption expenditures 
price index, and the publication of the policymakers’ 
conditional forecasts for policy rates. These measures came 
as no surprise to market participants, as the central bank’s 
communication had previously indicated such intentions. 
The minutes of meetings reveal that the two strategic steps 
were already considered in the autumn, following which the 
staff presented the proposals and a subcommittee devised 
the specific form of the measures. As the end result, the 
rate projections were integrated into the other variables of 
the forecast, while a separate announcement was published 
on the longer-term goals of the central bank.
The published announcement confirmed that the Fed 
continues to consider as its primary objective the fulfilment 
of its dual mandate, that is, price stability as well as 
maximum employment. On the other hand, it was also 
emphasised that the communication of a numerical inflation 
target may help keep longer-term inflation expectations 
firmly anchored, thereby fostering price stability and 
moderate long-term interest rates and enhancing the 
effectiveness of measures to promote maximum 
employment. Unlike inflation, the labour market is 
influenced by a number of factors over which monetary 
policy has no control (e.g. demographics, labour market 
Dániel Felcser and Kristóf lehmann: the Fed’s 
inflation target and the background of its 
announcement
In the first stage of the crisis, the Federal Reserve (Fed) rapidly embarked on interest rate cuts followed by several rounds 
of substantial quantitative easing. However, the marked monetary easing and the persistently low interest rates triggered 
mounting fears of inflation, calling into question the Fed’s commitment to medium-term price stability. In response to 
criticism and to the risks relating to monetary policy, in January 2012 the Fed announced an explicit inflation target of 2 
per cent to exploit the fact that a numerical inflation target improves the transparency of the central bank, helps to 
anchor inflation expectations and fosters consensus about the definition of price stability among policymakers. With this 
move, the Fed added key elements of inflation targeting to its monetary strategy. The announcement confirmed that 
inflation targeting is becoming increasingly popular and may be an attractive and efficient monetary strategy, even for 
the largest central banks.
1  When using non-conventional tools, the central bank strives to achieve its objectives through the use of mechanisms other than the traditional 
adjustment of the base rate (direct credit market intervention, for instance through high-volume asset purchases or government bond purchases). For 
more details, see Lehmann (2012).
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regulation, minimum wages, qualifications). Consequently, 
it is not appropriate to specify a target value for employment 
alongside the inflation target. Nevertheless, the Fed takes 
into account the labour market situation when making its 
rate decisions. It was also emphasised that the two 
objectives − price stability and maximum employment − are 
generally not contradictory for policymakers; indeed, the 
measures adopted to maintain price stability tend also to 
improve employment. When this is not the case, the Fed 
follows a balanced approach in fulfilling its mandate, taking 
into account the magnitude and nature of shocks, the 
condition of the economy, deviations from the inflation 
target and the employment level consistent with its 
mandate as well as the time horizons over which employment 
and inflation are projected to return to levels judged 
consistent with its dual mandate.2
These measures fit into the series of steps taken by the Fed 
to enhance the transparency of its own operation: 
statements have disclosed votes by name since 2002, the 
minutes have been released before the next meeting since 
2005 and press conferences have been held after rate 
decisions since 2011. Still, the assessment of the Fed’s new 
strategic elements is not unequivocal. Some believe that by 
setting an inflation target, the Fed has introduced a 
so-called flexible inflation targeting regime (Anderson, 
2012; Bullard, 2012; Carney, 2012), while others still do not 
consider the Fed to be an inflation targeter (Thornton, 
2012). In the following, we assess the January 2012 
announcements of the Fed in light of the economic debates 
on monetary policy and the statutory mandate.
BeNeFitS OF tHe NOMiNAl ANCHOR 
AND tHe PRACtiCe OF iNFlAtiON 
tARgetiNg
One factor behind the changes to the Fed’s strategy could 
have been the numerous benefits offered by an explicit 
inflation target. Perhaps the most important of these is it 
helps monetary policy to better anchor inflation 
expectations, which plays a key role in maintaining price 
stability. In the absence of a nominal anchor, historic data 
and anecdotal evidence may divert inflation expectations 
more easily as the goal of the central bank is unclear. The 
statement of the FOMC also emphasised the efficiency of 
the explicit target in anchoring inflation expectations. The 
announcement also had the objective of increasing the 
transparency and effectiveness of monetary policy 
(Bernanke, 2012). For the announcement, the decision-
making body of the central bank must reach a consensus on 
the level of the nominal anchor. This consensus provides for 
a more coherent decision-making process, more effective 
price stability related communication and the enhanced 
accountability of monetary policy. Finally, in the event of 
more easing to stimulate the real economy, there is less risk 
of rising inflation expectations, which may also be an 
important consideration in the present situation.
The effectiveness of the explicit target is shown by the 
rapid international spread of inflation targeting and its 
success as a strategy. Inflation targeting (IT) is a monetary 
policy strategy where the central bank strives to achieve its 
primary objective of price stability through a publicly 
announced inflation target. Inflation targeting was first 
introduced in New Zealand in December 1989. In the 
subsequent two decades, a number of other countries 
followed suit and now this strategy is employed by the 
central banks of 27 countries at different levels of economic 
development throughout the world (on the main features of 
the regime, see MNB, 2012). Experience shows that the 
regime has been successful in curbing inflation (e.g. Roger, 
2010), and consequently, no central bank has abandoned 
the IT strategy so far, with the exception of some euro-area 
members as they introduced the common currency. Based 
on the current international best practice, inflation 
targeting central banks (IT central banks) operate in a 
so-called flexible inflation targeting framework. Under this 
regime, in addition to its primary goal of maintaining price 
stability, the central bank attempts to reduce economic 
volatility which arises from other sources and reduces social 
welfare (see Carney, 2012; Svensson, 2009). Inflation 
targeting has typically been a regime for small, open 
economies, but in addition to the IT central banks of a 
number developing and developed countries, the strategies 
of several central banks with global significance, such as 
the Fed and the European Central Bank (ECB) also contain 
elements of IT. Furthermore, in 2012 the Fed and the Bank 
of Japan took another step towards an IT regime by 
announcing explicit inflation targets. (See Box 1 on the 
measures of the Bank of Japan.) The announcements 
indicate that a shift towards IT offers an attractive 
monetary policy framework to major central banks as well.
2  Unlike demand shocks, supply shocks affect inflation and output in opposite directions; therefore the central bank is faced with a trade-off between 
stabilising inflation or output. For instance, in oil importing countries a rise in oil prices is soon reflected in consumer prices through increasing petrol 
prices, and the higher transportation costs may in the longer run trigger price increases in a wider scope of products. Increased production costs 
prompt businesses to reduce their output, which in turn slows GDP growth. Relative stabilisation of consumer prices would result in additional output 
losses in the short term and add to the volatility of the real economy, while in the absence of a central bank response the entire effect of the shock 
would be reflected in prices and built into the pricing decisions of economic agents. Thus in this case both objectives need to be compromised and 
the partial stabilisation of both prices and output may be the appropriate decision.
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The Fed conducts monetary policy in a framework other 
than IT, based on its so-called dual mandate. The 1977 
amendment of the Federal Reserve Act set three goals for 
the Fed: maximum employment, price stability and 
moderate long-term interest rates. This was the first time 
that the maintenance of price stability was added to the 
tasks of the Fed, reflecting the changing economic thinking 
in the wake of the double-digit inflation of the 1970s. As 
the Fed can moderate long-term interest rates mostly by 
keeping inflation low, which reduces the inflation premium 
required by investors from long-term assets, the goals of 
the Fed are generally referred to as the dual mandate. This 
name reflects the idea that price stability and maximum 
employment have the same weight and the goal of price 
stability does not play a primary role. This, however, does 
not preclude the setting of an explicit inflation target.
The simultaneous achievement of price stability and the 
employment goal means that the Fed must strive to keep 
unemployment close to its natural rate. In other words, 
maximum employment does not mean zero unemployment, 
but rather a sustainable level of employment that does not 
result in inflationary pressure, or to put it differently: 
where unemployment is at its natural rate (Meyer, 2004). 
The differentiation between the two employment concepts 
was reinforced by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978, 
which clarified the amendment of the Federal Reserve Act 
in the previous year. Furthermore, while the Fed may have 
only a minimum effect on the long-term unemployment 
rate, it may be able to smooth short-term economic 
fluctuations (Judd and Rudebusch, 1999). Thus, it is more 
appropriate to interpret the goal of maximum employment 
as the stabilisation of output. In this interpretation, under 
its dual mandate the Fed strives simultaneously to reduce 
the volatility of inflation and of the real economy − similarly 
to a number of other central banks.
In its practical, flexible form, IT also includes the mitigation 
of both types of volatility. Central banks are aware that 
excessive volatility in the real economy must also be 
avoided, balancing between considerations of inflation and 
the real economy. The economy may be subject to a 
number of shocks that may divert inflation from the 
designated inflation target. Below a certain − typically 
medium-term − projection horizon, IT central banks strive 
to bring inflation back to a level consistent with price 
stability. The length of the horizon may depend on the size 
and nature of economic shocks. Assuming a credible 
monetary policy, the central bank may disregard the effect 
of temporary shocks, and by stabilising inflation in the 
medium term it may avoid causing excessive real economic 
volatility in the economy and the money markets. For 
instance, when the economy suffers a supply shock (e.g. an 
increase in oil prices) and inflation could be brought back 
to the target only at additional costs to the real economy, 
the central bank does not attempt to fully offset the shock, 
but rather only tries to moderate second-round effects. 
Indeed, in case of a flexible IT real economic swings may be 
dampened more effectively because due to the anchoring 
of inflation expectations, a temporary departure from the 
inflation target has no major effect on longer-term inflation. 
This, however, requires a credible nominal anchor.
Flexible IT does not limit the room for manoeuvre of central 
banks as compared to the dual mandate, as it also takes 
into account considerations of the real economy when 
conducting monetary policy. Empirical research shows that 
inflation targeting central banks have been able to curb 
inflation with lower economic volatility than the central 
banks of countries at similar levels of development which 
adopted different monetary regimes (Levin et al., 2004; 
Roger, 2010). Thus, the stabilisation of inflation at a low 
level does not need to be accompanied by greater economic 
volatility. Indeed, results indicate the opposite: by anchoring 
expectations, central banks can be more effective in 
smoothing economic swings as well.
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) is one of the central banks of a developed country that conducts monetary policy in a regime other than 
inflation targeting. In February 2012, however, practically simultaneously with the Fed, they introduced an important IT element, 
setting an explicit inflation goal temporarily at the 1 per cent level while establishing a medium- and long-term goal of 2 per cent or 
less. The announcement intentionally avoided the use of the term ‘target’, which is associated with inflation targeting, using ‘goal’ 
instead to show a lesser degree of commitment than under the inflation targeting regime, with no target date announced.
In the past fifteen years, the Japanese economy has faced severe growth problems due to the extended deleveraging process. Economic 
policy has moved towards flexible wage adaptation to moderate the decline in employment. In response to falling wages, intense 
Box 1
the inflation goal of the Bank of Japan
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FeD’S CONveRgeNCe tO iNFlAtiON 
tARgetiNg
Before the financial crisis, the performance of the Fed was 
viewed with general satisfaction. Its achievements in 
curbing inflation and anchoring expectations contributed to 
the credibility of monetary policy. The employment mandate 
of the central bank may allow economic policymakers to use 
it as an excuse to prioritise the short-term political benefits 
of low unemployment over the longer-term economic costs 
of higher inflation − but the good inflation results of the Fed 
did not hint at any substantial political pressure (Labonte, 
2012). Furthermore, in respect of transparency, the Fed was 
by and large in line with other major central banks (ECB, 
Bank of Japan) and the inflation targeting central banks of 
developed countries in the 1990s, and more progress 
competition among businesses and growing imports, enterprises 
changed their pricing strategy and deflation (falling general price 
level) followed. Intense competition prompted cost cutting by 
businesses, which in turn drove up unemployment and even though 
consumption expanded, deflation remained (Chart 1).
Persistent deflation was linked to expectations of weak economic 
growth. In the course of the deleveraging which started in the 
1990s, economic stimulation was ineffective despite continuous 
monetary easing. The BoJ announced that the zero interest rate 
policy introduced in 1999 would be maintained as long as 
deflationary expectations prevailed. However, monetary easing 
proved to be ineffective. On the contrary, the dotcom crisis 
followed by fears of global recession starting in 2001 only 
reinforced expectations of low economic activity and falling price 
levels in Japan. As traditional monetary policy instruments had 
already reached their limits, the BoJ resorted to quantitative 
easing between 2001 and 2006 to stimulate growth and lending. 
During those six years the stimulation of the economy produced 
no appreciable results and deflationary expectations stabilised. Given the renewed growth problems during the global financial crisis, 
continued monetary easing was unable to persistently prevent the decline of price levels.
It may have been due to the ineffectiveness of the zero base rate and the non-conventional measures that the BoJ took a step towards 
inflation targeting. The Governor of the Japanese central bank, Masaaki Shirakawa, hinted that the BoJ was trying to publicly clarify 
general monetary policy principles (Shirakawa, 2012). Previously, policymakers had separately specified their own views on the 
percentage consumer price index that was consistent with price stability. The statements and announcements of the central bank in 
previous years showed an understanding of price stability similar to the goals now announced. Thus, the present announcement did 
not represent a substantive change, but the collectively announced inflation goal may help anchor expectations. Shirakawa emphasised 
that the primary responsibility of the central bank was to overcome deflation, and then to achieve sustainable growth with price 
stability (1 per cent inflation). The decade-long period of deflation may be the reason that the short-term objective was identified as 
1 per cent, along with the medium- to long-term goal of 2 per cent or less.
The announcement of the BoJ represented a step towards IT, but without the other instruments of IT (great degree of transparency, 
inflation reports, priority of the inflation goal) it is no more than that, while no serious commitment to achieving the inflation goal 
has been made. At the zero lower bound, the BoJ is unable to rely on interest rate policy while the experience of two lengthy periods 
show that quantitative easing has been unable to shift the economy towards a 1 per cent rate of inflation, and thus the only remaining 
tool was communication and the adjustment of the set of objectives. Within this, the indication for the expected interest rate is also 
linked to inflation, unlike in the case of Fed, for instance, which gives a specific period, currently lasting until mid-2015. At the press 
conference where the inflation goal was introduced, the expansion of the asset purchase programme was also announced. The dual 
announcement was meant to curb deflationary expectations. According to Shirakawa, in the wake of the crisis central banks have tried 
to improve their monetary regimes, learning from each other’s lessons important elements such as the explicit inflation target. This 
happens by a convergence in the operation of central banks, which blurs past differences to some extent.
Chart 1
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followed in the 2000s (Chart 2). In the 2000s, before the 
outbreak of the crisis (at the time of the so-called ‘Great 
Moderation’), dynamic growth was coupled with high 
employment and low inflation, and thus the main 
requirements from modern central banks and in particular 
the Fed were apparently satisfied.
Despite the good performance, there were intense economic 
debates as to whether a switch should be made to inflation 
targeting as an alternative to the dual mandate. Critics of 
the IT argued mainly that the new framework for achieving 
only the inflation target would limit the manoeuvring room 
of the Fed, and that the inflationary effects of shocks would 
need to be offset within a fixed horizon, which would 
reduce the flexibility of the Fed (Friedman, 2004; Meyer, 
2004). Following this logic, the inflexibility of inflation 
targeting would lead to a greater volatility in the real 
economy because, for instance, in the event of a supply 
shock it would give preference to meeting the inflation 
target. In the discussions of the FOMC the members failed 
to reach a consensus on a number of items ranging from the 
target indices (headline consumer price index or core 
inflation) to the definition of the specific target value.
Proponents of IT emphasised that the monetary policy of 
the Fed was flexible, but the absence of clear long-term 
goals caused greater uncertainty, which could have been 
avoided if there were a nominal anchor. The performance 
of the Fed was also more difficult to assess while the 
benchmark was unknown. According to this rationale, 
despite the success of the dual mandate, IT would provide 
a clearer strategic framework for the Fed. The research of 
Bernanke et al. (1999) indicates that IT is the best available 
framework to keep inflation and expectations low in the 
long run in order to promote economic growth, while in the 
face of economic shocks it also permits temporary deviations 
from price stability. For instance, the optimal monetary 
policy takes into account the size and nature of shocks and 
flexibly moves the horizon accordingly. Despite the good 
assessment of the Fed’s inflation performance, it was noted 
that compared with IT central banks, inflation expectations 
were less anchored in the case of the Fed because the long-
term inflation expectations of the private sector responded 
more sensitively to economic news (Gürkaynak et al., 2010).
The practical working of IT, particularly during the crisis, 
also proved that the inflation target is not in conflict with 
growth. In response to worsening growth prospects, the 
central banks of developed countries lowered the base rate 
to near zero within a short time, followed by high-volume 
asset purchase programmes and other measures also aiming 
for quantitative easing. In this, they were supported by 
weak demand moderating price and wage developments as 
well as the credibility of monetary policy established by the 
low inflation of the preceding period and the anchored 
inflation expectations. Alongside IT banks, the Fed also 
played a pioneering role in devising monetary policy 
instruments to stimulate economic recovery.
In the course of the crisis concerns were raised, however, 
that due to the substantial quantitative easing and prolonged 
low interest rate levels, the Fed could face problems of 
inflation in the longer run. After the tensions on the 
subprime market and the Lehman bankruptcy, the Fed 
attempted to handle market frictions through aggressive 
monetary easing, in order to avoid a banking crisis. Even 
though the Fed initially justified this by the need to avert 
the risk of deflation, strong quantitative easing and pro-
growth communication increased inflation fears, particularly 
in 2011, when inflation soared in the wake of the global 
commodity price shock, and 12-month inflation expectations 
increased considerably (Chart 3). Longer-term expectations 
were anchored; however, surveys showed that uncertainty 
increased after the onset of the crisis: while the central 
tendency remained stable, an increased percentage of 
respondents expected deflation or higher inflation 
(Pasaogullari and Bianco, 2010). All this may have been a 
warning sign for credibility concerning price stability, and 
over time it could have threatened longer-term expectations 
as well.
As a result of the strong fiscal easing and the consolidation 
of the financial sector, U.S. public debt rose sharply. Gross 
public debt increased by one-half in 4 years, exceeding 100 
Chart 2
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per cent of GDP by end-2011. It came up for discussion that 
as most of the U.S. debt is fixed in nominal terms, high 
inflation would reduce the debt to be repaid in real terms, 
and thus the accumulated debt could be reduced through 
higher inflation (see for instance Aizenman and Marion, 
2009). These ideas may also have strengthened expectations 
that the Fed would tolerate higher inflation in the future, 
which could have also prompted the Fed’s policymakers to 
establish a more transparent strategic framework.
These problems revealed that the former implicit inflation 
target needed to be replaced by a strong nominal anchor. 
Economists now tend to think that in the Greenspan period 
(1987−2006) the Fed had an implicit inflation targeting 
regime that had no explicit, numerically expressed inflation 
target up till the end of January 2012 (Goodfriend, 2004).3 
Price stability was one of the goals all along and policymakers 
also made their commitment to this goal clear, while there 
was no consensus on the level of inflation the individual 
policymakers would consider consistent with the mandate 
of price stability; this could have been aggravated by the 
turnover in the members of the FOMC.4 From early 2009, an 
indication of the implicit target could be found in the long-
run inflation forecast of the members, which showed the 
value which the various policymakers thought inflation 
would converge to over the longer run, given an ‘appropriate’ 
monetary policy; based on this, the price stability mandate 
of the Fed was generally interpreted to mean a 2 per cent 
inflation target (Kocherlakota, 2010).5 By making the 
inflation target a specific, explicit number, the Fed can 
offer a firmer nominal anchor to the U.S. economy without 
incurring any cost to economic growth.
The main aspects of the present strategic framework of the 
Fed are consistent with the international best practice of 
inflation targeting, while certain unique features can also 
be identified. The point target selected by the Fed is 
characteristic of most IT central banks. Some of them also 
identify a symmetric tolerance band around the target, but 
a target band diverts attention from the actual inflation 
path, providing less firm orientation for expectations. The 
level of the inflation target (2 per cent) is within the 2−3 per 
cent interval typical in developed countries and in line with 
the implicit target emerging from the earlier projections of 
the policymakers (Chart 4). By contrast, the indicator for 
the inflation target and the absence of a uniform inflation 
report differ from the established practice of IT regimes. 
While IT central banks tend to set their targets in terms of 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the Fed opted for the 
Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index (PCEPI). 
The PCEPI takes into account changes in consumer habits 
and a broader range of products and services, such as 
expenditures of public health care programmes, but it is 
regularly revised over time.6 The absence of a uniform 
inflation report is another difference compared to the 
practice of IT central banks, even though the regional Fed 
banks analyse the economic developments of their 
respective regions and the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York also publishes detailed reports containing a staff 
projection. A regular, comprehensive publication used for 
the decisions of the FOMC could be conducive to the better 
Chart 3
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Michigan survey, Survey of 
Professional Forecasters (SPF).
3  Being an implicit IT central bank, the Fed influenced the policy rate the way an explicitly IT central bank would have done, that is, it responded to 
the deterioration of inflation prospects with a rate increase.
4  The FOMC has 12 members: the 7 members of the Board of Governors, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and four of the remaining 
11 regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents, who serve one-year terms on a rotating basis.
5  In 2011, the central tendency, which excludes the three highest and the three lowest projections, outlined a 1.7−2.0 per cent long-term range for 
inflation, as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures.
6  The two indices differ primarily in the statistical methodology of their calculation, the coverage of products and services consumed, the relative 
weighting of products and services (consumer or retail survey) and other statistical aspects (seasonal adjustment, imputed prices) (Clark, 1999). The 
variable basket of goods used for the PCEPI follows changes in purchasing patterns better, while the consumer price index is simpler and the 
measurement of prices is more reliable. The two indices typically move together, though significant differences may arise from time to time. This is 
partly explained by the fact that the PCEPI is better at capturing the substitution effect between products with rising prices and their substitutes 
through the changing consumption weights, and thus the price index may be lower than the CPI.
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understanding of monetary policy (Bernanke et al., 1999; 
Plosser, 2012), but critics of the idea think that it would give 
greater relative weight to inflation developments, and thus 
it would be inconsistent with the ‘spirit of the dual 
mandate’ (Meyer, 2004). In the meantime, the projections 
of the members are published, the reasoning behind the 
decision is explained in a press conference and other 
communication channels are also used intensively to lay the 
foundations for the necessary openness. Furthermore, since 
early 2012 the projections for the federal funds rate have 
also been published. The published policy rate projections 
help with the interpretation of the forecasts and the overall 
macroeconomic path and facilitate an understanding of the 
thoughts and positions of the policymakers (for more 
details, see Box 2).
Chart 4
inflation targets of it central banks for 2012
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(2012).
In addition to announcing the inflation target, since early 2012 the federal funds rate projections of policymakers have also been made 
public. Thus, the federal funds rate was added to the forecasted variables, with the Fed joining the ranks of a few inflation targeting 
central banks (New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Czech Republic). It should be noted that the federal funds rate projection is not a 
promise; instead, it shows the path projected based on the information available at the time. In addition, in the case of the Fed it is 
more of an assumption rather than a projection in the narrow sense. This is because it does not show the most likely path, but rather 
Box 2
Forecasting the federal funds rate
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THE FED’S INFLATION TARGET AND THE BACKGROUND OF ITS ANNOUNCEMENT
With its January announcement the Fed took a major step 
towards inflation targeting. Nevertheless, in formal terms it 
is not an IT central bank because there is no commitment 
to the priority of price stability, as the employment 
objective is not subordinated to price stability (Table 1). 
According to a widely accepted classification, inflation 
targeting requires that the central bank has an explicit, 
numerical inflation target and a hierarchical set of 
objectives, that is, the inflation target has priority among 
mandates. With the announcement in January, the first 
criterion is now satisfied but the Fed still fails to meet the 
second one. The other elements of strategy, however, are 
all present in the operation of the Fed, and any further 
approximation may be hindered by political and legal 
obstacles. The strategy of IT could be legally introduced in 
the framework of the current mandate of the Fed, if it 
considers that this would be conducive to achieving its 
objectives more efficiently (Labonte, 2012; Plosser, 2011). 
In the present labour market environment, however, 
dropping or de-emphasising the employment mandate 
would be a politically difficult decision. Since the onset of 
the crisis, the U.S. labour market has still not recovered; in 
light of this, commitment to the priority of price stability 
would not necessarily coincide with the preferences of 
policymakers or households and it would be difficult to 
communicate against the backdrop of the current fragile 
economic recovery and loose labour market conditions. 
Nevertheless, we think that despite the tradition of the 
dual mandate the Fed has effectively committed itself to a 
monetary policy strategy corresponding to flexible IT.
In the past six months, soaring inflation expectations have 
been corrected and inflation has decreased. Though the 
elapsed time is too short for comprehensive analysis and for 
conclusions to be drawn, in 2011 Q4 and 2012 Q1−Q2 the 
U.S. economy produced dynamic annual growth of over 2 
per cent on average, while disinflation continued despite 
the high energy prices early in the year. The (one-year) 
the interest rate that, in the opinion of the various policymakers, would facilitate the achievement of the desired economic (inflation, 
employment) outcome (Plosser, 2012). The publication of interest rate projections makes the conduct of monetary policy easier to 
understand and economic agents may have a clearer notion of future policy rates. In this respect, it is not the accuracy of the initial 
projections that matters but the fact that economic agents may observe the projections change over time and thus they can learn 
more about the Fed’s reaction function (Evans, 2012). This may help households and businesses make more informed decisions, reduce 
economic and financial uncertainty (and thus long-term interest rates) and increase the efficiency and accountability of monetary 
policy.
However, conclusions concerning monetary policy should be drawn from the projections with caution because individual projections 
are taken into account when adopting a decision, but the main communication tool is the FOMC statement. The interest rate projection 
may clarify the forward guidance given in the statement, but there may also be conflicts between them. This is possible because 
projections are made not only by the current members of the FOMC, therefore they also reflect the personal assessments of non-voting 
members at the time. By contrast, the statement contains the views of the FOMC members.
The Fed does not publish the entire interest rate path just like in the case of the other projected variables, as opposed to the Swedish, 
Norwegian or Czech central banks. Instead, the projections are displayed in two charts. The first chart shows the expected year of 
the first increase in the policy rate (Chart 5, left panel). This reflects the guidance that the federal funds rate may remain extremely 
low until end-2014. The second chart shows the projections for the last quarter of the current year, for subsequent years and over the 
longer run (Chart 5, right panel). The chart also indicates that the ‘particularly low interest rates’ do not necessarily coincide with the 
current 0−0.25 per cent. The median is 0.75 per cent, thus the 0.25−0.75 per cent range may fall into the particularly low category.
table 1
is the Fed an inflation targeting central bank: assessment based on the criteria of Mishkin (2004)
Criterion Satisfied
Announcement of medium-term numerical target for inflation 
Institutional commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy 
Information inclusive monetary strategy 
Increased transparency of monetary policy towards the public and the markets 
Increased accountability of the central bank for the attainment of its inflation objectives 
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inflation expectations subsided despite the growth 
prospects, favourable in international comparison, and the 
persistent high level of energy prices. All of this created 
appropriate conditions for the new asset purchase 
programme of the Fed announced in September 2012, 
whereby it will purchase USD 40 billion of mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) a month. In addition to the new asset 
purchase programme, existing instruments (such as the 
aforementioned ‘Operation Twist’) have also been extended 
to the end of the year and the federal funds rate is 
projected to remain low until mid-2015, i.e. longer than 
previously envisaged. Based on the projection of the Fed, 
inflation will remain on target despite continued easing, 
growth will pick up, and by end-2014 unemployment may 
slowly fall to below 7 per cent. In our opinion, the new 
strategy elements announced in January may have 
contributed to the successful anchoring of inflation 
expectations and may continue to play an important role in 
the future.
ReFeReNCeS
aiZenMan, JoShua and nanCy Marion (2009), “Using Inflation to 
Erode the US Public Debt”, NBER Working Paper, no. 15562, 
National Bureau of Economic Research.
anderSon, riChard g. (2012), “The FOMC: Transparency 
Achieved?”, Economic Synopses, 9, Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis.
Bernanke, Ben S. (2012), Statement before the Committee on 
Financial Services, February 29.
Bernanke, Ben S., thoMaS lauBaCh, FrederiC S. MiShkin and adaM 
S. PoSen (1999), Inflation Targeting: lessons from the 
international experience, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey.
Bullard, JaMeS B. (2012), Inflation Targeting in the USA, 
speech, Union League Club of Chicago, February 6.
Carney, Mark (2012), A Monetary Policy Framework for All 
Seasons, speech, U. S. Monetary Policy Forum, New York, 
February 24.
Clark, todd e. (1999), “A Comparison of the CPI and the PCE 
Price Index”, Economic Review, Q3, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, pp. 15−29.
dinCer, nergiZ and Barry eiChengreen (2010), “Central Bank 
Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates”, 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, vol. 11 no. 1, pp. 75−123.
evanS, CharleS l. (2012), Monetary policy communications 
and forward guidance, speech, International Research 
Forum on Monetary Policy Seventh Conference, Frankfurt 
am Main, March 16.
FriedMan, BenJaMin M. (2004), “Why the Federal Reserve 
Should Not Adopt Inflation Targeting”, International Finance, 
vol. 7 no. 1, pp. 129−136.
goodFriend, Marvin (2004), “Inflation Targeting in the US?”, 
in: Bernanke, Ben S. and MiChael WoodFord (2004), The 
Inflation-Targeting Debate, University of Chicago Press, pp. 
311−352.
gürkaynak, reFet S., andreW t. levin and eriC SWanSon (2010), 
“Does Inflation Targeting Anchor Long-Run Inflation 
Expectations? Evidence from the U.S., UK, and Sweden”, 
Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 8 no. 6, 
pp. 1208−1242.
haMMond, gill (2012), “State of the Art of Inflation Targeting. 
Centre for Central Bank Studies”, Bank of England Handbook, 
no. 29.
Judd, John P. and glenn d. rudeBuSCh (1999), “The Goals of 
U.S. Monetary Policy”, FRBSF Economic Letter, 99-04, 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
koCherlakota, narayana (2010), Economic Outlook and the 
Current Tools of Monetary Policy, speech, European 
Economics and Financial Centre, London, September 29.
laBonte, MarC (2012), “Changing the Federal Reserve’s 
Mandate: An Economic Analysis”, CRS Report for the 
Congress, R41656, Congressional Research Service.
lehMann, kriStóF (2012), “International experiences with 
unconventional central bank instruments”, MNB Bulletin, 
June, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, pp. 24−30.
levin, andreW, FaBio M. nataluCCi and JereMy M. Piger (2004), 
“The Macroeconomic Effects of Inflation Targeting”, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St.Louis Review, vol. 86 no. 4, pp. 51−80.
Meyer, laurenCe h. (2004), “Practical Problems and Obstacles 
to Inflation Targeting”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Review, vol. 86 no. 4 July−August, pp. 151−160.
MiShkin, FrederiC S. (2004), “Why the Fed Should Adopt 
Inflation Targeting”, International Finance, vol. 7 no. 1, pp. 
117−127.
MNB BulletiN • OctOBer 2012 37
THE FED’S INFLATION TARGET AND THE BACKGROUND OF ITS ANNOUNCEMENT
MNB (2012), Monetary Policy in Hungary, Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank.
PaSaogullari, MehMet and tiM BianCo (2010), “Survey-Based 
Measures of Inflation Expectations”, Economic Trends, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
PloSSer, CharleS i. (2011), Strengthening Our Monetary Policy 
Framework Through Commitment, Credibility, and 
Communication, speech, Global Interdependence Center's 
2011 Global Citizen Award Luncheon, Union League Club, 
Philadelphia, November 8.
PloSSer, CharleS i. (2012), A Progress Report on Our Monetary 
Policy Framework, speech, Forecasters Club, New York, 
February 29.
roger, SCott (2010), “Inflation Targeting Turns 20”, Finance 
and Development, March, pp. 46−49.
ShirakaWa, MaSaaki (2012), The Bank of Japan’s efforts 
toward overcoming deflation, speech, Japan National Press 
Club, Tokyo, February 17.
SvenSSon, larS e. o. (2009), Flexible inflation targeting − 
lessons from the financial crisis, speech, Netherlands Bank, 
Amsterdam, September 21.
thornton, daniel l. (2012), “How Did We Get to Inflation 
Targeting and Where Do We Need to Go to Now? A 
Perspective from the U.S. Experience”, Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis Review, vol. 94 no. 1 January−February, 
pp. 65−81.
MNB BulletiN • OctOBer 201238
iNtRODuCtiON
The new MNB Act, passed at the end of 2011, which also 
includes tasks related to the identification and management 
of systemic risks,1 makes the MNB the institution primarily 
responsible for the conduct of macroprudential policy in 
Hungary. The essential elements of an efficient 
macroprudential policy are the analytical tools which can 
help in the quantification of potential effects arising via the 
various channels of systemic risk and regulatory instruments 
which allow for the efficient management of these risks.
Based on the findings in international literature, three main 
channels of systemic risk can be identified at present: (i) 
sustained and excessive credit growth associated with 
significant asset price growth,2 (ii) external and internal 
shocks affecting financial system participants simultaneously, 
and (iii) interbank and financial market contagion. 
Quantifying the effects arising through these channels and 
the proper quantitative assessment of systemic risk require 
the simultaneous use of a number of analytical tools. The 
following tools constitute the backbone of the family of 
models and indices serving the measurement of systemic 
risks.
1.  ‘Early warning’ systems, which may facilitate the 
identification of periods characterised by excessive 
credit growth and the accumulation of critical imbalances 
on the banking sector’s assets and liabilities side as a 
result of excessive bank lending.
2.  Stress tests (for liquidity, market and credit risks), which 
may help in quantifying the impact of various real 
economic and financial risks on financial institutions’ 
Dániel Holló: identifying imbalances in the 
Hungarian banking system (‘early warning’ 
system)
The new Hungarian Central Bank Act passed at the end of 2011 delegated macroprudential regulatory powers to the MNB. 
The essential elements of an effective macro-prudential policy are analytical tools which make it possible to quantify the 
effects arriving via different systemic risk channels and regulatory instruments which can help in the management of 
systemic risks. Among the four analytical tools tuned to identify and measure systemic risk (‘early warning’ system, stress 
tests, contagion models and a system-wide financial stress indicator) two are already in regular use at the MNB (stress 
tests and the system-wide financial stress indicator), a contagion model is currently under development and the ‘early 
warning’ system is about to be introduced. This article presents one of the four tools discussed above: the ‘early warning’ 
system. The ‘early warning’ system may help in the identification of periods characterised by excessive credit growth and 
the accumulation of critical imbalances on the banking sector’s assets and liabilities side as a result of excessive bank 
lending (excessive credit growth channel of systemic risk), and may serve as a point of reference for the timing of the 
introduction of measures named in the new MNB Act to reduce systemic risk (e.g. anti-cyclical capital buffer and other 
regulatory instruments designed to prevent excessive credit growth). Our results show that excessive imbalances on the 
asset and liability sides of the Hungarian banking system started to emerge in 2005 Q4; the current problems facing 
Hungarian banks stem from the large imbalances on the assets and liabilities side (excessive credit growth and significant 
increase in the share of non-core or secondary liabilities within total liabilities), which characterised the period between 
2005 Q4 and 2008 Q4.
1  According to De Bandt and Hartmann (2000); De Bandt et al. (2009); ECB (2009) ‘systemic risk can be defined as the risk that financial instability 
becomes so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a financial system to the point where economic growth and welfare suffer materially’.
2  Alessi and Detken (2009).
MNB BulletiN • OctOBer 2012 39
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solvency and liquidity position. Stress tests, however, can 
be used not only to measure the effects of distinct risk 
scenarios on banks’ solvency and liquidity, but also to 
produce risk scenarios (showing combinations of real 
economic and financial risks which might endanger 
financial system stability).
3.  Contagion models, which may help in quantifying the 
effects arising via various contagion channels in the 
interbank and financial markets. Furthermore, contagion 
models may also support the identification of systemically 
important financial market participants.
4.  Indicators of financial stress, which measure the current 
level of stress in the financial system, i.e. help to assess 
how the financial system’s risk level is changing as a 
result of the interaction of shocks and accumulated 
tensions and imbalances in the system. In addition, 
critical stress thresholds calibrated to the financial stress 
indices may help in deciding whether the level of risk 
observed in the financial system in a given period has 
reached an extent which would pose a threat to the 
entire system’s stability.
However, conducting macroprudential policy requires more 
than just the existence of analytical tools serving to 
measure the effects arising through the distinct systemic 
risk channels; it also requires regulatory instruments 
designed to mitigate systemic risks. The macroprudential 
instruments enumerated in the MNB Act primarily serve to 
mitigate risks arising from banks’ excessive lending 
(excessive credit growth channel of systemic risk), such as, 
for example, the anti-cyclical capital buffer and rules 
designed to prevent excessive credit growth (e.g. limits on 
the loan-to-value ratio). However, the Act also allows for 
the imposition of additional requirements to mitigate the 
default risk of systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs) in order to reduce contagion risks and to promote 
system-wide stability. Moreover, the new Central Bank Act 
makes it possible to prevent the build-up of systemic 
liquidity risks as well.
The ‘early warning’ system presented in this article serves 
two purposes. First, it may help to identify periods 
characterised by excessive growth in credit and to measure 
its impact on the banking sector’s assets and liabilities side, 
second, it may serve as a point of reference for timing the 
introduction of measures to mitigate systemic risk. Our 
results show that the excessive imbalances on the assets 
and liabilities side of the Hungarian banking system started 
to accumulate in 2005 Q4; the period between 2005 Q4 and 
2008 Q4 was characterised by large imbalances on the 
assets and liabilities side (excessive credit growth and 
significant increase in the share of non-core or secondary 
liabilities within total liabilities), which are responsible for 
the current problems facing Hungarian banks. The article 
first outlines the set of criteria which may be worth 
considering in developing an ‘early warning’ system. It then 
presents the theoretical background of the Hungarian ‘early 
warning’ system and shows the results of the empirical 
analysis. Finally, the article gives a concluding summary.
CRiteRiA Set FOR DevelOPiNg AN 
‘eARly WARNiNg’ SySteM
The recent global financial and economic crisis has given 
new impetus to ‘early warning’ system-related research. At 
the same time, however, it has also resulted in a shift in 
respect of the research question. This is mainly attributable 
to the failure of the so-called first-generation approaches, 
which focused on crisis prediction. While the aim of the 
classical or first-generation ‘early warning’ systems was to 
predict a sort of financial crisis, the goal of the second-
generation approaches was not crisis prediction, but rather 
the timely identification and measurement of critical 
financial imbalances causing systemic vulnerabilities.3 
According to the underlying philosophy, if an economy is not 
vulnerable (e.g. it is free from significant real and financial 
imbalances), then on the one hand there is a low risk that 
an ‘own’ financial crisis will emerge, and on the other hand 
the adverse financial and real effects of crises spilling over 
into the domestic economy will be less severe. The failures 
of the first-generation ‘early warning’ systems were mainly 
attributable to crisis definition problems (e.g. what is the 
precise definition of an exchange rate, a banking or a 
balance of payment crisis?), modelling difficulties (e.g. the 
relatively small number of crises, which may be an obstacle 
to developing a country-specific crisis prediction system) 
and coordination failures (e.g. the absence of harmonisation 
of signals generated by crisis prediction systems of various 
countries or regions and the lack of cross-border coordination 
of the related crisis prevention measures). Based on these, 
the following criteria may be worth considering in developing 
an ‘early warning’ system.
1.  First, due to the problems with the first-generation ‘early 
warning’ systems, identifying and measuring the 
magnitude of financial imbalances potentially causing 
3  In an economic context, the concept of vulnerability expresses the multi-dimensional nature of crises, i.e. it denotes conditions created by real 
economic and financial developments which may easily lead to severe financial crises. Banking sector imbalances and fiscal and external imbalances 
also constitute part of this set of criteria. Consequently, vulnerability is a criteria set, while the various forms of imbalances are ‘elements’ of this 
criteria set.
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systemic vulnerabilities (i.e. the second-generation 
approaches) might be more relevant than predicting a 
financial crisis.
2.  Another argument in favour of the second-generation 
‘early warning’ systems is that they may help to eliminate 
the main methodological weaknesses of the first-
generation approaches, namely crisis definition problems 
and modelling difficulties arising from the relatively 
small number of crises.
3.  Finally, in developing an ‘early warning’ system it may be 
useful to take into account regulatory aspects as well; in 
other words, focus should be placed primarily on those 
financial imbalances that can be managed with 
macroprudential regulation.
The Hungarian ‘early warning’ system has been developed 
in consideration of the above criteria, i.e. our objective is 
not crisis prediction, but rather the timely identification 
and measurement of the magnitude of critical imbalances 
on the assets and liabilities side of the Hungarian banking 
system. In developing the ‘early warning’ system, we 
primarily focus on the banking sector, because with 
macroprudential regulation banking system developments 
can be influenced directly, through which macroprudential 
policy may indirectly reduce imbalances in other segments 
of the economy and influence overall economic processes 
(e.g. imbalances in the real estate market, foreign trade 
deficit, short- and medium-term economic growth, 
inflationary developments, etc.). However, international 
experience suggest that − in terms of the direct and 
indirect costs − banking crises are the most severe as well 
as those crises, which do not originate from the banking 
sector, but in which the banking system is nevertheless 
significantly involved. The International Monetary Fund has 
estimated the direct costs of banking crises management 
in the year of the crisis and the subsequent five years to 
be 10–15 per cent of GDP on average;4 but, according to 
Reinhardt and Rogoff (2008), these costs are dwarfed by 
the loss of tax revenues due to the banking crisis-related 
recession and the fiscal costs caused by the increase in 
social expenditure. As a result of these processes, the 
cumulative increase in government debt may be as much as 
83 per cent on average three years following the crisis. in 
other words, a stable, adequately capitalised banking 
system (i.e. capitalised consistently with its true risk 
level), which is free from substantial asset and liability 
side problems, may significantly improve the resilience 
of the entire financial system to shocks, as it is able to 
absorb, instead of amplify the effects of various adverse 
external and/or internal shocks, and can therefore also 
dampen business cycle fluctuations. It is important to 
note, however, that imbalances potentially threatening the 
stability of the financial system may emerge not only in the 
banking sector, but also, for example, in respect of the 
external balance (current account) or fiscal positions. 
These imbalances, however, can only be partially and 
indirectly managed with macroprudential regulation (e.g. a 
foreign trade deficit might be reduced by restraining bank 
lending).
DevelOPMeNt OF iMBAlANCeS ON 
tHe ASSetS AND liABilitieS SiDe OF 
tHe BANKiNg SySteM (tHe 
tHeORetiCAl BACKgROuND OF tHe 
HuNgARiAN ‘eARly WARNiNg’ 
SySteM)
The traditional banking system channels the funds it raises 
from savers to borrowers. Deposits constitute the most 
important liabilities of banks. The increase in the stock of 
deposits depends on the ability of economic agents to 
accumulate financial wealth. In periods of economic boom, 
the amount of deposits is generally insufficient and may 
impede bank lending. Therefore, financial institutions have 
to rely on other sources of funding to finance the expansion 
of credit in periods of economic upswing. This, in turn 
means that banks’ liability structure (the share of deposits 
considered stable and the share of other liabilities 
considered less stable within total liabilities) may vary 
considerably in different stages of the business cycle (Shin 
et al., 2011).
Similarly to the liabilities side, the structure of the banking 
sector’s assets side is also constantly changing. This can be 
partly explained by the changing number of positive net 
present value investment projects as well as by changes in 
banks’ risk preferences (e.g. in periods of economic 
downturn, financial institutions are less willing to finance 
risky investments). The relationships below may help the 
understanding of the build-up of banks’ asset and liability 
side problems.5 For the sake of simplicity, loans to the 
private sector are considered the only bank asset.6
4  Sources: IMF banking crises database (http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm) and the related study (Laeven and Valencia, 2008).
5  A detailed technical description of the approach can be found in the study by Shin et al. (2011).
6  The stylised model presented provides an easily understandable, simple framework for the better understanding of developments and interactions on 
the asset and liability sides of banks’ balance sheets. A possible future direction for extending the model could be the use of a more complex asset 
structure (e.g. taking into account liquid assets) and the inclusion of important off-balance sheet items (e.g. taking into account FX swaps, due to 
their importance in financing lending in Hungary).
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Balance sheet identity
 C = E + CL + NCLB + NCLFC, (1)
where C denotes the stock of credit to the private sector, E 
denotes the amount of the banking system’s capital stock, 
CL denotes deposits considered as the ‘primary’, or core 
liability of financial institutions, NCLB and NCLFC denote 
interbank and external liabilities respectively, which are 
the ‘secondary’ or non-core liability of banks.
leverage i.
 L = C / E, (2)
where L denotes leverage.
Generally, financial institutions are willing to hold as much 
capital as they need to protect them against unexpected 
losses − in other words, the amount of economic capital 
required to cover unexpected losses must be just equal to 
the value-at-risk (VaR) of a given asset portfolio. If V 
denotes value-at-risk per unit of loan, then the amount of 
economic capital required as a buffer against unexpected 
losses is the following.
economic capital
 E = V · C, (3)
that is leverage can also be expressed using the following 
formula.
leverage ii.
 L = C / E = 1/V. (4)
Based on formula (4), leverage is procyclical − in other 
words, it is high due to the low value-at-risk of banks’ asset 
portfolio in periods of economic upswing (V, i.e. value-at-
risk, falls; and L, i.e. leverage, increases), while it is low 
due to the high value-at-risk of banks’ asset portfolio in 
times of economic recessions (V, i.e. value-at-risk, increases; 
and L, i.e. leverage, falls).7 Consequently, the ‘balance 
sheet capacity’ of financial institutions (the maximum size 
of their balance sheet) is determined by the amount of their 
available capital stock and the capital requirement per unit 
of loan.
During periods of economic upswing, the balance sheet 
capacity of financial institutions rises for two reasons. First, 
improving profitability increases the capital base and, 
second, the capital requirement per unit of loan falls, due 
to diminishing credit risks. These factors in turn contribute 
to an improvement in banks’ ability and capacity to lend, 
i.e. to the increase in the supply of credit. If the rate of 
credit growth significantly exceeds the growth rate of 
deposits − that is the growth rate of core liabilities (the 
expansion of credit is not followed by an equal increase in 
deposits) − then banks’ borrowing from external sources 
(non-core liabilities) increases. As a result the share of 
deposits within banks’ total liabilities may fall significantly. 
This may be a problem primarily because deposits are more 
stable compared to non-core liabilities (interbank and 
foreign funds); they are a more predictable source of 
funding, less exposed to the adverse effects of changes in 
the economic cycle and investor sentiment. Consequently, 
the change in the liability structure of banks may provide 
useful information about the stickiness of funding, i.e. 
about the size of financial institutions’ exposure to funding 
liquidity risk. It is also important to note that a change in 
the liability structure may not only increase banks’ ‘funding’ 
liquidity risk, but may also raise contagion risks via the 
interbank market.
In contrast with economic upturns, financial institutions’ 
‘balance sheet capacity’ may fall for two reasons during 
periods of economic downturn. First, banks’ capital stock 
may decline due to rising credit losses and, second, the 
capital requirement per unit of loan rises due to an increase 
in credit risks. As a consequence, banks may become 
capital constrained. In extreme situations, i.e. in times of 
very severe economic downturn, these developments may 
even lead to a credit crunch.
Consequently, an ‘early warning’ system, developed for the 
banking system, should be capable of capturing problems 
emerging simultaneously on the asset and liability sides of 
the banking sector. An explanation for this is that a 
deterioration in banks’ loan portfolio quality, accumulated 
as a result of excessive lending, may result in an increase in 
financial institutions’ ‘funding’ liquidity risk, the magnitude 
of which, however, depends primarily on their liability 
structure, i.e. the share of non-core, more volatile liabilities 
(interbank and foreign liabilities) within total liabilities. the 
major risk is if financial institutions fully utilise their 
increasing lending capacity due to the expansion of their 
7  The relationship can be easily realised with knowledge of the arguments of the Basel capital function. In periods of economic upswing, the value of 
the risk parameters expressing the credit risk of the portfolio (default probability, loss given default) are much lower than those observed in times of 
recession, i.e. with identical portfolio size, portfolio composition and confidence level, the value at risk of the portfolio during a period of upturn may 
be significantly lower than the value at risk of the portfolio in periods of economic downturn.
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balance sheet capacity by significantly easing lending 
standards, which may entail a dilution of loan portfolio 
quality (the implicit accumulation of credit risks in 
periods of economic boom) and excessive lending is 
financed mainly from non-core liabilities (the implicit 
accumulation of ‘funding’ liquidity risks in periods of 
economic boom).
It is important to note that the default risk of individual 
financial institutions is not only influenced by the extent to 
which their credit losses and ‘funding’ liquidity risks 
increase due to various shocks, but also by the reaction of 
other banking sector participants to the shocks affecting 
the system. The strength of systemic effects depends on 
the number of banks reacting to the shocks, the similarities 
of their behaviour and the size of the reacting financial 
institutions. For example, banks may react to the 
deteriorating ‘funding’ liquidity position by shortening the 
maturities of their assets, lengthening the maturities of 
their liabilities, increasing the quantity of their liquid assets 
and reducing the quantity of their illiquid assets. Banks’ 
reactions may primarily affect the markets of illiquid assets 
and stable funds; such reactions may lead to a fall in asset 
prices in the former and an increase in the price of stable 
funds in the latter. The decline in asset prices may entail 
further increases in losses and banks’ default risk as well as 
a further deterioration in the ‘funding’ liquidity position. 
That may necessitate additional adjustments by banks on 
the asset and liability sides of their balance sheets. As a 
result, a credit and ‘funding’ liquidity risk spiral may ensue, 
which may lead to the collapse of market liquidity and, in 
an extreme case, the meltdown of the entire financial 
system.
eMPiRiCAl ANAlySiS
In this section, we outline the econometric background of 
the Hungarian ‘early warning’ system. In the first step of 
the empirical analysis, by relying on the theoretical 
framework presented earlier the variables are chosen which 
may help to capture imbalances on the banking sector’s 
asset and liability sides, asset price movements adversely 
affecting developments in the value of banks’ assets, the 
current state of the business cycle and the product risk 
structure of the loan portfolio. The asset side imbalance 
was approximated with the deviation of bank loans to the 
private sector (exchange rate adjusted household and 
corporate loan stock) from its trend (loan stock/trend of 
loan stock), i.e. with the credit cycle. The greater the 
amplitude of the credit cycle, the greater the imbalance on 
the asset side of the banking sector’s balance sheet (e.g. 
significant credit growth in good times due in part to an 
easing of lending standards, and a sharp curtailment of 
lending in times of recession due to materialising credit 
risks). The liability side imbalance was approximated with 
the deviation of the exchange rate adjusted loan-to-deposit 
ratio8 from its trend [liquidity cycle=(loan-to-deposit ratio)/
(loan-to-deposit ratio trend)]. The more the current loan-
to-deposit ratio exceeds its equilibrium level, i.e. the 
quotient of the ratios exceeds 1 or 100 per cent, the more 
financial institutions finance lending by raising less stable, 
secondary funds, and the more the liability side imbalance 
of the banking sector (latent ‘funding’ liquidity risk) will 
increase. For example, if the equilibrium value of the loan-
to-deposit ratio is 1.06 and its current level is 1.08, then the 
deviation of the loan-to-deposit ratio from its trend is 
approximately 2 per cent (1.08/1.06). The deviation of real 
GDP from its trend was taken as the proxy variable of the 
business cycle (real GDP/real GDP trend). In the empirical 
analysis, the deviation of the FHB house price index from its 
trend was taken as the asset price proxy (FHB house price 
index/FHB house price index trend). This variable captures 
movements in house prices more directly related to banks’ 
lending activity.9 Finally, the share of foreign currency 
private sector loans within total loans to the private sector 
was employed to approximate the ‘product risk’ structure 
of credit.10 The relationship between imbalances emerging 
on the asset and liability sides of the banking system was 
modelled in a regime switching vector autoregressive model 
framework (Markov-switching VAR).11 According to the 
underlying intuition, economic agents behave differently in 
distinct states of the world or regimes (e.g. in times of 
8  In performing the calculations, we decided to use the exchange rate adjusted loan-to-deposit ratio because the numerator of the loan-to-deposit ratio 
increases by more than its denominator as a result of exchange rate depreciation, due to the high ratio of foreign currency loans and the relatively 
low ratio of foreign currency deposits − in other words, the value of the ‘unadjusted’ indicator may increase sharply as an effect of an exchange rate 
depreciation, which may falsely suggest a change in the liability structure (increasing demand for secondary liabilities). It is important to note that in 
interpreting a change in the liability structure we focus exclusively on on-balance sheet items.
9  Based on international experience, excessive credit growth is generally associated with rapid rise in residential property prices. In periods of 
recession, i.e. when credit risks materialise, banking losses are not only increased by the increase in the number of defaults, but also by the 
simultaneous decline in the value of properties used as collateral.
10  In filtering a trend using the Hodrick−Prescott filter, we used the 400 000 lambda value for the credit variable by taking into account the 
recommendation of the Basel Committee and the 1600 lambda value for the liquidity and business cycles, (recommended value in the case of 
quarterly time series).
11  The MS_Regress package, developed for MATLAB, was used to produce the estimate. It is downloadable at: http://www.mathworks.com/
matlabcentral/fileexchange/15789.
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expansion and low growth) − in other words, the evolution 
of economic and financial developments is regime specific 
(e.g. periods of upswing are characterised by excessive 
credit growth, a shortening of funding maturities and a 
decline in the ratio of total liabilities to stable funds; 
periods of economic downturn are characterised by a sharp 
curtailment of lending, a lengthening of funding maturities 
and an increase in the ratio of total liabilities to stable 
funds). The econometric method can be used to quantify 
the probability of staying in different states of the world or 
regimes, where the regime probabilities can be considered 
as an ‘early warning’ indicator derived from the system. In 
the model, regime switching basically depends on two 
factors: the past behaviour of model variables and the 
so-called transition probabilities, i.e. a ‘deterministic’ and 
a stochastic factor. In the calculations, we assumed the 
existence of two regimes: an expansionary and a low 
growth regime.12 The model itself does not identify the 
regimes, i.e. which is the low growth and which one is the 
expansionary period. The regimes can be identified based 
on the descriptive statistics of the model variables and on 
the basis of the estimated model parameters. The table 
below contains the mean and standard deviation of the 
model variables in regime 1 and regime 2.
According to the results of the Table 1, the means of model 
variables in regime 1 exceed the average values in regime 
2, and the means of the variables in regime 1 are above 
trend, while in regime 2 they are below trend. Furthermore, 
it can be seen that the standard deviation of the variables 
in regime 1 is lower than the standard deviation in regime 
2 − in other words, regime 2 is characterised by a greater 
degree of uncertainty than regime 1, which can be generally 
observed in periods of economic downturn. A similar 
conclusion can be drawn by examining the constants and 
variances of the model. The values of regime-specific 
constants in regime 1 exceed those in regime 2; however, 
the direction is just the opposite in the case of the 
variances: regime 2 is characterised by higher volatility and 
regime 1 is characterised by lower volatility. Based on the 
behaviour of the model variables (above trend values and 
lower volatility in regime 1; below trend values and higher 
volatility in regime 2) and the regime-specific values of the 
model parameters, regime 1 is the expansionary regime 
and regime 2 is the low growth regime. This result partly 
coincides with the findings of a study examining periods of 
excessive credit growth in CEE countries written by MNB 
authors in 2006 (Kiss et al., 2006), i.e. with the finding that 
household credit growth in Hungary since 2004 was stronger 
IDENTIFYING IMBALANCES IN THE HUNGARIAN BANKING SYSTEM (‘EARLY WARNING’ SYSTEM)
12  Two regimes can be identified on the basis of the estimated Kernel density functions of the liquidity and credit cycles; the estimated empirical 
distribution of both variables is bimodal.
table 1
Descriptive statistics of model variables in regime 1 and regime 2
estimation period 1998 q2−2011 q2
Regime 1 2005 q4−2008 q4 Regime 2
1998 q2−2005 q3; 
2009 q1−2011 q2
Regime 1 (credit cycle, mean) 112.6% Regime 2 (credit cycle, mean) 98.4%
Regime 1 (credit cycle, standard 
deviation) 2.1%
Regime 2 (credit cycle, standard 
deviation) 7.9%
Regime 1 (liquidity cycle, mean) 102.2% Regime 2 (liquidity cycle, mean) 97.1%
Regime 1 (liquidity cycle, 
standard deviation) 2.6%
Regime 2 (liquidity cycle, 
standard deviation) 4.0%
Regime 1 (growth rate of private 
sector loans to foreign currency 
private sector credit compared 
to the previous quarter, mean) 3.6%
Regime 2 (growth rate of private 
sector loans to foreign currency 
private sector credit compared 
to the previous quarter, mean) 0.7%
Regime 1 (growth rate of private 
sector loans to foreign currency 
private sector credit compared 
to the previous quarter, standard 
deviation) 2.6%
Regime 2 (growth rate of private 
sector loans to foreign currency 
private sector credit compared 
to the previous quarter, standard 
deviation) 2.8%
Regime 1 (asset price cycle, 
mean) 101.0%
Regime 2 (asset price cycle, 
mean) 98.0%
Regime 1 (asset price cycle, 
standard deviation) 1.3%
Regime 2 (asset price cycle, 
standard deviation) 4.7%
Note: The asset price cycle was approximated with the FHB house price index.
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than justified by economic fundamentals, the deviation of 
which from the equilibrium path reached its maximum in 
2009, exceeding its estimated equilibrium level by some 13 
percentage points.
Our ‘early warning’ indicator, i.e. the probability of staying 
in the expansionary regime, derived from the model, is 
presented in the chart below. It shows that this probability 
clearly identifies the period of expansion − in other words, 
its values are close to 1 throughout the expansionary 
period. As mentioned earlier, regime switching depends on 
the past behaviour of the model variables (deterministic 
part) and the so-called transition probabilities. In order to 
better track the deterministic processes driving regime 
switching, a composite indicator was also built from the 
standardised model variables.13 This index helps, on the 
one hand, to track the factors driving changes in the 
vulnerabilities of the banking sector (asset, liability side 
imbalances, and imbalances on the asset markets) and, on 
the other, to measure the extent to which the individual 
factors (credit cycle, liquidity cycle, asset price cycle, 
product risk structure of the loan portfolio) contribute to 
the vulnerabilities of the banking sector. High values of the 
composite indicator may signal a high level of banking 
system vulnerabilities, and an increase in the index may 
indicate a build-up of vulnerabilities, while low values may 
imply an absence or low level of vulnerability (pre-
expansionary period), on the one hand, and a correction 
following a period of the build-up of vulnerabilities (post-
expansionary period), on the other. The chart shows that 
the Hungarian banking sector entered the period of 
increasing vulnerability (persistent and positive trend 
deviations of credit and liquidity cycles, i.e. the 
development of asset and liability side imbalances) at the 
0.47 value of the composite index and exited at its 1.37 
value. At the time of entry into the expansionary period, 
the deterministic factor of the regime switch was driven 
primarily by positive trend deviations of the credit cycle, 
and, secondly and thirdly, by positive trend deviations of 
the asset price and liquidity cycles. In the correction 
phase, negative trend deviations of the liquidity, credit and 
asset price cycles were responsible for the fall in the 
composite index. It is important to note that the 
expansionary entry and exit levels of the composite index 
should not necessarily be considered critical levels 
remaining valid in the future, but as a kind of reference 
point. Furthermore, it is also important to note that an 
unambiguous increase in vulnerabilities in the banking 
sector requires a persistent, positive and simultaneous 
trend deviation of the model variables, as expressed by the 
steady and persistent rise in the composite index in the 
chart.
SuMMARy AND CONCluSiON
The article presents a new tool developed for the 
identification of critical asset and liability side imbalances 
of the Hungarian banking sector. In developing the system, 
the focus was on banking sector developments, because, on 
the one hand international experience suggests that the 
direct (e.g. bank consolidation costs) and indirect costs (e.g. 
costs of a real economic downturn) of banking crises are the 
highest − in other words, timely identification and mitigation 
of asset and liability side problems of the banking sector 
may help avoiding serious banking system disruptions and, 
in the most severe case, banking crises. On the other hand, 
the banking sector can be considered stable and highly 
resilient to shocks if no significant imbalance evolves on 
either the asset or liability sides of banks’ balance sheets. 
In that case, the banking sector absorbs rather than 
amplifies the adverse effects of the various financial and 
real economic shocks − in other words, its behaviour will be 
less procyclical.
In terms of the stability of the banking sector, persistent 
and significant credit growth and the simultaneous dilution 
13  Standardisation was performed by subtracting the sample mean from the ‘raw’ model variables and dividing this difference by the sample standard 
deviation. 
Chart 1
Probability of staying in the expansionary regime and 
the composite index built from the standardised 
model variables
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of the portfolio quality (latent build-up of credit risks) can 
be considered the main risk factors, if these are associated 
with liability side problems, i.e. the increase in the ratio of 
total liabilities to stable funds (latent build-up of liquidity 
risks). If this occurs, the effect on banks’ default risks of 
the interactions between asset and liability side strains in 
times of the materialisation of credit risks may intensify 
significantly.
According to our results, the significant asset and liability 
side imbalances (excessive credit growth, and sharp increase 
in the ratio of total liabilities to stable funds), responsible 
for the current problems of the Hungarian banking system, 
emerged in the period between 2005 Q4 and 2008 Q4.
The ‘early warning’ system presented may help decision-
makers to identify excessive asset and liability side 
imbalances in the banking sector’s balance sheet in a timely 
manner and may serve as a point of reference for the timing 
of the introduction of macroprudential regulatory 
instruments reducing such vulnerabilities.
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iNtRODuCtiON
Developments in external equilibrium and external debt 
indicators are key to the financial vulnerability of the 
country. One of the underlying reasons why improved 
external financing capacity (i.e. net lending), the outflow of 
funds from certain sectors and changes in debt indicators 
are important is that they may influence the risk perception 
of the Hungarian economy and risk premia. Developments 
in external funds held by the individual sectors may also 
help assess how external funds borrowed by the banking 
system were affected by heavy foreign currency lending to 
households and the financing of the fiscal deficit.
Fundamentally, there are three approaches to the 
analysis of external balance processes (Chart 1 summarises 
the various analysis options).
•  The real economy approach shows − on the basis of the 
external financing capacity/requirement (i.e. net lending/
borrowing) calculated as the sum of net exports recorded 
in the balance of payments, the balance of income and 
the balance of transfers − whether domestic use (e.g. 
consumption and investment) is lower/higher in overall 
terms than the revenues generated. Before the outbreak 
of the crisis Hungary had a net borrowing position, 
whereas currently there is a significant amount of 
Péter Koroknai and Rita lénárt-Odorán: 
Developments in external borrowing by 
individual sectors1
This article examines trends and developments in the external financing of the Hungarian economy from the perspective 
of external borrowing by individual sectors. In the pre-crisis period, economic agents’ spending exceeded their revenues, 
as a result of which the country had to rely on foreign borrowing. In addition to direct external borrowing by the 
government and companies, the banking system also relied on external borrowing to a large extent in relation to its lending 
to companies and households. This was also reflected in a rise in the country’s external debt indicators, which added to 
the vulnerability of the Hungarian economy.
During the crisis, domestic demand fell and the previous high deficit on the balance of payments turned into surplus. This 
also means that, due to a rise in the savings of economic agents, the country no longer has to rely on external borrowing 
and net repayment of loans taken out earlier is underway, i.e. earlier borrowing is being followed by an outflow of funds. 
Repayment of external funds is not occurring in each sector. On the one hand, the repayment of loans granted to the 
private sector triggered a sizeable outflow of funds from the banking system, while on the other hand, there was hardly 
any change in net external funds granted to the corporate sector; at the same time, the consolidated general government 
continues to borrow.
The adjustment process, which started after the crisis, is likely to continue in the years to come, and this may lead to a 
further increase in the external surplus of the economy and an acceleration of outflows of foreign funds. Our forecast for 
the period to 2013 implies a slower decrease in external funds granted to banks, but on the other hand, in contrast to 
earlier years, a net outflow of funds is likely to materialise at the level of public finances as well. As regards debt 
indicators, the repayment of foreign funds is not yet fully reflected in lower external debt ratios, due to the depreciation 
of the forint. With a more marked outflow of funds, a quick fall in external debt ratios is also expected to materialise.
1  The authors would like to thank Judit Antal, Áron Gereben and Mihály Hoffmann for their invaluable help with this article. The authors assume sole 
responsibility for any remaining errors.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN EXTERNAL BORROWING BY INDIVIDUAL SECTORS
external surplus, i.e. domestic use at whole economy 
level is lower than the revenues earned, as a result of 
which the country is in a net saving position.
•  The second approach, i.e. the savings approach, is based 
on the fact that the sum of the financial positions of the 
individual economic agents is identical with that of the 
total savings of the economy, i.e. the external financing 
capacity (net lending). This approach is reflected in the 
financial accounts, which show the share of the individual 
sectors in the economy’s net savings or net borrowing 
position. Before 2009, in Hungary the external financing 
requirement of the sectors was the outcome of the fact 
that the financing requirement of the companies and 
general government exceeded households’ financial 
savings. By contrast, the net financial savings of 
households and the corporate sector currently exceed the 
general government deficit to a significant degree. 
Accordingly, the country has a sizeable external surplus.
•  The third approach forms the basis of this article: the 
starting point of this approach is the financial balance 
that reflects the financing-side processes of the balance 
of payments and focuses on the processes of borrowing.2 
Developments in the holdings of external funds in the 
economy reflect savings by domestic agents and the 
external equilibrium of the economy. If an economy is 
faced with external imbalances, i.e. both the current 
account and the capital account show a deficit, then the 
borrowing of external funds is inevitable. While the 
economy was a net borrower before the crisis, i.e. 
external funds were used to finance the portion of 
domestic use that exceeded revenues, since the outbreak 
of the crisis, concurrently with the development of the 
economy’s domestic saving position, loans taken out 
earlier are being repaid, i.e. funds are flowing out.3
it is important to identify the interconnection between 
domestic savings and funds borrowed abroad. Domestic 
sectors may have financial (asset) claims from and liabilities 
to each other and the rest of the world. An example of 
domestic financing is when government securities are 
purchased by households, in which case such securities are 
assets held by households and debt owed by the state. An 
Chart 1
the external financing capacity of the sectors and a stylised chart of the outflow of external funds
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2  The result of this approach and/or the one based on the financial savings of the sectors are/is also referred to as bottom-up financing capacity/needs, 
as it is based on the financial balance recorded in the bottom section of the balance of payments.
3  An outflow of funds may, in a net sense, occur in two different ways: one is reduction in external debt (e.g. loan repayments or redemption of maturing 
bonds), the other is an increase in assets abroad (e.g. lending abroad or placement of deposits abroad). For instance, the outflow of banks’ external 
funds experienced over the past few years occurred by banks reducing their assets abroad (inflow of funds) and loans borrowed abroad earlier to a 
much larger extent (outflow of funds). Overall, banks’ financial position vis-à-vis the rest of the world has improved significantly (net outflow of funds).
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example of external borrowing is when foreigners subscribe 
foreign currency government bonds or when multinational 
companies and banks borrow from their respective parent 
companies and parent banks, respectively. The external 
financing of an economy may also occur in the domestic 
market, typically through banks. Companies and households 
borrow almost exclusively from domestic banks, which, in 
turn, borrow abroad in order to satisfy their borrowing 
requirements.
Our article is structured as follows: First, we provide an 
overview of past developments in the net savings of the 
individual sectors, after which, based on the Quarterly 
Report on Inflation, we briefly summarise what we can 
expect in connection with the savings of the individual 
sectors in 2012 and 2013. Next, we go on to discuss the main 
subject matter of this article, i.e. developments in the 
external funds of the individual sectors. As regards the 
marked increase in the external financing capacity, we 
focus on the sectors whose outflows of funds have resulted 
in this increased capacity. The next section covers the 
changes which the expected pronounced rise in external 
financing capacity is likely to bring about in the funds 
available to the major institutional sectors. Finally, we 
study the changes that have occurred and those yet to 
occur in the debt indicators which depend primarily on 
developments in external funding.
FiNANCiAl SAviNgS OF iNDiviDuAl 
SeCtORS
In this section, we rely mainly on the analytical framework 
used in the inflation reports. External financing capacity is 
the sum of the financing capacity/requirement of general 
government (consolidated with the MNB), households and 
companies.
Prior to the outbreak of the crisis, the reduction in the 
general government financing requirement was broadly 
counterbalanced by the decline in the financial savings 
of the private sector. Consequently, Hungary’s external 
balance did not improve materially. Adjustments after 
2006 improved the fiscal balance markedly: the SNA-based 
(pension fund savings-adjusted) GDP-proportionate 
financing requirement of general government dropped from 
8 per cent in 2006 to 2 per cent in 2008 (Chart 2). At the 
same time, these fiscal adjustments resulted in a significant 
deterioration in the private sector’s income position. The 
financing requirement of the corporate sector grew, while 
households reduced their net financial savings, as a result 
of smoothing consumption. Thus, overall, the net savings of 
the domestic sectors declined, and consequently the 
external financing requirement of the Hungarian economy 
did not decrease. Accordingly, the country’s dependence on 
external funding amounted to around 8 per cent of GDP, 
similar to 2006.
After the outbreak of the crisis, the government’s 
financing requirement rose, but due to private sector 
adjustments, the external balance improved 
spectacularly. After the outbreak of the crisis, the inflow 
of external funds fell dramatically. The drying up of funds 
led to a decline in lending and harsher liquidity constraints, 
and forced the private sector to adjust quickly, which was 
reflected in a downturn in borrowing. The earlier significant 
financing requirement of the corporate sector dropped, and 
then turned into a net savings position. On the real 
economy side, this was mainly attributable to a fall in gross 
capital formation (investment and inventory building). The 
increase in the sector’s financial savings was also boosted 
by rising transfers from the EU. The underlying reason for a 
rise in the general government financing requirement in the 
first three years of the crisis was falling tax revenues in 
response to the cyclical position; in 2011 lower personal tax 
burden was another contributing factor. Households’ 
disposable income, which grew due to lower personal 
income tax rates, went into mostly financial savings, which 
grew further in 2011 as a result of the disbursement of 
pension fund real yields. Households were also cautious 
about borrowing and decided to pay off their loan debts, 
which also added to the sector's net financial savings. 
Thanks to the adjustment of the private sector and, within 
Chart 2
Developments in the net lending position of the 
individual sectors
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* General government includes the central budget, local governments, 
ÁPV Zrt., quasi-fiscal entities (MÁV and BKV), the MNB and entities 
implementing investment projects which are formally PPPs, but are 
initiated by the government. The SNA-based financing requirement is 
shown for general government, which does not include payments into 
pension funds and is different from the official (ESA) balances.
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that, companies, the country’s external financing capacity 
improved significantly. All in all, the savings of domestic 
economic agents have been in the positive domain since 
2009, as a result of which there has been no need for 
external borrowing; in fact, the past few years has even 
seen an outflow of funds.
in 2012 and 2013, the country’s external equilibrium 
position is expected to continue improving significantly. 
The Inflation Report claims that further increases in net 
exports and anticipated higher EU transfers will result in 
additional improvement in the external financing capacity 
of the Hungarian economy. Net exports are boosted by the 
launch of car manufacturing, as well as by developments in 
imports, which, in response to weak domestic consumption, 
are just moderate. The reasons underlying the increase in 
the net saving position at the whole economy level is the 
improved financial position of the general government and 
companies. Lower fiscal deficits are the outcome of the 
Structural Reform Programmes, in response to which 
domestic demand is likely to remain subdued. Higher 
corporate savings are due to weaker investment and higher 
EU transfers. Households’ savings may decrease as a result 
of the absence of one-off items boosting savings 
(disbursement of real returns by pension funds and early 
repayments of foreign currency loans). Overall, the external 
financing capacity of the Hungarian economy is likely to 
approach 3 per cent of GDP this year and 5 per cent next 
year; i.e. an outflow of funds amounting to a total of 
around 8 per cent of GDP is expected to materialise over 
two years.
HOW HAS tHe CRiSiS AFFeCteD 
BORROWiNg By tHe iNDiviDuAl 
SeCtORS?
The next section presents an overview of external borrowing 
by the individual sectors. For the purpose of this analysis, 
we rely on the sectoral breakdown of the financing side of 
the balance of payments, where the net liabilities (assets 
and debts) of direct investment capital, portfolio equities 
and other debt liabilities are totalled.
Two major differences should be borne in mind in connection 
with the net savings of the individual sectors. One is that, 
except for foreign currency purchases, households do not 
have any direct link with the rest of the world. The other is 
that most loans to the private sector are channelled via 
banks; i.e. part of financing the private sector materialises 
through the balance sheet of the banking system in the 
process of external financing. It follows that there are the 
following sectors on the financing side of the balance of 
payments: general government, the MNB, the banking 
system and other private sectors (mostly transactions by 
non-financial corporations with the rest of the world).
general government
Before the crisis, general government used external 
funds to cover only part of the deficit; in 2008 and 2009, 
however, external funds in an amount exceeding the 
deficit were used. The government’s reliance on external 
funds is linked to the financing of the fiscal deficit: the 
government’s issuance of foreign currency bonds, purchases 
of government securities by foreigners and other minor 
financing items (privatisation, development loans from 
international organisations and the pre- and post-financing 
of EU transfers) represent inflows of external funds. During 
the years preceding the crisis, in order to finance the 
deficit, the government relied on both external funds and 
purchases of government securities by domestic sectors. 
However, after the outbreak of the crisis, the situation 
changed. As domestic sectors consistently downsized their 
holdings of government securities till 2011 on the whole, 
external borrowing by the government was similar in volume 
to what we experienced earlier (Chart 3), despite a decline 
in the GFS (the cash-flow based) deficit in 2008 and 2009.
there were, however, two reasons behind this borrowing 
in an amount exceeding the deficit. One was that, due to 
problems in the government securities market, the issuance 
Chart 3
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Note: The chart plots the GFS, or cash-flow based deficit to be actually 
financed rather than the borrowing demand on an accrual basis in Chart 
2. In 2010, the government’s external borrowing was rather modest 
thanks to the repayment of the loans granted to banks earlier (HUF 200 
billion) and an increase in the mark-to-market stock, due to the 
weakening of the euro (HUF 250 billion).
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of longer-term government securities was temporarily 
suspended, while the sale of short-term securities remained 
undisturbed; simultaneously, repayments at the maturity 
dates of the government securities issued earlier had to 
continue. The other was that in an uncertain international 
situation, in order to boost foreign investor confidence, the 
government strove to increase its reserves of financing 
funds. This led to an enhanced role of foreign currency 
loans granted by international organisations and consistently 
strong external borrowing. In the past two years, the 
government’s net borrowing has been modest relative to 
earlier years; by contrast, purchases of government 
securities by the rest of the world has been on the increase 
in the context of rising borrowing demand.
When the government takes out a foreign currency loan, it then places the foreign currency it receives with the central bank, as a 
result of which the MNB’s FX reserves increase. The budget uses the loan taken to finance the deficit, i.e. it needs HUF and has the 
loan converted into forint by the MNB. Thus, the government’s foreign currency deposit is converted into a forint deposit without any 
change in the MNB’s FX reserves. When the government makes payments (e.g. it pays pensions or wages to public servants), it depletes 
its forint deposit placed with the MNB. In response to the payments, the economy’s liquidity increases (economic agents place the 
funds received as deposits with banks, or the funds spent by them are placed by the agents as deposits at the banks which receive 
them), which, ultimately, increases the funds of the banking system. Banks place such excess liquidity with the MNB in the form of 
two-week bills, i.e. a decrease in the government’s deposit portfolio with the MNB is counterbalanced by a rise in holdings of MNB bills. 
All in all, any foreign currency loan granted to the government increases the MNB’s liability due to an increase in the stock of MNB bills. 
Due to the above process, the stock of MNB bills increases similarly to FX reserves, with the latter growing, as a rule, in response to 
the government’s net foreign currency borrowing (Chart 4). Concurrently with the government’s foreign currency borrowing, the MNB 
also borrows from domestic agents (typically from banks) by issuing MNB bills. Ultimately, the general government consolidated with 
the MNB finances the increase in the FX reserves and government spending by means of the foreign currency loans borrowed and two-
week bills.
The above process has two consequences as to external borrowing.
1.  As the MNB’s FX reserves increase (an increase in foreign assets 
entails the outflow of external funds) concurrently with the 
government’s foreign currency borrowing (external borrowing), 
the financing of the budget through foreign currency loans 
means zero external borrowing in net terms for the general 
government in the broader sense. Accordingly, developments in 
external borrowing by the general government should be 
examined consolidated with the MNB (Chart 5).
2.  Concurrently with foreign currency borrowing, the stock of 
MNB bills, the majority of which are held by banks, also rise. 
As banks also need external funds to finance their assets, 
ultimately, this also means that the government’s foreign 
currency borrowing contributes to a rise in banks’ external 
borrowing (or a lower outflow of foreign funds relative to the 
available possibilities); this issue is revisited in the section on 
developments in external borrowing by banks.
the government’s foreign currency borrowing and the stock of MNB bills
Chart 4
Developments in Fx reserves and the sterilisation 
portfolio
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
5,500
6,000
6,500
7,000
Ja
n.
 0
6
A
pr
. 
06
Ju
ly
 0
6
O
ct
. 
06
Ja
n.
 0
7
A
pr
. 
07
Ju
ly
 0
7
O
ct
. 
07
Ja
n.
 0
8
A
pr
. 
08
Ju
ly
 0
8
O
ct
. 
08
Ja
n.
 0
9
A
pr
. 
09
Ju
ly
 0
9
O
ct
. 
09
Ja
n.
 1
0
A
pr
. 
10
Ju
ly
 1
0
O
ct
. 
10
Ja
n.
 1
1
A
pr
. 
11
Ju
ly
 1
1
O
ct
. 
11
Ja
n.
 1
2
A
pr
. 
12
Bn HUF Bn EUR
Sterilization instruments (MNB-bill, O/N deposit)
FX reserves (right-hand scale)
After the outbreak of the crisis, the government’s 
external borrowing continued even after correcting for 
growth in Fx reserves. The discussion presented in the 
above box reveals that the government's external borrowing 
should be examined on a consolidated basis with the MNB. 
According to this argument, although an outflow of funds 
that materialises in response to an increase in FX reserves 
reduces the size of external borrowing significantly, the 
government’s external borrowing was typical in both the 
pre- and post-crisis period. There was no external borrowing 
at the level of the general government consolidated with 
the MNB for two years. In 2005, the privatisation of 
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Budapest Airport increased the FX reserves by an extent 
exceeding 2 per cent of GDP (this outflow of funds reduced 
borrowing by the consolidated general government); in 
2008, at the onset of the crisis foreign investors sold a huge 
amount of government securities.4 Over the past three 
years, external borrowing by the general government 
consolidated with the MNB has been rather stable, hovering 
at around 2 per cent of GDP.
the corporate sector
Prior to 2008, companies borrowed heavily abroad. 
During the years leading up to the crisis, the corporate 
sector financed its investment and business operations 
through strong domestic and external borrowing, which 
materialised, typically, through borrowing in an amount 
exceeding the placement of deposits, equity financing by 
the rest of the world and taking out foreign loans (e.g. loans 
from banks or parent companies). Thus, in addition to the 
banking system, the corporate sector also borrowed strongly 
abroad directly and indirectly by taking out foreign currency 
loans with the intermediation of banks (Chart 6).5
At the same time, however, overall, there has been no 
outflow of foreign funds in net terms from the corporate 
sector − the sector’s rising financial savings are due to a 
decline in bank loans. After the outbreak of the crisis, the 
sales opportunities of companies began to deteriorate, 
which, in turn, led to falling investment spending and, 
ultimately, a decline in borrowing demand. Furthermore, 
the loss of confidence in response to the crisis also resulted 
in the drying up of external funds, which also narrowed 
companies’ opportunities to access to foreign and domestic 
financing. As a result of very weak demand for and supply 
of loans, external and domestic borrowing by the corporate 
sector declined. At the same time, however, in contrast to 
the withdrawal of funds, no material outflow of foreign 
funds materialised at an aggregate level.6 Overall, neither 
foreign owners (shareholders) nor foreign banks reduced 
the funds granted to domestic companies7 − a development 
which, as we shall see, runs strongly counter to trends in 
banks’ external funds. This also implies that almost the 
Chart 5
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Chart 6
Breakdown of the corporate sector’s financing 
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Note: Corporate financing capacity as illustrated in the chart does not 
include the financing capacity of banks, because the breakdown of 
funds is based on the balance of payments, which records the data of 
the non-bank private sector.
4  In response to the foreign currency loans granted by the IMF/EU (borrowing), the MNB’s FX reserves rose (outflow of funds), thus, all in all, it did not 
affect external borrowing.
5  An exception to this is the year 2007, when the purchase of MOL’s treasury shares reduced investments by the rest of the world in Hungary by close 
to EUR 2 billion.
6  It should be noted that a zero outflow of funds at an aggregate level is the result of rather different processes on a stand-alone basis. Many companies 
saw their borrowing opportunities fall concurrently with the deepening of the crisis in Europe, and adjustments for the crisis are also likely to have 
entailed a forced reduction in funds. This impact is likely to have been counterbalanced by the fact that the parent banks of other companies continue 
to grant shareholders’ loans to their subsidiaries, and companies are also likely to downsize their foreign assets.
7  The 2011 data were influenced by two individual impacts, which roughly counterbalance one another. The government’s purchase of MOL shares 
reduced the ownership share of the rest of the world in domestic companies, i.e. this represented an outflow of funds. In the wake of the sale of 
assets subsequent to the transformation of the private pension fund scheme, the corporate sector’s claim against the rest of the world declined to a 
corresponding extent, i.e. an inflow of funds in a similar amount materialised.
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entire rise in corporate financial savings stemmed from an 
improvement in the position of companies vis-à-vis banks 
(i.e. mostly from loan repayment).
Banking system
Before the crisis, the net savings of the private sector 
were in the negative domain. the banking system 
borrowed abroad to finance the foreign currency loans 
granted to households and companies. Before the crisis, 
on the whole, the private sector was in a net borrowing 
position: in keeping with the normal functioning of the 
economy, the corporate sector had a sizeable financing 
requirement, whilst households’ net financial savings had 
dropped close to zero by 2008 as a result of heavy 
borrowing. Likewise, before mid-2008, net borrowing by the 
private sector from banks exceeded the banking assets 
(bank deposits and bank bonds) of the private sector (Chart 
7, dashed line). The rise in foreign currency lending 
subsequent to the tightening of the home subsidy scheme 
contributed to a sizeable pick-up in lending. The banking 
system looked mainly to parent banks for additional funds.8 
In the meantime, liquid assets (government securities and 
MNB bills) in the banking system grew only moderately.
Over the past few years, the increase in private sector 
financial savings went hand in hand with a sizeable 
withdrawal of funds by banks. On the other hand, 
however, due to the crisis, banks’ needs to hold liquid 
assets also grew, as a result of which banks’ external 
funds declined more slowly than would have been 
justified on the basis of deposit placements and lending. 
In response to the crisis, the private sector’s sizeable net 
borrowing position − amounting to 6 per cent of GDP − 
turned into a net lending position of 4 per cent by 2009. As 
mentioned in the section on the corporate sector, the 
improvement in the position vis-à-vis banks played a 
decisive role in this. Low credit availability for the corporate 
sector and the deteriorating income position led to a 
downturn in demand for credit in the household sector as 
well, i.e. households’ position vis-à-vis banks improved 
significantly. A major proportion of the financial savings 
comes from the decline in (repayment of) bank loans; the 
increase in holdings of bank securities was also a contributing 
factor. This means that the increase in the net savings of 
the private sector boosted banks’ liquid assets considerably. 
Banks used this excess liquidity to finance two things. One 
is that on the asset side their holdings of MNB bills expanded 
further in response to the sterilisation portfolio growing 
concurrently with a rise in the FX reserves and a growing 
need to hold liquid assets (Chart 7). The other is that banks 
used their remaining liquid assets to repay loans they had 
borrowed abroad (Chart 7, the solid line, and the right-hand 
side of Chart 8 − banks borrowed abroad before the crisis; 
since 2009, the outflow of funds has been dominant).
the early repayment scheme in late 2011 and early 2012 
significantly affected the financing processes of banks. 
During the early repayment programme, concurrent with 
the repayment of loans, the reduction in the external debt 
of banks accelerated, and this was only cushioned to a 
limited extent by the rising external financing stemming 
from capital increases at banks (i.e. inflows of direct 
investment capital). Due to reporting obligations, 
information on the anticipated scope of early repayments 
was already available in late 2011, and thus the banking 
system was able to take this into account during its 
customary end-of-the year balance sheet management. This 
is also likely to have played a role in the phenomenon that, 
subsequent to the significant acceleration, the outflow of 
funds from banks slowed down in early 2012.
the national economy
Concurrently with trends in the net lending position of 
the Hungarian economy, an outflow of external funds 
also commenced, but this was not the case in each sector 
(Chart 8). Continued placement of deposits by households 
and the corporate sector as well as loan repayments in 
Chart 7
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8  Securing foreign currency financing was in the vested interest of the banking system, because such helped control the B/S FX position, where the gap 
brought about by foreign currency lending to the domestic sectors started to widen.
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response to the crisis contributed significantly to a sharp 
rise in the private sector’s net savings, enabling the banking 
system to increasingly downsize its external financing. By 
contrast, the net lending position of the corporate sector 
that had evolved did not entail a reduction in its direct 
external liabilities. As for the consolidated general 
government, the past few years have seen a rise in its 
borrowing demand and simultaneously, external borrowing 
has continued.
exPeCteD exteRNAl BORROWiNg By 
tHe iNDiviDuAl SeCtORS
Based on the forecasts presented in the Inflation Report, 
Hungary’s net lending will continue to increase in the future 
(see the section on the financing capacity of the individual 
sectors). At the same time, the outflow of foreign funds 
may become more intense. In the following, we examine 
the likely changes in the external funds of the individual 
sectors over a time horizon until the end of 2013. In so 
doing, we continue to rely strongly on the forecasts 
presented in the Inflation Report.
in order to avoid any confusion, it should be noted that 
we had to rely on a number of assumptions in connection 
with the behaviour of the individual sectors when 
formulating our expectations for the future.
•  The most important is that − similar to the past few years 
− we expect that the Government Debt Management 
Agency (GDMA) will issue foreign currency bonds to 
finance its expiring foreign currency loans and that, in 
line with the adopted practice, it will have foreign 
currencies converted into forints at the MNB.
•  We also assume that the funds available to domestic 
banks will increase, with the amount of deposits from the 
private sector and that of loan repayments added to 
them.
•  Finally, as regards the behaviour of banks, we rely on the 
historical wisdom that growth in the MNB bill portfolio 
will be absorbed mainly by domestic banks.
In light of the above, let us look at the changes that may 
occur in the dynamics of the external funds of the individual 
sectors.
in the context of net repayments by companies of the 
loans provided by domestic banks, we also expect a 
reduction in the external funds available to companies. 
Financial savings of the corporate sector are expected to rise 
further in the years to come in response to the launch of auto 
industry manufacturing, EU transfers and persistently 
subdued investment. Consistent improvement in the financial 
position of the sector is likely to materialise indirectly 
through the banking system (mostly through the repayment 
of loans, and in part through new placements of deposits) 
and directly in the processes of external finances. The latter 
may mean both foreign bank loans and the outflow of FDI 
liabilities, which became stuck at a certain level earlier (e.g. 
a marked reduction in intercompany loans).
Chart 8
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Continued balance sheet adjustment by the banking 
system is also likely to still play an important role in the 
reduction in external funding. the expected rise in the 
MNB bill portfolio may reduce banks’ net withdrawal of 
funds. The private sector’s still sizeable net saving position 
means continued loan repayments and the placements of 
new deposits, which opens up another window of opportunity 
for a reduction in banks’ net external funds. In addition to 
the savings of the private sector, banks’ position vis-à-vis 
the central bank may also influence trends in banks’ 
external funds. As mentioned above, along with a rise in FX 
reserves, there was a rise in the MNB bill portfolio (Chart 
4), with the bills purchased mainly by banks. Thanks to the 
expected significant rise in EU transfers, central bank FX 
reserves may start rising again in the years to come (if the 
government takes on new foreign currency loans equal to 
those that mature). Simultaneously, banks’ liquidity surplus 
is also likely to rise, which the banking system will have to 
finance. Banks’ excess liquidity will go, in part, into the 
purchase of MNB bills and the repayment of external funds. 
While developments in the position of banks vis-à-vis the 
private sector could make a larger reduction in external 
funds possible, the expected rise in the MNB bill portfolio 
may put a brake on the outflow of banks’ funds. All in all, 
compared to the past a smaller outflow of bank funds is 
expected to materialise by the end of 2013.
Along with moderation in the general government 
borrowing requirement, external borrowing by the state 
may also decline; by contrast, due to a rise in Fx 
reserves, a net outflow of funds is likely to materialise at 
the level of general government consolidated with the 
MNB. Over the past few years, the volume of issuance of 
foreign currency bonds by the GDMA has been identical to 
the volume of maturing foreign currency debt; accordingly, 
we continue to assume that the government’s net foreign 
currency borrowing will not entail net external borrowing. 
Simultaneously, domestic agents may play a greater role in 
financing the fiscal deficit, which is expected to be 
considerably lower than in 2011; in the first half of 2012, 
households and banks purchased Hungarian government 
securities in the amount of HUF 140 billion and HUF 240 
billion, respectively. Overall, external borrowing by general 
government excluding the MNB may be lower this and next 
year than in 2011. Concurrently, the MNB’s FX reserves may 
rise, which entails an outflow of funds. Taking the MNB’s 
position vis-à-vis the rest of the world into account, we 
expect a net outflow of funds at the level of consolidated 
general government in the years to come, a development 
completely opposite to the inflow of funds that characterised 
the pre-crisis and the crisis years.
in addition to the baseline scenario outlined above, we 
wish to present two other scenarios in which the share 
of the individual sectors in the outflow of funds changes. 
In one of the possible scenarios, banks’ holdings of MNB bills 
increase at a lower rate than in our assumption, which may 
be attributed to a number of factors: either banks are 
unwilling to hold liquid assets in such an amount or parent 
banks need the funds generated by their Hungarian 
subsidiary banks to a larger extent.9 In either case, the 
outflow of banks’ funds may be faster than what would 
follow from our assumption. An unusually rapid outflow of 
funds may also entail a rise in yields on government 
securities and a weaker forint, which, in turn, may result in 
changes in macroeconomic financial savings and the 
financial savings of the individual sectors. Based on 
historical wisdom, we think that lack of demand experienced 
by banks may be counterbalanced by the purchase of 
government securities and MNB bills by the rest of the 
world, which is also likely to be related to a shift in price-
type variables. All in all, an increase in the government’s 
external borrowing may counteract higher outflow of 
banks’ funds. In another possible scenario, companies do 
not reduce their external liabilities despite the increase in 
their financial savings. In this case, liquidity arising from 
the saving position of the companies will flow into the 
banking system in the form of loan repayment or stronger 
placement of deposits. Banks will use these additional 
funds to reduce further their foreign debts, i.e. a lower 
outflow of corporate funds may be counterbalanced by a 
stronger outflow of banks’ funds.
DevelOPMeNtS iN exteRNAl DeBt
The sum of borrowing by the individual sectors (i.e. 
external financing capacity) determines the way in which a 
country’s external debt changes. There are two types of 
external debt: debt liabilities (e.g. loans borrowed abroad 
and foreign currency bonds issued) and non-debt liabilities 
(e.g. direct investment and equity liabilities). Analyses 
focus mainly on external debt, as it carries roll-over risks, 
while equity-type external liabilities pose less risk to 
Hungary.
9  If the government can only issue foreign currency bonds in an amount that is smaller than that of the maturing bonds, this would also result in a smaller 
portfolio of MNB bills held by banks. In such a situation, the government should increase the issuance of HUF. If the total amount of such additional 
securities were purchased by the banking system, then there would be no departure from the baseline scenario in respect of external borrowing. If, 
however, part of the securities were purchased by the rest of the world, then, ceteris paribus, banks’ external borrowing could be lower relative to 
the baseline scenario.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN EXTERNAL BORROWING BY INDIVIDUAL SECTORS
Net external debt, which rose significantly before the 
crisis, has decreased only moderately, despite the 
significantly stronger net lending position. Hungary’s net 
external debt started to rise sharply after 2004 and had 
exceeded 50 per cent of GDP by 2008. Such a marked rise 
was attributable to banks’ external borrowing concurrently 
with a take-off in foreign currency lending and external 
borrowing by the corporate sector (Chart 9). Nevertheless, 
despite the economy’s net lending position, net external 
debt did not decrease before 2011, which was due to a rise 
in the forint-denominated amount of external debt in 
response to the weakening of the forint. In 2011, however, 
despite further depreciation of the forint, GDP-proportionate 
net external debt fell tangibly, because the outflow of debt 
financing was particularly large.
A consistently high external surplus means that, unless 
the exchange rate changes, debt indicators key to 
Hungary’s external vulnerability will decline further. 
Hungary’s external surplus approximates 8 per cent of GDP 
for 2012 and 2013 taken together. Thus, we expect an 
outflow of net external funds (debt and non-debt liabilities) 
of a similar size to occur in the next two years, i.e. the net 
external liabilities of the economy (debt and non-debt 
liabilities) is likely to decline to a similar extent. The likely 
underlying reasons for the outflow of funds are, to a lesser 
degree, a reduction in the FDI liabilities of companies and, 
to a larger degree, the net repayment of debt financing of 
the domestic sectors (companies, banks and the state). As 
regards the structure of financing, we expect a moderate 
inflow of non-debt financing in 2012, which may turn into 
an outflow in 2013. The underlying reason for this is that 
net savings of the corporate sector increase markedly, 
which may go hand in hand with a significant fall in 
intercompany loans. Thus, a reduction in external liabilities 
may materialise mainly through reduction in net external 
debt.
As an outcome of the improved external balance and 
along with the appreciation of the forint since in late 
2011 and an increase in nominal gDP, Hungary’s gDP-
proportionate net external debt is likely to drop from 50 
per cent as at end-2011 to below 40 per cent by end of 
2013. Both net repayments of foreign loans (a gross 
reduction in debt) and an expected rise in foreign currency 
reserves (a gross increase in foreign assets) will contribute 
to a reduction in net external debt. The increase in FX 
reserves is due to EU transfers and the expected issuance 
of foreign currency bonds. By June, the appreciation of the 
forint early this year had led to an approximately 5 
percentage point decline in the net external debt rate. 
Next year, unless the exchange rate of the forint changes, 
the reduction in net external debt indicators will depend 
mostly on the outflow of funds, which the impact from an 
increase in nominal GDP may accelerate slightly.
Despite net lending and more moderate debt indicators, 
the Hungarian economy is likely to remain financially 
vulnerable, because the gross borrowing requirement 
will remain significant, due to the economy’s high 
indebtedness. Although the balance-of-payments surplus, 
the net saving position of the Hungarian economy and 
indicators of external debt, which have been decreasing 
consistently albeit slowly, mitigate the riskiness of Hungarian 
assets, gross data underlying the net figures should not be 
neglected, as net lending reduces Hungary’s gross borrowing 
only to a limited extent. As regards short-term funds, 
economic agents have to roll over funds in an amount of 
around EUR 30 billion each year, the execution of which will 
likely continue to pose risks.
SuMMARy
Prior to the crisis, Hungary borrowed heavily as a combined 
result of investment and consumption exceeding the incomes 
of domestic agents and lax fiscal policy. In response to the 
crisis, the net savings of the domestic sectors rose 
substantially, while the borrowing possibilities for banks and 
companies were fewer, which ultimately led to an outflow of 
funds. Our analysis reveals that not all the sectors strive to 
repay external debt: in the context of a significant outflow 
of funds from the banking system, there was no material 
change in the external funds held by companies, whereas by 
contrast, the general government sector continues to 
borrow. Our forecast reveals that changes in the outflow of 
funds from the individual sectors are likely to occur in the 
years to come. The underlying reasons for this are that there 
may be some slowdown in the reduction of banks’ external 
Chart 9
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funds in response to the expected increase in holdings of 
MNB bills and that an outflow of funds may materialise at 
the level of consolidated general government as well. Its 
extent depends heavily on the possibilities available to 
banks for withdrawing funds and on their intention to do so. 
If parent banks decide to withdraw further funds or FX 
reserves grow only modestly, the government is likely to 
borrow further. Concurrently with the possible outflow of a 
larger volume of funds, Hungary’s net external debt may fall 
faster than it used to.
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iNtRODuCtiON
The financial crisis which emerged in 2007 and intensified 
in 2008 spread from the US to other regions, including the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Terms of financing 
changed significantly, credit risk premia rose dramatically 
and lending declined. Although the European Monetary 
Union as a whole is less indebted than other global regions, 
it has become the riskiest region since the outbreak of the 
Greek crisis at the end of 2009. In earlier MNB publications, 
we have discussed the (mainly institutional) deficiencies 
which can explain this apparent contradiction.1 This article 
attempts to provide a brief overview of the debates related 
to the success of crisis management in Europe and, within 
that, the effectiveness of fiscal consolidation.
tHe glOBAl CReDit CRiSiS AND tHe 
ReSPONSe OF tHe euROPeAN 
MONetARy uNiON
In response to the deteriorating global macroeconomic 
situation, after the G-20 summit in Washington in the 
autumn of 2008,2 governments and central banks intervened 
decisively to put an end to developments which threatened 
to lead to general panic. On a number of occasions, they 
resorted to unconventional economic policy tools only used 
during crisis periods. As for fiscal policy, they adopted the 
European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), which enabled 
governments to swiftly mitigate the consequences of the 
crisis and put their respective economies back on a growth 
path by means of country-specific fiscal measures which 
could handle the crisis, temporarily ‘suspending’ the strict 
fiscal regulations designed for ‘normal times’. As an 
independent institution, but working in unison with the 
governments, the European Central Bank (ECB) resorted to 
non-standard tools to prevent financial panic from leading 
to the collapse of the banking system.
From 2009 onwards, when the first signs of global economic 
stabilisation were discernible, policymakers in the developed 
countries began considering the possibility of gradually 
abandoning non-standard measures. In September 2009, the 
G20 decided to implement a ‘back-to-normal’ process in a 
concerted, but country-specific manner.3 However, 
encouraged by the results of immediate crisis management, 
the individual global regions soon started to increasingly 
diverge in terms of economic policy priorities. Europeans, 
who were especially worried about their fiscal deficit and 
sovereign debt, which were inconsistent with the operating 
principles of the EMU, decided to embark on a path of fiscal 
consolidation. This intention became stronger with the 
outbreak of a fiscal crisis in Greece at the end of 2009 and 
mounting financial market tensions in the other periphery 
countries. Whilst also seeking ways ‘normalise’ conditions, 
other major advanced regions, primarily the US and Japan, 
were more cautious about launching the process of fiscal 
consolidation.
Since the second half of 2011, fears of another recession 
have become more pronounced. The European Monetary 
Zoltán Szalai: A crisis of crisis management? 
Debates over fiscal adjustments in the 
european Monetary union
In response to increasing market pressure, EMU countries embarked on a robust consolidation process in 2010 in order to 
reduce their fiscal deficits and sovereign debt levels. Although − relying on external help in a number of cases − they have 
been implementing aggressive adjustment programmes, their public debt-to-GDP ratio is unlikely to change or change very 
much this or next year. Consequently, a debate has evolved over the effectiveness of fiscal tightening.
1  For a more detailed discussion of the global crisis, see MNB (2011).
2  G20 was expressly founded to manage the global crisis in a co-ordinated manner. The rationale for this was that it became clear in the crisis that major 
developing countries were not represented in a manner that is commensurate with their weight within the current global institutional framework.
3  G-20 (2009) Pittsburgh Summit: Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth
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Union has become the most important risk to global 
economic stability. Fiscal consolidation in the EU member 
states under market pressure has resulted in little 
improvement and other larger member states have also 
come under pressure. The looming possibility of another 
recession also calls into question the sustainability of fiscal 
policies. Accordingly, a debate on the following issues has 
erupted again: Is fiscal tightening a reasonable solution 
when, due to balance sheet adjustments, the private 
sector's propensity to save is much stronger than it used to 
be and when growth is fragile? Is there any likelihood that 
such a policy results in an unintended outcome of GDP 
falling so steeply that debt either cannot be reduced or 
even rises to a level that is higher than before the 
tightening? Or, on the contrary, is fiscal policy supposed to 
help the private sector with balance sheet adjustments by 
allowing the deficit to grow further? Is this a feasible policy 
in those countries where sovereign debt is already high? 
Why should markets assume this additional risk if there are 
investments that carry lower credit risks?
Neither the aggregate debt nor the fiscal deficit of the EMU 
countries explains Europe’s eagerness to implement speedy 
fiscal consolidation: the corresponding indicators for both 
the US and Japan are worse. Nevertheless, in respect of the 
EMU member states, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal 
will need to make more marked fiscal adjustment than the 
US or Japan.
Before the crisis, yields on government securities in Greece 
and other countries which later came under market 
pressure hardly featured any risk premium in excess of 
German yields which were seen as a safe investment. A 
sovereign default by an advanced country has not been a 
serious possibility since the end of WW II. Therefore, the 
government securities of such countries were considered to 
be practically default risk free and were held by many 
investors which were allowed to hold only a limited number 
of risky securities (e.g. pension funds, certain investment 
funds and central banks such as the ECB). However, when 
fears that sovereign debt in Greece and other EMU countries 
is not as risk free as in Germany, as these countries may not 
necessarily be bailed out by other member states if faced 
with repayment difficulties, markets started to take a 
closer look at the sustainability of their debt.
The renewed appearance of sovereign default risk in 
advanced economies had a profound impact on Greek 
government securities, which also spread to the government 
securities markets of countries facing high debts for other 
reasons (e.g. Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Cyprus, 
etc.). The underlying reasons for the indebtedness of these 
countries vary and so does their macro-economic situation. 
The common denominator is that yields on their government 
securities reached levels that called into question the 
sustainability of their debt and several of them had to 
resort to external help. Fears developed that deposits in 
the individual countries were also risky to varying degrees. 
As a result, a flight to safety soon ensued, with deposits 
flowing out from periphery countries into the strongest 
member states. Speculation emerged about sovereign 
defaults and bank bankruptcies, with the threat of becoming 
self-fulfilling prophecies, and the individual periphery 
countries were unable to manage these problems on their 
own.4 In light of the uncertainty that had evolved, member 
states in a stronger fiscal position concluded that further 
rapid fiscal consolidation in all countries was the only viable 
solution to restore market confidence and to prevent panic 
about a disintegration of EMU. Accordingly, the condition 
for a bail-out to be met by each crisis-stricken country was 
stringent fiscal adjustment.
This article presents the debate over fiscal adjustment in 
connection with Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal 
(EMU 5). The situations in all of these countries are not the 
same: for example, Greece has already received several 
bail-out packages and been granted debt relief, whilst Italy 
is not in a crisis yet, but can only access financing at 
unsustainably high yields. What they have in common is that 
they are both a risk to the stability of the EMU as a whole, 
due to either the size of their economies alone or the 
potential contagion risks.5
FiSCAl ADJuStMeNt AND tHe 
SuStAiNABility OF DeBt
The outlook for a slowdown in the global economy − which 
first emerged in 2011 and then became more definite from 
the summer of 2012 − points to an even more unfavourable 
fiscal path in the GMU-5 countries, compared to the earlier 
forecasts. Especially in light of their longer-term growth 
4  See De Grauwe (2011), who provides evidence that even if Spain’s debt is lower than that of the UK, its sovereign default risk indicator is much higher. 
He attributes this contradiction to the fact that neither Spain nor the other EMU member states enjoy monetary independence, and markets fear that 
the common central bank will not intervene in their respective government securities markets if a market failure materialises (market maker of last 
resort).
5  Slovenia found itself under similar pressure for a while, but its growth prospects have improved and its sovereign debt is not too high either. Cyprus 
turned to the IMF for help in the summer of 2012. Given that these two countries are relatively small and that their problems are less serious, they 
attract less attention in respect of the stability of the EMU as a whole.
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potential, debt in these countries seems unsustainable. 
Market conditions for borrowing by them make this obvious; 
it follows then that fiscal adjustment is inevitable in these 
countries. There are debates about the ways in which 
GMU-5 countries should respond to the bleaker outlook: 
should they introduce further austerity measures to 
maintain the previously designated fiscal path or would 
doing so result in further burdens on economic agents to 
the degree that they cannot or will not bear such burdens? 
Or, in an even bleaker scenario, would the adoption of such 
measures backfire and lead to an outcome that is just the 
opposite of what is intended, due to its disproportionately 
adverse impact on business activity?
In order to be able to answer these questions, we need to 
know how a reduction in budgetary expenditure affects 
growth in terms of its size and composition. This impact 
depends on the value of multipliers. The influence of fiscal 
tightening on the ‘snowball effect’ must also be assessed 
(See Box 1).
table 1
indicators of the sustainability of sovereign debt in five eMu countries
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013*
greece
GDP growth −0.1 −3.3 −3.5 −6.9 −4.8
Debt rate 113 129 145 165 163
Yields on government 
securities 7.4 5.7 8.2
PSB** −9.6 −3.4 1.2 3.4 1.9
ireland
GDP growth −3 −0.7 −0.4 0.7 0.5 1.9
Debt rate 24.4 42.2 74.9 96.4 105.6 109.5
Yields on government 
securities 4.4 4.9 9.2 8.5 6.9
PSB −7.6 −6.5 −4.9 −4.1 −2.4
italy
GDP growth −1.2 −5.5 1.8 0.4 −1.9 −0.3
Debt rate 105.8 116.1 118.1 120.1 125.8 126.4
Yields on government 
securities 4.5 4.1 4.8 5
PSB 0.7 1 1.3 4.7 5.5
Spain
GDP growth 0.9 −3.7 −0.1 0.7 −1.5 −0.6
Debt rate 40.2 53.9 61.6 68.5 90.3 96.5
Yields on government 
securities 4.4 4 4.3 5.5 7.1
PSB −6.9 −5.4 −4.9 −1.6 −1.5
Portugal
GDP 0 −2.9 1.4 −1.6 −3.3 0.3
Debt 71.6 83.1 93.4 107.2 112.4 115.3
Yields on government 
securities 4.5 4.2 5.4 10.1 11.7 8
PSB −5.8 −5.6 −2.3 1.8 3.7
* IMF forecast.
** Primary structural balance.
Source: IMF (2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2012e, 2012f).
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Table 1 shows the trends and developments in the variables 
key to sustainability in the countries under market pressure: 
due to the rate of growth and interest on debt − i.e. the 
snowball effect − the sustainability of their debt is in 
question. The debt-to-GDP ratio is unlikely to decrease this 
year and next year due to high risk premia and the 
deteriorating growth outlook. This is attributable, in part, 
to short-term multiplier effects, which, in response to fiscal 
consolidation, trigger a more marked fall in growth than the 
extent of the improvement in the fiscal balance.6 They also 
reflect market uncertainty about the success of 
consolidation, which, in turn, leads to high yields on 
government securities.
Fiscal balance and economic growth interact via a number of channels.
D(t) = D(t−1)*(1−G(t))−E(t) = D(t−1)*(1+R(t)−G(t))−EE(t)
In the formula, D denotes the debt-to-GDP ratio, G is the rate of nominal growth, R stands for the average rate of interest on sovereign 
debt and EE is the primary fiscal balance. The formula describing annual dynamics reveals that, fundamentally, trends in debt are 
shaped by the primary structural balance and the snowball effect.
There may also be instances of revaluation, e.g. the revaluation impact of exchange rate changes or one-off transfers such as the take-
over of the assets of the private sector; however, they are not fiscal adjustment items and are, in part, exogenous attributes as far as 
consolidation is concerned. The budgeting process also takes into account these changes that are beyond control.
The primary balance is the recorded fiscal balance minus interest payments, which reveals more about trends in fiscal policy, because 
interest payments are subject to past indebtedness and market interest rates, with the latter two left unaffected by current economic 
policy. The structural primary balance shows what the balance would be if tax bases were at their medium-term levels. Thus, from 
this point of view, medium-term economic performance, i.e. potential GDP, is of key importance.
The primary balance should cover current interest payment obligations if debt were to remain sustainable. As the primary balance 
changes in conjunction with long-term growth and interest depends on government securities market yields, the primary balance 
should be higher than debt, i.e. the snowball effect (the difference between interest on debt and the growth rate of the economy).
Snowball effect means that if the primary balance is in equilibrium, and the debt-to-GDP ratio is exactly 100 per cent, then if growth 
is lower than interest rates, debt grows and cannot be sustained. It follows then that a surplus is needed to stop the snowball.
Box 1
Fiscal balance, economic growth and cycles
The European Commission’s 2012 Report on Public Finances in EMU provides a useful and exhaustive summary of the assessment of 
fiscal multipliers. Multipliers show how a unit change in the fiscal balance affects output. If the relationship is in the positive domain, 
the direction of the change in both is identical: if the deficit decreases, then GDP declines as well; if the multiplier is higher than one, 
then GDP will fall to a greater extent than the deficit. As a rule, the interpretation is symmetrical, i.e. an increase in deficit will raise 
output. Non-Keynesian effects materialise if there is an inverse relationship in the negative domain, when a change in the deficit 
results in an increase in output; this can counterbalance the adverse impact of weaker demand by favourably influencing long-term 
interest rates. If non-Keynesian effects are dominant, fiscal consolidation does not result in growth sacrifice: fiscal stabilisation results 
in an increase in output; by contrast, when classic Keynesian effects are dominant, there is, at least for a temporary period of time, 
growth sacrifice. There are also expenditure and revenue-side multipliers, and the impact of the individual items also varies.
Box 2
Assessments of fiscal multipliers
6  European Commission (2012), pp. 138−144.
MNB BulletiN • OctOBer 2012 61
A CRISIS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT? DEBATES OVER FISCAL ADJUSTMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN...
In simulations of debt sustainability, subsequent to a short-
term increase in debt in response to consolidation, 
sustainability can be restored in two or three years, i.e. 
debt either stops growing or starts declining. The same 
factors explain medium- and longer term developments in 
debt as short-term ones except that, over these horizons, 
the debt-reducing impact of consolidation is dominant in 
terms of its adverse influence on GDP (denominator effect).
However, simulations cannot take into account a few 
important impacts, because such effects cannot be 
quantified to a satisfactory degree. Under certain 
circumstances, these impacts can trigger an effect that 
runs counter to the one intended by consolidation. One 
such impact is when the multiplier is persistent, i.e. its 
impact continues for several years. This can be the case if 
consolidation fails even after a number of attempts. With 
its size and direction depending on a number of factors, the 
impact on interest rates is of key importance. Consolidation 
is a primary source of impact through reduction in deficit 
and debt. As these impacts also influence GDP, interest 
rates also reflect the expectations that are the outcome of 
these interactions. In other words, interest rates reflect 
market expectations regarding the success of consolidation. 
A scenario where expectations foil consolidation cannot be 
ruled out either. If, for instance, significant long-term 
adjustments are needed, markets expect societies to resist 
austerity measures and governments give in. Another 
possibility is that planned consolidation is implemented, but 
GDP falls to a larger-than-expected extent and consolidation 
has to be repeated.
DeBAteS OveR CRiSiS MANAgeMeNt
The relationships described above facilitate the 
interpretation of debates over crisis management. Some 
recommend that, in response to deteriorating growth 
prospects, the countries affected should implement 
consolidation in a protracted manner. Fiscal tightening 
along with excessive saving by the private sector would 
increase the economic downturn disproportionately and 
unnecessarily. This recommendation seems to push at an 
open door, because the new economic co-ordination 
framework accords higher importance to the structural 
Research shows that the value of multipliers depends on a number of factors. Impacts are stronger if an economy is closed, i.e. there 
is no ‘import leakage’, consolidation is consistent and lasting, and economic policy is credible, etc. There may be a difference between 
the impact of multipliers in the first year and in subsequent years (persistence). Given the context of the current crisis, it is especially 
important that the impact of multipliers varies to a large degree depending on the prevailing phase of the business cycle. If the 
proportion of unused capacities is high, so is the impact. This also works symmetrically: in theory, consolidation reduces output to a 
large extent, while expansion boosts it even more markedly, relative to non-crisis periods.
Estimates in studies range rather widely: In non-crisis periods, expenditure multipliers range between 0.4 and 1.2, with tax multipliers 
showing a somewhat lower value (often below 0.7). In crises, especially in financial ones, they usually stand at 1.4 or even 1.6. The 
European Commission’s own estimate also corroborates these values. Results vary considerably from one country to the next; however, 
this is attributable to not only the different characteristics of the individual countries, but also to the uncertainties of the estimates.
In light of such uncertainties, the values of a critical multiplier serving as a benchmark have also been calculated. These threshold 
values are the values of the multiplier where, at any given level of interest rates and debts, fiscal consolidation will increase debt in 
the first year. This indicator depends on the original amount of debt, the flexibility of the fiscal balance to trends in growth, which 
weakens the ability of consolidation to reduce deficit, and the value of the multiplier itself. If debt-to-income ratio is 100 per cent, 
then, with automatic stabilisers standing at 0.5, the value of the critical multiplier is around 0.6 to 0.7.
The Commission calculated critical multiplier values for 27 
member states, with the values ranging between 0.5 (Greece) and 
2.8 (Estonia). A comparison of these threshold values with the 
estimates in empirical literature reveals that figures for Greece 
are unequivocally critical already in normal times. If the values 
are higher as is the case in crises, in the Commission’s judgement, 
the multiplier is expected to reach the critical value in around 
two-thirds of the member states; accordingly, consolidation will 
result in higher debt in the first year. The EMU countries that are 
the hardest hit by the crisis are in this group.
table 2
Critical first-year multipliers in the context of 
unchanged 2011 interest rates
Greece 0.5
Ireland 0.7
Italy 0.6
Portugal 0.7
Spain 0.9
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balance, of all the fiscal policy objectives.7 This means that 
if there is an adopted fiscal path and a related growth path, 
then, if the latter turns out unfavourably, no further 
consolidation measures need to be taken automatically. It 
follows then that it is the cyclically adjusted balance rather 
than the headline deficit that needs to be maintained; the 
former may be higher than the original fiscal objective 
calculated for higher GDP as is the case in the example that 
we offer. This is, however, not automatically done, as the 
consent of the counterparties and the Commission needs to 
be obtained.
Agreement with counterparties can improve credibility as 
perceived by the markets and mitigate the threat that a 
modified objective may rule out the possibility of a less 
painful adjustment through increased interest and the mass 
withdrawal of deposits. There have been a number of 
instances consolidations slowing down recently. In July 
2012, Spain was given the following relief in light of 
deteriorating growth prospects: the Spanish government 
was allowed to postpone reducing the deficit to below 3 per 
cent by one year until 2014. Similarly, in Portugal the new 
deficit target allows a 0.5 percentage point larger deficit in 
2012 and a 1.5 percentage point larger deficit next year. In 
the past, Greece had also been granted similar relief. In 
fact, there seems to be agreement on this issue; the 
question is when relief should be granted and to which 
countries.
Other proposals seek to manage the ‘denominator effect’, 
i.e. growth. Those in favour of fast consolidation wish to 
improve the longer-term growth prospects of the countries 
via fiscal and other austerity measures. In their opinion, 
one important factor threatening long-term growth is 
excessively high government debts, which, once they have 
reached a certain level, reduce or even hinder growth. By 
contrast, those arguing for slower consolidation are also 
afraid that longer-term growth may also fall victim to a 
shorter-term downturn: referring to what is called 
hysteresis, they worry that downturn may lead to a marked 
loss in output and capacity, leading to a permanent 
deterioration in potential growth.
Closely related to this are debates over structural (product 
and labour market) reforms. Those in favour of fast 
consolidation argue that the crisis should be turned into an 
advantage. Reforms that would hardly be accepted by 
stakeholders under other circumstances should be 
implemented and governments themselves would also be 
unwilling to adopt unpopular measures (‘Let’s not waste a 
perfectly good crisis.’). Those against the idea argue that 
reforms make stakeholders even more wary and, hence, 
urge them to save more heavily and postpone capital 
investments in economies that are already suffering from 
slack demand. In the absence of demand, boosting supply 
and competition cannot succeed. In a dynamically growing 
economy, losers of reforms can be compensated for the 
losses that they suffer, which helps reforms gain acceptance 
and makes it easier to manage the impacts that put a brake 
on growth.
Another even more intriguing debate is being held about 
the competitiveness of indebted countries. According to the 
most widely held view, the problem of the indebted 
countries is that their competitiveness is weak, which 
cannot be remedied through depreciation due to the 
common currency. This raises the issue in both the longer 
and the shorter run, as to whether satisfactory performance 
can be achieved within EMU. Others doubt that, except for 
Greece, there is anything the matter with competitiveness. 
In their opinion, competitiveness in the EMU-5 countries is 
unlikely to have deteriorated before or during the crisis, as 
wage competitiveness and export sales were similar to 
those in the rest of the EMU member states.8 This is shown 
in the two graphs in Chart 1. Competitiveness is relative: 
the chart reveals that there is ‘overcompetitiveness’ in 
Germany rather than a blatant lack of competitiveness in 
the crisis countries. If, however, the opinion that the EMU-5 
countries are uncompetitive gains ground, then this may 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy in the form of higher 
prevailing interest rates and may make the establishment 
and operation of a sustainable debt path difficult.
A number of analysts claim that indebtedness and, within 
that, the indebtedness of the private sector offer a more 
plausible explanation for overheating and the absence of 
external equilibrium in the EMU countries, although fiscal 
deficit was a more important contributor in Greece9 (see 
Chart 2).
According to this opinion, austerity measures and fighting 
overheating would have made sense in the pre-crisis period. 
Therefore, the European Commission, the ECB and the 
European Council have worked out a group of macro-
economic indicators, on the basis of which they may, in the 
future, for preventive purposes, stipulate macro-economic 
7  Buti and Pench (2012a, 2012b).
8 See, e.g. Fatás (2011).
9 See, e.g. Brender et al. (2012).
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adjustments for the countries where they detect and 
identify unsustainable processes.10 However, austerity 
measures presently fail to achieve their objectives, because 
they only make the situation of an already adjusting private 
sector even worse by putting a brake on the output 
potential of the economy and may even lead to mass 
bankruptcies.11
At this juncture, we have returned to the issue of a major 
deficiency in the institutional framework of the EMU/EU. 
Chart 1
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10  In response to the crisis, the European Commission has adopted a scoreboard. Based on this, the potential macro-economic vulnerability as well as 
the internal and external imbalances of the member states are checked starting from 2012.
11  See, e.g. Koo (2012).
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EMU is a monetary region in which − although the member 
states have discretion over their respective fiscal policies, 
restricted by certain regulations as the case may be − they 
have lost their monetary independence. In other words, 
monetary sovereignty has been fully centralised, as a result 
of which the participating countries relate to their own 
currency as if it were a foreign currency. This explains why 
markets perceive the sovereign default risk in Spain higher 
than that of the much more heavily indebted UK.12 Due to 
the current mode of operation of the ECB, weaker EMU 
participants are faced with a situation that is similar to that 
of the non-participating countries, which raised debt in 
euro or other foreign currencies rather than their own 
sovereign currency.
The large degree of integration in the financial sector failed 
to be followed by the integration of fiscal policy to a 
corresponding extent. Therefore, some of the 
recommendations for institutional changes are focussed on 
balancing out this asymmetric integration and urge 
community rather than national solutions. A higher level of 
co-ordination in fiscal stimuli would be achieved, if 
aggregate demand were redistributed within the EMU. In 
such an arrangement, countries with greater room for 
manoeuvre would ease their fiscal policy or at least slow 
down consolidation. They could help the countries that 
have to implement consolidation faster by serving as export 
markets for them.
Another more centralised solution is increasing aggregate 
demand via the EIB (European Investment Bank). 
Expenditures could target increasing the growth potential 
of less competitive countries, e.g. infrastructure 
development. Others claim that in order to handle high 
unemployment at the same time, activities capable of 
creating a large number of jobs at any unit cost should be 
financed; infrastructure development is not among them, 
because too large a proportion of expenses is allocated to 
table 3
Fiscal adjustments: a summary of pros and cons
Austerity measures and resultant impacts Pros Cons
Short-term decline in GDP
Probable, but inevitable. Growth soon 
returns (1 or 2 years).
The private sector already saves heavily, as 
a result of which the fiscal multiplier is 
higher and the resultant sacrifice is greater.
Impact on yields on government securities
Only austerity measures can convince the 
markets. Credible tightening brings down 
yields to a sustainable level.
Markets only think short term and soon start 
panicking. The short-term growth impact 
may deteriorate how sustainability is 
perceived. Investments flow out of the 
countries experiencing protracted weakness.
Longer-term growth
No or no significant adverse impact. 
Reduction in debt and lower interest rates 
help long-term growth.
Unnecessarily permanent loss in output and 
capacity (capital and labour). If growth can 
be contained, then both debt burden and 
the amount of the debt start to reduce 
steadily.
Necessary, albeit unpopular, reforms
Market pressure may also help governments 
implement such structural reforms that they 
would not dare/want to but for the crisis 
(theory of ‘good crisis’).
Crises are not the best time for carry out 
reforms − as a rule, it is easier to 
compensate losers for their losses if the 
economy grows. Their short-term impact on 
GDP amplifies negative feedback.
Encouragement and EMU participation
The EMU functions well if all adopt a 
stability-oriented policy. This must be 
corroborated − otherwise lack of discipline 
re-emerges.
It is not lack of discipline that led to the 
current crisis. The scoreboard will prevent 
imbalances in the future.
Extinguishing fire is not the right time to 
find and preach to the 'culprits'. Fire must be 
extinguished first.
Balance sheet crisis/competitiveness
Improved competitiveness is one of the 
conditions for recovery from crises even if 
underlying reasons for the evolvement of the 
crisis were different, e.g. build-up of 
external debt and excessive domestic 
consumption.
Competitiveness is a must; however, wage 
competitiveness does not always help faster 
growth. This may emerge at each other’s 
expense within the EU. During balance sheet 
crises income must be stabilised because of 
tax burdens; internal depreciation may 
backfire.
12  De Grauwe (2011). For the avoidance of doubt, it should be added that this is not completely analogous with the case of foreign currencies. As regards 
distressed countries, the ECB could also act in the same way as did the respective central banks of the USA or the UK. This is a selected mode of 
operation, which can be changed. A number of proposals aim at just this.
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capital goods.13 IMF analysts14 claim that even structural 
reforms would be easier to implement if fiscal policies were 
supportive.
Various forms of debt relief (e.g. partial debt forgiveness 
and restructuring) entail greater sacrifices and solidarity. 
We have already seen an example of this kind when an 
agreement was reached with private creditors to cancel 
part of the Greek debt. This, however, can hardly be a 
solution in large countries with sizeable debts. The only 
way out for them is to render debt sustainable by restoring 
growth and to reduce debt servicing burdens by mitigating 
risk premia. The most recent recommendations that look to 
the ECB for reducing yields on government securities may 
help prevent the panic that emerges during the downturn in 
the first phase of consolidation and gain some time. That 
said, a viable solution should come in the form of further 
community measures.
SuMMARy
So far, crisis management has failed to restore the eroded 
confidence in the sustainability of the fiscal situation in 
some countries. There seems to be a consensus that 
consolidation in the current crisis situation is leading to a 
serious economic downturn at least over the short term, 
i.e. on a one- to three-year horizon. The underlying reason 
for this is that too many participants strive to make 
adjustments concurrently, the aggregate result of which is 
weak economic performance. The problem is that the 
countries that are the most in need of fiscal adjustment 
have the least room for reducing the costs of consolidation. 
Furthermore, wary of contagion and strongly risk averse, 
even the participants that, in theory, have room for 
manoeuvre opt for tightening. Some propose that in order 
to find a solution to the crisis, and for market stress to be 
eased, balance sheet adjustment should be facilitated 
through proper coordination, and such a solution would also 
benefit net lenders. This strategy also carries risk, however; 
therefore, countries in a stronger position show little 
willingness to adopt it. As long as markets see certain 
countries teetering on the verge of default, while others 
are true safe havens, capital flows will reinforce this chasm. 
Therefore, in order to resolve this situation, we need to 
stabilise market expectations permanently, dispel fears of 
the disintegration of the EMU and demonstrate growth 
potential.
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MACROeCONOMiC iMPliCAtiONS OF 
MiCRO-level HeteROgeNeity
Professor Christopher Carroll dedicated his keynote speech 
to illustrating and stressing the importance of agent 
heterogeneity in macroeconomic modelling. To motivate his 
talk, he started with recalling his experience of presenting 
the standard representative-agent based DSGE models to 
the members of the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC), who met them with significant scepticism. One of 
the policymakers’ biggest concern (which Professor Carroll 
fully shares) was the way these models approach uncertainly. 
This is quite understandable − policymakers face uncertainty 
about the potential impact of their decisions on the 
economy on a daily basis, and this has become especially 
important during the financial crisis. Uncertainty also often 
affects the behavior of consumers, firms, banks, financial 
markets and countries, which became especially apparent 
during the current sovereign debt crisis. At the same time, 
standard representative-agent based DSGE models treat 
uncertainty in a very rudimentary and unrealistic fashion. 
Uncertainty is introduced into these models as either a 
sudden universal decline in economy-wide technological 
efficiency, as an arbitrary change in the representative 
agent’s patience, or as a monetary policy shock which 
Professor Carroll referred to as ‘monetary-policy-makers 
gone wild’. In addition to the lack of realism, the magnitude 
of these shocks is too small. In the micro-level data, the 
variance of the household-specific shocks is many times 
bigger than the variance of the shocks used in these 
models. 
Professor Carroll believes that one of the big advantages of 
modelling agent heterogeneity explicitly is the availability 
of large micro level datasets which can be used to estimate 
and empirically test such models. This is in sharp contrast 
to the models with a representative agent which have to 
rely on aggregate-level data. As an example, Professor 
Carroll used the recent heated debate between Professor 
John Taylor (Stanford University) and Moody’s Analytics 
chief economist Mark Zandi (and, more broadly, between 
the supporters of the Republican and Democratic parties in 
Stepanchuk Serhiy1: 11th Annual 
Macroeconomic Policy Research Workshop at 
MNB: Microeconomic Behavior and its 
Macroeconomic implications During the 
Financial Crisis
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contributions by the keynote speakers and the papers presented at the workshop.
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the US in general) about the possible effects of the 
Republican proposal to cut government spending on the US 
economy. According to John Taylor, such cuts, by improving 
the fiscal situation in the US, would reduce private sector’s 
uncertainty about the possible future tax increases, and 
thus stimulate private spending and investment. Mark 
Zandi, on the other hand, does not think that these 
considerations play a big role for private sector agents, and 
predicts that the proposed spending cuts will have significant 
negative effect on aggregate demand, employment and 
output. Professor Carroll pointed out that, unfortunately, 
there is little hope of finding empirical support for either of 
the two views, since one would have to essentially rely on 
a single data point − the effect of the 2009 stimulus 
package on the US economy.
 Next, Professor Carroll turned to comparing the predictions 
of the representative agent based DSGE models and 
macroeconomic models that explicitly address consumer 
heterogeneity about the marginal propensity of consume 
(MPC). MPC is important both for the economists and for 
the policymakers for a number of reasons. First, it relates 
to consumers’ risk aversion, and hence influences their 
portfolio choice. This is of particular significance and 
interest during the financial and sovereign debt crises, 
when dwindling investors’ appetite for risk may contribute 
to a drop in asset prices and increased interest rates for 
risky sovereign debt. Second, MPC related to consumers’ 
labor supply decisions and intertemporal choices. Finally, it 
is of special interest for policymakers who try to decide on 
the effectiveness of the fiscal stimulus measures, since it 
determines how much of the additional income will be 
spent and how much of it will be saved. Empirical studies 
usually have found that MPC, measured as a change in 
consumption spending over a year in response to a surprise 
extra \$1 of income, lies somewhere between 0.2 and 0.7. 
However, a typical representative-agent based DSGE model 
which disregards wealth and preference heterogeneity, 
potential impact of borrowing constraints on less wealthy 
consumers, and confronts the representative agent with 
small aggregate-level income shocks usually implies that 
MPC is much smaller, between 0.02 and 0.05. 
The solutions proposed in the literature that try to change 
the predictions of the representative-agent based models 
are far from satisfactory. The one proposed by Campbell 
and Mankiw (1989), who suggested adding some arbitrary 
fraction of the so-called ‘hand-to-mouth’ consumers, and 
assumed that this fraction earns 50 per cent of the 
economy’s total income, has many drawbacks. It is rather 
ad hoc, and it fails to match the micro-level data, where 
only 10 per cent of households have zero wealth. In 
addition, it fails to address the potential effects of credit 
and uncertainty, as they are irrelevant for both groups of 
consumers in this model, while these questions are of 
particular interest to policymakers. Another proposed 
solution − adding habit formation to the representative 
agent’s utility, moves the model’s predictions in the wrong 
direction, since in this case, one obtains the MPC of less 
then 0.01. As a result, Professor Carroll argues that one 
should not try to rationalize the behavior of the economy-
wide aggregates with the choices made by a single agent. 
Instead, Professor Carroll proposes to use the models that 
treat agents’ heterogeneity explicitly, and follow the 
following approach:
•  calibrate income uncertainty using household-level data;
•  solve for optimal consumption behavior given preferences;
•  simulate to generate wealth distribution;
•  calibrate ex ante heterogeneity (in preferences, age, 
expected income growth, mortality risk) to match wealth 
distribution.
With the progress made recently in the development of 
numerical algorithms designed to solve such problems, and 
the rapid advancement of the computer hardware tools, 
this approach becomes increasingly feasible. Professor 
Carroll believes that this approach can deliver more 
plausible, understandable and informative answers for 
policymakers, and should eventually replace the 
‘representative agent’ paradigm in macroeconomics. 
DiFFeReNtiAl iMPACt OF tHe 
FiNANCiAl CRiSiS ON eCONOMiC 
AgeNtS: eMPiRiCAl eviDeNCe
There are important differences in the way the financial 
crisis has affected various economic agents. Professor 
Matthew Shapiro (University of Michigan) used his keynote 
speech to present his recent thought-provoking research in 
which he investigates the impact of the financial crisis on 
the well-being of older Americans. He finds large 
heterogeneity both in the impact of the financial crisis on 
this population group, and in their capacity to absorb it. In 
this research, Professor Shapiro relies on the data collected 
in the two waves of the Cognitive Economic Study (CogEcon), 
a survey conducted by the University of Michigan. This 
study provides baseline wealth measurements and very 
detailed information about the structure of households’ 
portfolios for a representative sample of US individuals 
aged 50 years and older, and in addition, has a wide range 
of preference and cognition measures, including measures 
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of risk preference, expectations, financial knowledge and 
attitudes, and cognitive status, that should partially 
determine households’ portfolio choices. The two waves of 
the CogEcon study provide a unique insight into the impact 
of the crisis on this group of Americans because of their 
timing. The first wave has been completed shortly before 
the financial crisis that began in the fall of 2008. The 
second wave was fielded in early summer of 2009. It 
re-measures some of the first wave’s variables, but also 
contains many questions that assess the changes in 
circumstances, attitudes and plans that followed from the 
financial crisis.
The financial crisis had a negative impact on the stock 
market, directly affecting the stockholders. Higher wealth 
households on average have greater exposure to the stock 
market, and consequently have experienced greater wealth 
losses during the crisis. Professor Shapiro finds a positive 
relationship between cognitive skills among the people in 
his sample and both their wealth and their exposure to the 
stock market. Hence, he finds that on average people with 
high cognitive skills experienced larger financial losses due 
to stock market decline during the financial crisis.
At the same time, he finds that those who displayed higher 
cognitive skills appeared to be better able to deal with the 
effect of the crisis. People with low cognitive skills were 
more likely to have experienced some form of financial 
stress − having late payments on a loan, being denied 
credit, losing a home or a property due to a bank foreclosure 
etc. To some extend, this can be accounted by the fact that 
those with low cognitive skills were more likely to have low 
wealth, and thus lacked a financial buffer.
Interestingly, financial crisis had a non-monotonic effect on 
the plans to postpone the retirement for people with 
different starting wealth. The mean increase in reported 
planned work years was 1.32. The response was greater for 
those with greater capital losses from the crises (typically, 
the people with larger starting wealth). However, those 
with no wealth showed as big a mean increase in years 
worked as those with substantial losses. 
There was a similar non-monotonic response in consumption. 
Professor Shapiro argues that consumption is likely to be a 
good measure of the overall well-being for this population 
group. They are typically no longer on the upward-sloping 
part of the life-cycle earnings profile, and should not be 
liquidity constrained. Thus, changes in consumption should 
closely track changes in lifetime resources. Overall, 
consumption in the CogEcon sample dropped by 3 per cent 
in response to the crisis. Those who lost more wealth report 
larger declines in consumption. However, those who have 
little wealth look more like those who had big losses than 
those who had more modest losses. The response of 
consumption to the crisis was fairly flat across the levels of 
cognition, which suggests that there might have been 
offsetting factors related to cognitive capacity − high 
exposure to the stock market among the high cognition 
group might have been offset by a greater capacity of high 
cognition individuals to buffer shocks.
Multivariate regression analysis shows that after controlling 
for financial losses which are positively correlated with 
having high cognition, high the cognition status appears to 
be a buffer against consumption declines during the crisis, 
and high cognition group does distinctly better in terms of 
the consumption response to the crisis compared to the 
middle and low cognition groups.
Several other papers presented at the workshop added 
further insights into different aspects of the financial crisis’ 
impact on different economic agents. Békés et al. (2011) 
use the data from the European Firms In a Global Economy 
(EFIGE) to document the impact of the crisis on firms in 7 
European countries − Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, Spain and the UK. They find that even though the 
crisis had a large negative effect on firms on average − it 
lead to a 12 per cent decline in sales, 11.6 per cent decline 
in export volume and 6 per cent of their workers were laid 
off, the firm response was quite diverse. In fact, more than 
a quarter of the surveyed firms experienced no decline in 
their sales. The response was similar across different 
industries, and across the firms of different sizes. Exporting 
firms appear to be affected more − an average exporter 
experienced a 3.2 percentage points larger decline in sales 
than an average non-exporter within the same country. 
Firms that outsource some part of their production and 
firms that control other companies did better during the 
crisis. Outsourcers witnessed a 1.8 per cent smaller 
reduction in sales. Firms that are controlled by other 
companies have reduced their sales by 4.2 per cent more 
than the average. On the other hand, firms that control 
other companies at home or abroad were able to preserve 
more jobs. They also find that firms relying on external 
finance suffered a greater decline in sales. However, this 
effect was quite modest − firm that rely on external finance 
suffered an additional 1 per cent reduction in sales 
compared to firms that rely more on internal funding. At 
the same time, they do not find any significant effect of the 
use of trade credit. 
Demyanyk et al. (2012) investigate whether the decrease in 
house prices in the US has lead to a lower labor mobility. 
This has become a popular hypothesis attempting to 
explain, at least partially, the rise in unemployment in The 
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US during the crisis, finding support both in academic 
articles and in the popular press (for example, in The 
Economist, August 28, 2010). In their analysis, the authors 
use an extensive dataset from one of the three major Credit 
Bureaus in the US, TransUnion, which contains a large 
number of credit characteristics for consumers who had at 
least one non-agency securitized mortgage at any point in 
time between April 2005 and December 2010. This dataset 
was merged with the mortgage loan-level LoanPerformance 
Securities database provided by CoreLogic. This allowed 
the authors to obtain both the individual and loan 
characteristics. They also tested the robustness of their 
findings using the data from another major Credit Bureau 
− Equifax. In this paper, the authors do not find evidence of 
negative home equity locking households into their local 
labor markets and preventing them from moving to regions 
with better job prospects. To the contrary, they find that 
individuals with negative equity are more likely to move, in 
particular if the amount of negative equity is large, 
exceeding 20 per cent of house values, and that potential 
costs associated with disposing of an underwater property 
are outweighed by the benefits of obtaining a job. 
Haltenhof et al. (2012) examine how firm and household 
access to credit has affected manufacturing employment in 
the US. Using a variety of micro and macroeconomic data, 
they conclude that access to credit has affected employment 
in the manufacturing sector mostly through changes in the 
average size of establishments, that household access to 
finance matters more than firm access to loans for 
employment dynamics, but that both credit channels (for 
firms and households) appear to have been economically 
significant in the Great Recession. 
Masier and Villanueva (2012) investigate the heterogenous 
consumption of homeowners to the changes in loan 
conditions in Spain. According to economic theory, 
consumption of unconstrained homeowners should respond 
to the interest rate, while consumption of credit constrained 
homeowners is influenced by the size and timing of 
payments (mortgage maturity). The authors find that the 
consumption of households headed by an individual with a 
high school education responds more to mortgate maturity 
than to the interest rate, while the consumption of the rest 
of indebted households is insensitive to loan maturity.
Benczúr et al. (2012) use the data from the Hungarian 
Household Budget Survey from 1998−2008 and estimate the 
response of labor supply to taxation and transfers at the 
extensive margin. This is particular relevant for Hungary, 
given that the recent (and possible future) fiscal reforms 
here are centered around labor market activity, and given 
a very low participation rate in Hungary. Unlike most of the 
literature, they provide a unified treatment of taxes and 
transfers. They find that some subgroups that are highly 
responsible for Hungary’s low participation rate (low-
skilled, women at child-bearing age, elders) are relatively 
highly responsible to tax and transfer changes.
Endrész et al. (2012) investigate the issue which is very 
relevant for Hungary − the problem of foreign currency (FX) 
borrowing and currency mismatch in the balance sheet of 
firms. The ratio of FX loans relative to export in Hungary is 
not very high compared to other countries have experienced 
balance sheet type financial turmoil (Argentina in 2000, 
Mexico in 1994, Thailand in 1996). However, using a firm-
level dataset, they find substantial heterogeneity among 
firms in Hungary. A significant share of firms with large FX 
debt has no natural hedge, i.e. no FX revenues from export. 
These firms exposed to currency mismatch had a sizeable 
share both in real aggregates and on the loan market before 
the crisis. Firms with currency mismatch tend to be larger 
and more indebted, which suggests that FX borrowing might 
have eased their liquidity constraint before the crisis. 
During the crisis balance sheet effects were likely to be 
triggered by the large depreciations. Firms with FX loans 
tended to have a larger decrease in the probability of 
making profit, a larger fall in investment, and were more 
likely to go bankrupt. 
Beckmann et al. (2012) cast more light on the problem of 
foreign currency borrowing in Eastern European countries. 
They study the household sector FX debt, investigating the 
determinants of household arrears in these countries. Their 
findings suggest that FX loans increase loan arrears in 
countries that experienced currency depreciations, 
however, this increase is relatively modest. In addition, 
they find that arrears for both foreign and domestic 
currency loans are substantially higher in countries that 
experienced currency depreciation compared to non-
depreciation countries, which suggests that, in addition to 
adverse balance sheet effects, currency depreciation have 
negatively affected loan repayments through other 
mechanisms, such as decreased households’ income. 
MODelliNg MiCROeCONOMiC 
BeHAviOR AND itS MACROeCONOMiC 
CONSequeNCeS
Several of the papers presented at the Workshop have 
explicitly modelled heterogeneous micro-level behavior of 
economic agents and investigated how it affects 
macroeconomic dynamics in different sectors of the 
economy, such as corporate finance, housing market or the 
banking sector. Motivated by the observed dynamics of the 
corporate finance structure in Europe during the last two 
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decades, and in particular during and after the financial 
crisis, De Fiore and Uhlig (2012) develop a model with 
heterogeneous firms that optimally choose between two 
sources of external finance − bank loads or debt securities. 
In their model, there is a continuum of ex ante heterogeneous 
firms who receive 3 types of productivity shocks. The first 
shock is public knowledge, and introduces ex ante 
heterogeneity. The second shock can only be revealed 
before the production at some cost. The last shock is known 
only to the enterpreneur after production, but can be 
monitored by an outsider at some cost as well. The firm 
needs to obtain a loan to pre-pay the factors of production. 
There are two types of financial intermediaries − banks that 
are willing to spend resources to acquire information about 
an unobserved productivity shock, and ‘capital mutual 
funds’ which intermediate bond finance and are unwilling to 
incure information-acruisition costs. Because information 
acquisition is costly, bond issuance is a cheaper but riskier 
instrument of external finance. In equilibrium, the firms 
that experience ex ante low productivity shocks and thus 
high risk of default choose to abstain from production and 
not raise external finance, which allows them to retain their 
net worth. Firms with relatively low risk of default choose 
to issue debt securities because this is the cheapest form of 
external finance. Firms with intermediate risk of default 
decide to approach banks, because they highly value the 
option of getting further information before deciding 
whether or not to produce. The authors consider the impact 
of three aggregate shocks that are designed to mimic the 
impact of the financial crisis: an increase in the ‘iceberg’ 
cost of obtaining bank financing, a decrease in capital 
quality and an increase in uncertainty. The results that they 
obtain can qualitatively replicate the changes in the 
composition of corporate debt which has been observed in 
the data during the crisis. In response to each of the 
aggregate shocks, their model produces a fall in the ratio of 
bank loans to debt securities, as a larger share of firms with 
high ex ante risk of default finds the cost of external 
finance too high and chooses not to produce. At the same 
time, a larger share of firms that experience intermediate 
realizations of the firm productivity shock find the flexibility 
provided by banks too costly and decide to issue bonds 
instead. This, in turn, increases the costs of both bond and 
bank finance. Bond finance becomes more costly as the 
quality of the pool of market-financed firms deteriorates. 
Similar effect obtains for the costs of bank finance, as the 
share of firms with low risk of default that move from bank 
finance to bond finance more than compensates the share 
of firms with high risk of default that move out of banking 
and decides not to produce. They can also quantitatively 
match the responses observed during the financial crisis 
when all three aggregate shocks are simultaneously 
introduced. Finally, they find that the firms’ ability to shift 
between the two sources of external finance can smooth 
the effect of the aggregate shocks on the aggregate 
investment and output. 
Forlati and Lambertini (2012) document the increase in 
‘exotic mortgages’ during the pre-crisis period (2004−2006) 
in the US. The distinguishing feature of these ‘exotic 
mortgages’ is low early amortization − the reduction in 
borrowers' initial monthly payments. They build a model 
with housing and endogenous default, and use it to evaluate 
how the introduction of such ‘exotic mortgages’ has 
impacted the housing market, and whether it could have 
exacerbated the effects of the mortgage default crisis. 
They model the crisis as the sudden increase in the variance 
of the idiosyncratic shock to the house value (which they 
call ‘mortgage risk shock’), relating it to the entrance of 
subprime borrowers in the mortgage market. They find that 
low early amortization increases housing demand, housing 
prices and the leverage ratio. At the same time, it amplifies 
the macroeconomic effects of the mortgage risk shock. This 
happens both through the steady-state effects − higher 
loans and housing stock lead to larger negative wealth 
effects following the shock, and through the dynamic 
effects, as borrowers stategically postpone default. As a 
result, there is lower default during the early periods of the 
mortgage life (when the consumer has to pay smaller 
payments and still enjoy the housing services), but much 
higher default in the later periods. There is also a negative 
second-round equilibrium effect, as both consumption and 
housing prices fall. 
Caggese and Perez (2012) develop a model with financial 
and labor market frictions, and analyze the aggregate 
implications of the precautionary behavior of firms and 
households. In their model, financial frictions generate 
costly bankrupcy risk for rims and limited insurance against 
unemployment risk for workers. Precautionary decisions of 
households and firms interact to significantly amplify the 
effect of financial factors on aggregate output and 
unemployment. 
Bluhm et al. (2011), motivated by the widespread concern 
about the increased systemic risk during and following the 
financial crisis, develop a dynamic network model with 
heterogeneous banks, whose links emerge endogenously 
from the interaction of their optimizing decisions and an 
iterative tatonnement process that determines market 
prices. They assume that banks hold liquid assets in the 
form of cash and deposits, and lend to each other in the 
interbank market to invest in non-liquid assets, such as 
bonds or collaterized debt obligations. At time zero, banks 
differ in their returns on non-liquid assets due to different 
information and administrative costs. This leads to 
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heterogeneous optimal portfolio allocation, and hence to 
demand and supply of bank borrowing and lending. The 
resulting banks’ links are given by the cross-lending and 
borrowing in the interbank market. The authors use their 
model to investigate the systemic risk. They model 
contagion as a result of the transmission of shocks to non-
liquid assets. Since banks are interlinked through the 
counterpart exposure in the interbank market, a defaulting 
bank transmits losses to creditor banks. At the same time, 
there is an indirect contagion through fire-sales − a 
negative shock in the value of non-liquid assets induces 
several banks to de-leverage, which produces a fall in the 
market price and a cascade of losses in marked-to-market 
balance sheet of all other banks. They also investigate the 
impact of prudential policies − an increase in the capital 
requirement ratio and a Pigouvian systematic risk tax. 
They find that the increase in the capital requirement 
makes financial system less interconnected and more 
homogenous. They also find that the Pigouvian tax is an 
adequate measure that reduces systemic risk, but its 
effect is non-monotone on all banks. They also find that 
there seems to be a trade-off between banks’ stability and 
banks’ investments in non-liquid assets, which they 
interpret as banks’ links with the real economy. Thus, their 
results indicate that higher stability may come at the cost 
of a lower provision of financial products and services to 
the real economy. 
CONCluSiONS
The event presented an excellent opportunity for 
researchers who work in various areas of macroeconomics 
to present their work which documents the importance of 
agent heterogeneity and microeconomic behavior during 
the financial crisis. The two keynote speeches and the 
papers presented at the workshop made a strong case for 
moving towards incorporating agent heterogeneity in the 
standard macroeconomic models, arguing that this can 
strongly enhance our understanding of the aggregate 
economy and devise better policy responses to the crisis. In 
addition, lively formal and informal discussions during the 
workshop have provided a lot of interesting ideas for future 
research.
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– Tell us about your involvement with practical macro issues, including central banking.
Fabio Canova: I was interested in theoretical and applied macro issues but always from a theoretical point of view. So 
I wanted to see in practice how policymaking works. About 10 years ago I got involved at the Bank of England as an 
advisor, building their macro model, and from then on I did a bunch of other consulting activity with other central banks 
(ECB, Banca d'Italia), a bunch of Latin American central banks (Columbia, Argentina, Brazil). Essentially, my interest was 
motivated by their desire to use dynamic macro models, as developed in academics, and to see how they are employed 
in practical situations. And in the process I discovered a few anomalies, primarily due to the fact that they used these 
models in a different way from academics. That also stimulated some of my own research, because I could see a 
mismatch between what was available and what were their interests, and I tried to fill in with new tools and new ideas.
Katalin Szilágyi: What is the main difference between practical and theoretical macro modeling?
F. C.: There has been a convergence of interest between academic and central bank economists and that convergence 
is both in terms of tools and in term of languages. So the models that academics and central bankers use these days, 
are common. Their language is the same: people talk in terms of preferences, constraints, optimization, which was not 
the usual language in the past. Although there has been a process of convergence,the way macro models have been 
built by academic economists is very different from the way central bankers employ them. When academic 
macroeconomists build a model, they don’t intend this model as being the true data generating process in the real 
world. A model, by definition, is a simplified representation of what reality is. And they try to derive implications, which 
allows them to understand better how the economy works. This is not the point of view of central bankers. Central 
bankers want a model to understand the economy, not a simplified representation of it. That is a very big mismatch. 
The way it is typically resolved, is that central bankers try to build more complicated models to add realistic features. 
The cost is making models much more complicated, larger and more complex to understand, and not necessarily better 
in terms of forecasting. Complexity generally makes it very difficult to understand the outcomes of these models. One 
of the beauty of academic economists’ models is that it is relatively easy to understand the mechanisms driving their 
dynamics. It much-much more difficult to understand them in the typical models available at central banks. With 
hundred equations, the interactions are most of the time which are very difficult to disentangle.
interview with Fabio Canova
(Katalin Szilágyi, istván Kónya)
Fabio Canova is currently a full-time professor at the European University Institute 
(Florence). He has taught in numerous universities around the world and given professional 
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Monetary Found (IMF). He is also program director of the Budapest School of Central Bank 
Studies. His research interests are in quantitative macroeconomics; monetary economics, 
time series econometrics and forecasting, international business cycles and growth 
policies. He has published over 70 articles in international journals and his graduate 
textbook, Methods for Applied Macroeconomic Research, was published in 2007 by 
Princeton University Press. He has been ranked in the Econometrics and Applied 
Econometrics Hall of Fame and in the Top 100 most productive economists.
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K. Sz.: So is it better to have a small model? Can you afford to have a small model in a central bank?
F. C.: Well, again, it’s a tradeoff. It’s a big tradeoff. In the past, in central banks, there’s been the idea that there should 
be one model. And this model should be built to explain every possible question that the management may ask. I think 
this is the wrong attitude, because we don’t know the right model. We may have sub-models, which are good to explain 
different aspects of the economy, but we are not able to integrate them yet in one framework. Given these difficulties, 
I think it is much better to have small-scale models, specifically designed to tackle certain problems, and a bunch of 
them, not only to answer different questions, but also to answer the same question. Because a model may not be the 
correct representation of reality, you may want to cover yourself against mistakes you can make. Generally my advice 
in this respect is to have a suite of models: these could include a bunch of general equilibrium models, a bunch of time 
series models, and a bunch of semi-structural models. The task of the policymaker is simply to combine the information 
they provide into one policy decision. The work of a policymaker is essentially trying to combine these many inputs into 
one possible output, which is the decision making.
K. Sz.: But we perhaps still need a core model to put this information together in a consistent way. Or can we avoid 
that?
F. C.: You can do it in two ways. One is informally: there are different groups, which use different models, and they 
provide their input to MPCs or members of the board. And the members of the board see different possible scenarios, 
outcomes, and they combine them themselves in an informal way. The alternative is to use formal methods, statistical 
decision-making theory to combine the information of the output of different models, and provide policymakers with 
one outcome. I guess which option is taken depends on the preference of the policymaker. There are policymakers, who 
prefer to see different outcomes from different models, and then combine them in their own way, and others, who 
prefer just to see one possible outcome. 
istván Kónya: Is there a sort of honest way of doing that? Or is it very subjective?
F. C.: Again, it depends on the preference of the policymaker. I can give you an example of the Federal Reserve Board 
at the time when Greenspan used to be there. He did not like models. He had the answer to most of the questions, 
except in a very small number of cases. In the latter case, he asked advise and when people presented scenarios, he 
picked the model which matched his prior, rather than combining their outputs. That’s a fine statistical criterion: you 
want the model to replicate some stylized facts, which you have in mind. And it is perfectly legitimate, under a 
particular loss function. If you tell me what is your loss function I can give you an optimal criterion. If you don’t give 
me a loss function, then I am not sure I can do a statistically optimal or credible way of combining different outputs. 
− Macroeconomics has been heavily criticized for not being able to predict the crisis. Do you think this criticism is 
justified? What do you think were the main problems with pre-crisis macro?
F. C.: Yes, true, we’ve been criticized a lot. But my usual answer here is: when there is an earthquake, do seismologists 
get criticized because they can’t predict earthquakes? Or when there is a volcano eruption, do volcanologists get 
criticized? It’s a rare event, typically we do not have many observations to predict, so the best you can do is to develop 
some early warning indicators. It’s true that people did not pay enough attention to early warning indicators in this 
case. There were some indicators, which kind of told you that we were not on the right track, but that did not 
necessarily mean that the probability that the crisis would occur was high − financial and banking indicators were poor 
also in other situations that did not lead to a crisis. In that sense, I think the criticism is wrong. So I think the lessons 
that people should learn from the crisis − I don’t know if we should call it current or past crisis, is that there should be 
a lot more monitoring. Not just macro variables or financial variables, but also monitoring of micro data, of balance 
sheets. And trying to assess if parameters essentially have gone out of the range that historically have been standard 
in the world economy. 
i. K.: People are very good at inventing new theories. So the stock market breaks through, I don’t know, 10,000 and we 
are in a new economy, justifying that. I guess that’s just human nature.
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F. C.: There is a tendency to behave like this. I mean, on the one hand, it was more than 50 years that no one saw a 
big crisis in the developed world − historical memory plays a role here. One of the things we like to assume in a lot of 
fields is what’s called ergodicity which means the memory just fades out; if something does not happen that often, then 
the probability essentially declines and we pay less and less attention to these things. It’s not a criticism; simply the 
probability that a crisis like this has occurred was very small a priori. Now that it occurred, it is easy to say ‘yeah, I 
could predict’ or with hindsight say, ‘yeah, if we had looked at these indicators, we could have predicted that’. Ex-post 
everybody can do that. I don’t see that as a very academic way of looking at problems. I don’t see the idea of creating 
theories ex-post it as a very practical way of proceeding. The general story is that many important actors failed to 
monitor the economy. Again, looking at microdata, is crucial, even if for macroeconomists it is something relatively 
new, looking more at heterogeneities, asymmetries. This I think, is the lesson to learn here.
− There are many efforts to improve on DSGE-type models including financial and other frictions. Do you think 
preserving the core RBC paradigm is the right way to go, or should we try something completely different?
F. C.: The question is: what’s the alternative? My favorite take here is that since there is no true model, the best you 
can do is having different models on the table, and trying to understand what are their structures, and their implications. 
I think the current models with this RBC paradigm, which I understand meaning rational expectations plus optimization, 
are obviously a useful benchmark to understand how far you are from this ideal world, and they are perfectly ok for 
academic purposes. Again, for central bankers they may not be what you want. There has been some development, for 
example, eliminating rational expectations, adding learning, in these models. Others have started using the idea of 
rational inattention: people pay attention only if the signal brings you to a completely different area; if it is a small 
signal you just don’t pay too much attention. So I think there are improvements, but they are going to complicate quite 
dramatically the setup. So my best take is: let’s have models in which we can do storytelling, like DSGE models. Let’s 
have models, which are good at fitting the data. Let’s have models, which are good at forecasting. Let’s try to see how 
different it is what they predict. And if they predict roughly the same thing, then that’s fine. If they have differences, 
then try to understand what the difference is, and either pick or combine the outcomes of different models.
i. K. Have you had any experience with agent-based models? They are sometimes advocated as alternatives, to building 
from the ground up, using simple heuristic rules but having kind of complex interactions of the agents, so basically 
abandoning rational expectations, even equilibrium.
F. C.: My impression is that these modes are not, mathematically, sufficiently developed. I mean heuristically they are 
fine, but they are not sufficiently developed to give you a precise answer to a question. If your governor wants to know, 
what do I do if the exchange rate is too high, do these models allow you to answer this type of question? I’m for the 
proliferation of models. I don’t think having one point of view only is the best way to approach economic questions. I 
think variety here gives you a much better understanding of issues. And variety also gives you a way of improving your 
models in a way or the other. You can take up different models and try to combine them in a hybrid setup, which has 
different features. But I have been trained with rational expectations, and I think it’s still very useful. RBC and rational 
expectations I think are very useful benchmarks to understand how the true economy differs from this ideal world.
− One of your main research areas is to try and reconcile the tight structure of DSGE models with the flexibility 
needed to match the data. Can you elaborate on this a bit?
F. C.: This is not easy. I think there is a tradeoff here: giving up some of the tight structure does not allow you to 
interpret your model as before. On the other hand, it may allow to do better in forecasting. So there is obviously a 
tradeoff here. I remember when I was at the Bank of England these two objectives were clearly specified in the model. 
There was a part of the model, which was used for interpretation, and a part of the model, which was used for 
forecasting. The structure was unique, but there were features which were turned off or on depending on the scope of 
the analysis. When the scope was simply interpretation, then the more flexible part was turned off in the model. When 
you were doing forecasting, both could be useful, both the structural part and the less structural part were used. I think 
depending on the objectives, it is not a bad idea to have a structure like this. Ideally, we would like to have a model, 
which does both. We are not there yet, so we have to compromise. Models like DSGE-VAR models, DSGE-factor models 
are essentially ways to combine different sources of information in a way that help you to catch two birds with one 
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stone. I am not sure if they’ve had a lot of applications in central banking yet. But there are at least some regional FEDs 
who are using these mixed frameworks. Obviously, it is very important to specify what’s your objective function, your 
loss function before you do anything like this. In principle, there could be even complete separation of the two, and 
choose, for example, a model for forecasting, just for forecasting, and I am going to build a model, which is optimal 
for that, and a model for interpretation purposes. I don’t see anything wrong with that. 
− What do you see happening in central bank modeling and forecasting after the crisis?
F. C.: Yes, I think there has been at least couple of changes I have noticed. First of all, there is much more attention 
to micro data. When I talk about micro data, it’s not simply banking data. For example, I am talking about differences 
in labor markets; I’m talking about how imbalances in one country feed into imbalances in other countries. I am talking 
about cross-country, cross-region, cross-market links. At the ECB, before the crisis, people were talking constantly 
about the Euro Area. Everything was the Euro Area. Now they are talking about how the economies of the Euro Area 
interact with each other, and how a shock generated in a particular region can be transmitted. The general idea here 
is simple: if a country sinks, the Euro Area will sink. It would be the Euro Area, not just some countries in the Euro 
Area. A few weeks ago someone told that the Euro area was like the Titanic: when it hit the iceberg not only that third-
class passengers went down, also first-class passengers did. If there is a disaster, there is a disaster for everybody. For 
this reason, there is much more attention to these interactions then in the past. And there is also much more awareness 
now of the possibility of extreme events. I don’t know if it’s an exact characterization, but my general impression is 
that before the crisis, the loss-function of policy makers was close to quadratic, they weighted up and down from the 
target more or less the same. Now there is a much more important penalty for getting it completely wrong. So the worst 
possible outcome now is becoming something that you want to try to avoid as much as possible. 
K. Sz.: Can I ask something about this micro data − you mentioned it already twice. What kinds of data are gaining 
importance? 
F. C.: Definitely there is much more monitoring of bank balance sheets, for example. But I’m thinking also of, for 
example, how regional economies behave, the finances of regional governments, rather than the overall balances of a 
country. How these impact, for example, on national deficits and what repercussions they may have. I’m thinking about 
how imbalances in labor markets in a particular region may spread out. The general awareness is that the world 
economy is not homogeneous and attention should be paid to that because heterogeneities may create imbalances 
which may turn out to change the outcome at the macro level or aggregate level. 
− It has been argued by Peter Howitt that the connection between central bank practice and academic macro 
research is much weaker than academic economists would like. What are your views on this, and how should 
interaction be improved?
F. C.: Well, I already implicitly answered to this. I wouldn’t be as negative as Peter on this. I think there has been a lot 
of convergence. If I look back at what people in central banks used to do 20 years ago, I think we are much closer now. 
Still there are differences, essentially in objective functions. For example, often because of the structure of central 
banks institutions, central bank economists just pick models build in academics, and use them for their own activities. 
That may not be the right way of proceeding, simply because the objectives are different. Again, the tradeoff between 
good empirical fitting and some macro storytelling, is not particularly interesting, nor particularly developed in 
academic economics. As long as you match some moments, that’s fine. An extreme characterization would be that 
central bankers are much more interested in tracking the time series, like engineers, meteorologists, or the military. 
You don’t care that much about the average; you want to hit the particular target. Academic macroeconomists happy 
as long as the average is right, how you get there is not particularly important. Or at least it’s not as important as (in 
central banking). Once I was in a central bank and I have asked them: you are inflation targeters, what is it that you 
dislike, level difference, or variation? They answered we never thought about it. But that is important. If you don’t like 
level differences, you may choose policy paths that are different than those you follow if you do not like variation 
around that. In general some of the tools developed for academic economists do not fit exactly the objective functions 
of central bankers. But again, we have made a big improvement relative to what it used to be 20 years ago, definitely. 
MNB BulletiN • OctOBer 2012 77
INTERVIEW WITH FABIO CANOVA
− Central bank forecasts try to balance numerical accuracy with meaningful storytelling, and expert opinion with 
macro modeling. How can this tradeoff be resolved in a meaningful way?
F. C.: I don’t think there is an easy way to get a solution here. The best way to proceed would be to approach the 
problem from a Bayesian viewpoint, recognize there is model uncertainty, parameter uncertainty, and stochastic 
uncertainty and try to design some kind of optimal decision rule, which takes this uncertainty into account. You don’t 
like the worst possible outcome, then build a loss function, which given the uncertainty you face, tries to minimize this 
worst possible outcome. There are lots of papers in macro, which try to find the optimal policy conditional on a 
particular model. But how do we know that this is the best model? Others find the optimal policy log-linearizing the 
decision rule, or taking a quadratic approximation of the decision rule. How do we know that this is enough? There are 
a lot of uncertainty, which are not taken into account, and probably the best answer here would be to try to robustify 
decisions; at least in the direction that you care most about. Given potential numerical difficulties, the question is, how 
much we want to push in that direction. If you are happy with some kind of approximation, I would work more on the 
side of parameter uncertainty and model uncertainty. I don’t know if here (in the Magyar Nemzeti Bank − the editor) it’s 
the same, but in central banks there has always been an attempt of separating expert opinion and macroeconomic 
modelers primarily because it is very difficult to make them talk the same language. But I think this is possible: there 
is a lot of information that these expert opinions have, which is not used in macro models. I’m thinking about consensus 
forecasts, specific information they have about micro-economy, and micro-markets that have no use in macro. People 
now are working on adding all this information to macro models. There is a very recent paper by Schorfheide and Del 
Negro,1 which is going to be in the Handbook of Economic Forecasting some time in the future, in which they are trying 
to use this information. And surprisingly enough, they show that if you add information in real time, your understanding 
of the financial crisis could have been dramatically improved. To be clear, the DSGE model is standard, but extra 
information, which was available and no one looked at the time when it was produced, is used. Here the information 
set you have may be more important than the model that you use. There is a lot of essential information in expert 
opinion, which is simply disregarded in more formal macro models. 
− Being an Italian who spent many years in Spain, and who is married to a Greek macroeconomist, you probably 
have strong views on the current Euro crisis. Any thoughts you could share with us on this topic?
F. C.: So now we have the final, the Mediterranean question. Yeah, I do have a strong opinion. I think the Euro crisis is 
the result of politicians, more than economic actors; politicians failing to understand exactly the consequences of their 
actions; failing to understand the dynamic implications of their choices; and essentially playing with fire. Any reasonable 
economists could have told you 20 years ago when the Maastricht treaty was signed that there was no easy way to get 
out of a crisis, given the setup that was designed − there was no exchange rate devaluation, or an easy way of 
readjusting the economy. The only available option was defaulting. Over the last 20 years, it was a very low probability 
event, but it happened and politicians simply disregarded the problem, thinking it will solve itself. I attended a talk by 
Charles Wyplosz in December, which was very-very informative, at least visually informative. He plotted the spread 
dynamics of the ten-year bonds against the German bund, against the meeting of the political leaders. And the day after 
every meeting they had done, the spread increased, every time. 
i. K.: Pre-crisis, as well as during the crisis?
F. C.: Since the situation of Greece was known. Every time they met and every time they agreed to have found a 
solution, the reaction was there. The day in which they announced, the spread fell, meaning the market thought they 
found a solution. As soon as the markets processed the details, and found them either unspecified, smoky, or not clear 
enough the spread rose. They created a rescue fund but it was not big enough to rescue anybody and measures like 
this. The reputation, built over the last 10 years of relatively good management, has been totally lost. My impression 
is that now politicians are really playing with fire, in the sense that − and I said that before − not only third-class 
passengers will sink, also first class passengers will sink. Poeple know that the problem is general, that you have to find 
a way to solve it, but they act as if it doesn’t concern them. I’ve seen recently an estimate that claims that if the Euro 
breaks, German GDP will fall by 10 per cent and the unemployment rate will increase by 4-5-percentage points. My 
1 del negro, MarCo and Frank SChorFheide (2012), “DSGE model-based forecasting”, Staff Reports, 554, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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solution is simple. First, clean up the mess and then make new rules, not the other way around. Politicians seem to 
think exactly in the opposite way. First, we make the rule, which will become operative by 2020 or 2025, and that will 
help us to drive the economy out of the mess today. The problem is that the mess is so big that unless something is 
done the economy will break. I just don’t see the right actions being taken. There are simple actions I think, which will 
calm down markets, make borrowing and the adjustment easier. In the current conditions, there is no chance for Greece 
or Spain to readjust − it will take forever. And the adjustment will have repercussions everywhere in Europe. So it is 
not just a problem of the Mediterranean, it is a problem of everybody. Politicians − probably because of electoral 
conditions − do seem not to understand. But, as I said, they are playing with fire. The amount of money, which is now 
circulating in financial markets, is enough to sink the European economy if they really want to do it. There is no way 
that the Spanish government will be able to afford 7 per cent real interest rates on their government bonds for more 
than a very-very short amount of time. 
K. Sz.: What should be done?
F. C.: My solution is radical. The ECB should use its capital to buy government bonds. Not all of it but, say, a large 
amount. Or − which would be the same essentially − slowly inflate away this amount. The second thing I would do is to 
create a central authority with some taxing power to be able to back this up. Unless you proceed this way, there is no 
way to convince the market that the policy is feasible. Once the situation is stabilized, then rewrite the rules. But these 
rules should be very-very simple, otherwise they are not going to be enforceable, as the Maastricht Treaty rules that 
have never been enforced. The idea to solve the problem with a balanced budget every period is wrong, I think, but 
balanced budget over, say 4-5 years, seems a reasonable target, you can adjust to. And if this is not enforced, there 
should be some measure, but not fines. The government should step down; it should be taken over by some kind of 
supernational authorities. I mean if there is someone irresponsible, and he is threatening your house, you want to take 
measures against them. I think there could be different ways of doing this, but you need some kind of clear and 
enforceable rules. Until you see politicians going to these Euro area meetings and saying, ‘yes we are going to balance 
the budget’, and then announcing the day after that the deficit will be 5 per cent of GDP in that year, what kind of 
credibility the institutions will have? What is missing right now is a realistic assessment of the situation, and an 
understanding on how to solve the short-run problem without endangering the long run sustainability of the economy. 
I think it is wrong to have default as the only way of rebalancing distorted economies. The situation is difficult, but 
there should be some other mechanism of adjustment, which is now not there in place.
K. Sz. and i. K.: Well, thank you!
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